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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“In any moment of decision the best thing you can do is 
the right thing, the next best thing is the wrong thing, and 
the worst thing you can do is nothing” 
Theodore Roosevelt 
 
 
 9 
 
To date, there is still oil on the sea surface of the Gulf of Mexico. In April 2010, a 
drilling rig off the coast of Louisiana exploded. Investigations showed that the main 
cause of this disaster was human error. Was it the rig worker who misinterpreted the 
sign on a fluid indicator? Was it the engineer who recommended the use of fewer 
materials than usual? Or was it the strict deadline for finishing the installment of the 
pipe? In reality, it was all of these factors combined. Seemingly small decisions were 
painfully biased and led to the second largest environmental disaster in the history of 
the United States. The worker who monitored the fluid signs processed the 
information selectively, as his work shift was almost to an end. The engineer advised 
to use less material to save costs, and the tight deadline caused people to skip extra 
checks.  
Of course, decision errors rarely lead to such huge disasters. However, consider 
the mayor of your city, who has to make important decisions concerning your city 
and your fellow citizens. Recently, a large number of so-called “Project X” parties 
have been organized by people via social media, both deliberately as well as 
unintentionally. During such a Project X event, a lot of people gather on the streets, 
usually bringing and consuming alcoholic beverages. These gatherings often get out 
of control and mayors of the involved cities get confronted with decisions concerning 
safety. Being in control of their own behavior and thinking is crucial to bringing such 
situations to a satisfactory conclusion. 
This dissertation investigates how being in control of one’s behavior fosters 
decision making. More specifically, the focus is on certain kinds of decisions. The 
above mentioned examples nicely illustrate a series of decisions where an 
overarching goal (e.g., safety) is a primary concern. The characteristics of these types 
of decisions diverge from that of decisions concerning someone’s love life, place to 
live, education or career. Whereas the latter often require time and relying on gut 
feeling, the decisions that are investigated in this dissertation concern a series of 
decisions where the overarching goal has to be kept in mind constantly. In other 
words, more urgency and focus is required in these types of decisions.  
In order to optimize the decision making process for these types of decisions, 
people must exert control over their behavior. This exerting of control over behavior 
is referred to as cognitive control and is in the service of goal-directed behavior. The 
latter evidently suggests that it is important to take into account goals when 
investigating decision making.  
In this introductory chapter, an overview is provided of the key concepts of this 
dissertation: decision making, cognitive control, and goals. In the final part of this 
1 
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chapter an outline is given of the empirical work that is the foundation of this 
dissertation.  
 
Decision Making 
Research on decision making has a long history and an abundance of theories have 
been proposed to explain human decision making behavior. Until back in the fifties, 
it was suggested that humans are perfectly rational beings, much like computers. For 
one to make the best decision, one had to be aware of the value of possible outcomes 
and simply calculate the chances of these outcomes in order to make the most 
optimal decision. However, it became rapidly apparent to researchers that people are 
not rational decision makers at all. Instead, people appear to make very unwise 
decisions regularly. Why do they engage in lotteries and gambles? Why do they 
avoid plane trips due to fear of an accident, choose unnecessary and costly insurance, 
or prefer chocolate cake over fruit salad?  
Deviations from normative models and rational decisions are well captured in 
descriptive theories that describe how people actually behave when making 
decisions (see e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Recently, Kahneman elaborately 
discussed two systems that operate when people make decisions: System 1 and 
System 2 (Kahneman, 2011). System 1 is related to automatic processes, operating 
quickly and with little effort or voluntary control, whereas System 2 is related to 
controlled processes and serves to perform effortful activities. System 2 is also 
involved in monitoring of behavior, regulation of emotions, and increasing effort 
when an error is foreseen (for other models concerning different modes of processing 
see e.g., Norman & Shallice, 1986 or Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Especially when a 
situation is new or difficult, System 2 is needed to provide extra control over the 
situation and to prevent people from falling prey to decision biases or other decision 
errors.  
Many factors can influence whether a person relies on System 1 or System 2 for 
making decisions. Contextual factors, such as time pressure, mood, workload, and 
social context are known to play a role in decision making. For example, a negative 
mood was found to facilitate rule-based decision making in a simple gambling game 
(de Vries, Holland, Corneille, Rondeel, & Witteman, 2012; Fiedler, 1988), whereas a 
positive mood was found to facilitate intuitive decision making (de Vries, Holland, & 
Witteman, 2008; Holland, de Vries, Hermsen, & van Knippenberg, 2012). Other 
research indicated that inducing a workload led to intuitive processing in moral 
11 
 
dilemmas (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom & Cohen, 2008) and impulsive 
behavior in health-related choices (Friese, Hofmann, & Wänke, 2008). 
Apart from contextual factors, individual differences play an important role in 
decision making. Appelt, Milch, Handgraaf, and Weber (2011) provided an overview 
of the different measures that are used in research on individual differences in 
decision making. They proposed seven categories of measures for individual 
differences in decision making: decision-making measures, risk-attitude measures, 
cognitive-ability measures, motivation measures, personality inventories, personality 
constructs, and miscellaneous measures. Some individual difference measures are 
not exclusive to only one of the seven categories. For example, information 
processing is related to both the category of motivation and the category of decision 
style (Appelt et al., 2011). Appelt et al.’s overview nicely illustrates the relevance of 
individual differences in decision making. For example, research from Stanovich and 
West (1998) showed that people with higher intelligence scores (a cognitive ability 
measure) were less vulnerable to the framing effect. The framing effect is a decision 
bias where people respond differently to a decision problem depending on how the 
decision problem is framed (Stanovich & West, 1998).  
Appelt et al. (2011) provided evidence for the role of individual differences in 
decision making. However, the role of individual differences in the capacity to 
process information in an effortful manner is not yet fully understood. The current 
dissertation therefore focuses on these individual differences in exerting control. 
Exerting control is often referred to as cognitive control and is a key process in 
regulating behavior. Cognitive control is of relevance to decision making research 
because it refers to the extent to which a person is capable to engage in effortful 
processing while making decisions. Moreover, cognitive control is in the service of 
goal-directed behavior and might therefore prove to be a reliable predictor of 
decisions in which focus on an overarching goal is crucial.  
 
Cognitive Control 
In most situations, for example when doing the dishes or cycling to work, relying on 
automatic processes is sufficient for adequate performance. However, in new and 
complex situations more control is required in order to perform adequately. Imagine 
trying to concentrate in a noisy workspace, which requires ignoring the surrounding 
noise and keeping constant focus on your work. Or imagine driving to work and 
encountering construction work on the road. In order to arrive at your destination 
you would have to plan a new route and keep track of whether you are still 
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approaching your final destination. Such new and complex situations require 
cognitive control.  
Cognitive control, also often referred to as executive functioning, comprises a set 
of cognitive processes and serves goal-directed behavior (e.g., Cohen, 2001; Posner & 
Snyder, 1975; Miller, 2000; Banich, 2009). A number of studies highlight the relevance 
of cognitive control for goal-directedness. For example, Nieuwenhuis, Broerse, 
Nielen, and de Jong (2004) suggested that decreased task performance on tasks 
requiring cognitive control is often the result of goal neglect: the inability to translate 
task requirements into a goal and keeping this goal active throughout the task. 
Furthermore, damage to the prefrontal cortex, a brain area closely related to 
cognitive control processes, leads to the inability of individuals to focus on a task 
(Duncan, Emslie, Williams, Johnson, & Freer, 1996). As Miller (2000) suggests, this 
may reflect the inability of patients with brain damage to keep goal-relevant 
information active in mind. Similarly, Paxton, Barch, Racine, and Braver (2008) 
suggest that decreased cognitive control in older adults may reflect a decreased 
ability to maintain goal-relevant information in mind. The above described examples 
indicate that cognitive control indeed serves goal-directed behavior. 
Older literature in the area of cognitive control often described cognitive control 
as the ability to overcome strongly activated response tendencies (see e.g., Posner & 
Snyder, 1975). However, the processes involved in cognitive control are actually 
more diverse (see e.g., Smith & Jonides, 2001). Miyake et al. (2000) explicitly 
addressed the unity and diversity of the different cognitive control processes and 
found that three components of cognitive control can be distinguished: “updating” 
(or monitoring), “switching” (or shifting), and “inhibition”. Updating refers to the 
ability to monitor and encode new information and replace old information. 
Switching refers to the ability to quickly switch between tasks, actions or mental 
states. Inhibition refers to the ability to inhibit dominant or automatic reactions when 
needed (Miyake et al., 2000). Each of these cognitive control components can be 
measured with different experimental tasks, see Box: Experimental Cognitive Control 
Tasks.  
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Experimental Cognitive Control Tasks 
A variety of experimental tasks can be used to measure cognitive control. Most of 
these tasks are derived from neuropsychological research. Some tasks, such as the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test or the Tower of Hanoi relate to more than one 
cognitive control component (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000). However, a number of 
experimental tasks can be listed that predominantly relate to only one of the 
cognitive control components.  
A widely used task for measuring updating is the n-Back task. In this task, people 
must constantly monitor stimuli that are presented one by one on a screen and 
indicate whether the stimulus they see is the same as on n trials back. In a 2-Back 
task for example, people must compare the current stimulus to a stimulus that was 
presented 2 trials ago, but also remember this current stimulus for comparison on 2 
trials later. This task requires continuous encoding and retrieval of information in 
working memory.  
In a typical switching task, participants have to respond to stimuli (e.g., numbers 
from 1 to 10), and use different rules (e.g., indicating whether the number is either 
odd/even or greater/smaller than five) for responding to these stimuli, depending 
on a specific feature (e.g., color). When a current trial requires the same rule as the 
previous trial, no switching is required. When the current trial requires a different 
rule than the previous trial, for example because the stimulus is presented in a 
different color, switching is needed. 
The Stroop test is often used to measure inhibition. In the Stroop test, people have to 
indicate the color of the ink in which a word is printed, while ignoring the meaning 
of the word. In some cases, the color of the ink is the same as the meaning of the 
word (for example the word blue printed in blue). In other cases, the color of the ink 
is different from the meaning of the word (for example the word blue printed in 
green). The latter induces a conflict and requires inhibition for correct responding. 
Different versions of the Stroop task are available, including a voice key version, a 
button press version and a mouse-click version.  
 
 
Cognitive Control in Decision Making 
The role of cognitive control in decision making has already been addressed by a 
number of studies. These studies show that high levels of cognitive control often lead 
to better decision making. For example, Hinson, Jameson, and Whitney (2003) 
investigated delay discounting in relation to cognitive control. Delay discounting 
refers to the idea that an immediate reward has more impact on task performance 
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than a reward that is delayed. Rationally, when choosing between a lower immediate 
reward and a higher delayed reward, the latter is the preferred option. Hinson et al. 
(2003) showed that a high memory load and higher scores on a measure of executive 
dysfunction were related to increased delay discounting. That is, in these cases, 
people were more likely to prefer an immediate lower reward over a higher delayed 
reward (see also Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). Other research suggested a role 
of cognitive control in moral dilemmas, where cognitive load interfered with rational 
decisions in moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2008) and in risk-taking behavior, where 
poor self-regulatory skills were related to increased risk taking (Magar, Philips, & 
Hosie, 2008). 
Del Missier, Mäntylä, and Bruine de Bruin (2012) explicitly addressed how the 
three different cognitive control components (i.e., updating, switching, and 
inhibition) were related to performance on a number of decision tasks. They found 
that both inhibition and updating were related to resistance to framing effects, better 
application of decision rules and enhanced cognitive reflection. The switching 
component was found to be related to risk perception. Although this research 
provided useful insight into the role of the different cognitive control components in 
different decision making aspects, it is not yet clear what underlying processes 
explain this role. This might be partly due to the large variety of the administered 
decision tasks in terms of features and attributes. For example, risk perception and 
framing effects probably constitute quite different decision problems, relying on 
different processes and abilities.  
Nevertheless, the above findings all suggest that cognitive control fosters decision 
making. At the same time, it is not yet clear what underlying processes explain the 
relation between cognitive control and decision making. We suggest a potential 
approach for unraveling the positive relation between cognitive control and decision 
making: taking into account the goals of the decision maker. We suggest that the 
quality of a decision depends on the goals of the decision maker. That is, a good 
decision is a decision in which the process and outcome are in line with the goal of 
the decision maker. Delaying a reward or avoiding risk may not necessarily be the 
best choice: the appropriateness of the choice largely depends on the goals of the 
decision maker. Hence, it is proposed that the goals of the decision maker should be 
taken into account when investigating the role of cognitive control in decision 
making. After all, cognitive control is in the service of goal-directed behavior. 
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Goal Pursuit 
Goals determine what people strive for in life, how they behave and how they act. 
When making decisions about what food to buy or what insurance to take, goals 
pertaining to health and money are likely to guide people’s decision making process. 
In other words, goals have a strong directive function for human action and decision 
making.  
Empirical evidence indicates that when people are given specific goals, they 
perform better in aspects concerning that specific goal as compared to aspects that do 
not relate to this goal. For example, when participants were given specific learning 
goals concerning finding information in a text (e.g., “What is the name of the scale 
used by oceanographers when recording the color of water?”), passages about these 
learning goals were learned better than passages that were not relevant to the goal 
(Rothkopf & Billington, 1979). In a similar vein, a study by Locke and Bryan (1969) 
showed that participants who were given the goal to increase performance on certain 
aspects of a driving test (e.g., using the brakes) indeed improved their performance 
on these aspects but not on others (e.g., elapsed time).  
Even when explicit instructions are not provided, goals can guide behavior. 
Experimental evidence shows that participants who are only subtly primed with a 
goal will behave according to this goal on a subsequent task. For example, 
Verplanken and Holland (2002) subtly primed participants with words related to 
protecting the environment. Participants who were implicitly primed with the 
environment made more environmentally friendly choices than participants who 
were not primed. Thus, both explicit and implicit goals can direct a person’s 
behavior.  
Although goals have a directive function, people do not always succeed in 
attaining their goals. Gollwitzer and Sheeran (2006) mention a number of reasons 
why people may fail to attain their goals: “failing to get started”, “getting derailed”, 
“not calling a halt”, and “overextending oneself”. Failing to get started refers to the 
idea that people do not initiate goal-directed behavior when they should. Getting 
derailed refers to the idea that people, once started with attaining their goal, are 
confronted with unwanted influences from which they have to shield their goals. Not 
calling a halt refers to striving for a goal, even though this is not productive anymore. 
Finally, overextending oneself is the idea that striving for one goal might cause 
depletion, which in turn leads to less success in striving for a subsequent goal. Thus, 
a number of things can go wrong in the process of goal-directed behavior.  
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Luckily, there are ways to overcome the above mentioned problems in goal 
attainment. For example, if people are given concrete instructions about how to 
perform goal-directed behavior, they are more likely to attain their goals. These 
concrete if-then rules about goal-directed behavior are termed implementation 
intentions and help to automatize adequate behavior, see Box: Concrete Plans for 
Goal-Directed Behavior. 
The problems that people may encounter when in the process of goal attainment 
suggest that goal-directed behavior might require effortful processing. Imagine for 
example an employee who has to finish a report by the end of the day. During the 
course of a workday, the average employee is being disturbed every 11 minutes, due 
to email, colleagues or phone calls. The employee will probably reply to these emails, 
friendly colleagues and incoming phone calls, although this doesn’t contribute to, or 
even conflicts with, finishing the report in time. In other words, the employee is not 
behaving in a goal-directed manner. Instead, he or she is reacting to incoming 
information from the environment. This example illustrates that keeping focus on a 
goal (in this case, finishing the report) is not that self-evident and requires effort and 
control.  
 
Concrete Plans for Goal-Directed Behavior  
Concrete plans for goal-directed behavior are referred to as implementation 
intentions and are concrete “if-then” rules that describe when and how goal-
directed behavior is to be performed. Implementation intentions were introduced by 
Gollwitzer (1993) and are a widely used and studied concept to aid goal-directed 
behavior. The crucial aspect of the success of an implementation intention is that a 
specific behavior is coupled to a specific situation, enhancing goal-directed 
behavior. Ultimately, the coupling of a specific behavior and a specific situation 
becomes automatized and less effortful processing is needed for performing goal-
directed behavior.  
For example, when one has the goal to adopt a healthy life-style, one could 
formulate the following implementation intention: “When I am in the supermarket, 
I will put a lot of fruit and vegetables in my basket”. Consequently, each time one 
arrives at a supermarket, the behavior of putting healthy products in the basket is 
activated and becomes a natural way of behaving.  
Ample research shows that implementation intentions prove to be successful in 
achieving goals. In a meta-analysis, Gollwitzer and Sheeran (2006) presented an 
overview of a large number of studies in which implementation intentions were 
indeed positively related to goal progress. 
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Cognitive Control in Goal-Directed Decision Making 
In the above sections it was described that cognitive control is beneficial for decision 
making. However, these findings do not provide insight into the underlying 
processes by which cognitive control is beneficial for decision making. For this 
reason, we propose an approach in which the goals of the decision maker should be 
taken into account. We suggested that a good decision is a decision in line with the 
goals of the decision maker.  
In the above sections it was also emphasized that cognitive control serves goals. 
That is, higher levels of cognitive control promote goal-directed behavior. 
Furthermore, the above sections underlined the directive function of goals in 
decision making. In line with these findings and ideas, it can be inferred that 
cognitive control might lead to good decision making because cognitive control helps 
to attain goals in the decision process. In this dissertation, we tested the idea that 
cognitive control leads to better decision making because it facilitates goal-
directedness in the decision process.  
Although previous research indicated that high levels of cognitive control lead to 
better decision making, it has yet to be shown that higher levels of cognitive control 
lead to better decisions because of better goal attainment. Goals and goal attainment 
obviously played a crucial role in prior research concerning cognitive control and 
decision making and some studies addressed the relevance of the goals of the 
decision maker. Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, and Schmitt (2008) for 
example found that individuals with high working memory capacity acted more in 
line with an explicit health goal to forego sweets than individuals with low working 
memory capacity. Although the goals of the decision maker clearly played a role 
here, goals were not explicitly manipulated.  
Furthermore, although previous research provided some insight into the role of 
the different cognitive control components in different aspects of decision making 
(e.g., Del Missier et al., 2012), a clear explanation for the observed relations is lacking. 
This lack of understanding the underlying processes might be due to the great 
variety of the investigated decision tasks. We claim that, in order to make progress in 
unraveling the relation between the different cognitive control components and 
decision making, one should clearly define the type of decision problem under 
investigation, instead of focusing on a wide variety of decision problems.  
A lot of research concerning controlled processing and decision making concerns 
consumer choices and health behavior. These studies primarily concern impulse 
control during a single decision (see e.g., Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999; Hofmann et al., 
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2008). This dissertation focuses on a different type of decision problem. More 
specifically, the focus is on decision problems in which a series of decisions has to be 
made that ultimately lead to an overarching goal. Thus, instead of investigating 
discrete decision problems requiring a single decision, we focused on a series of 
smaller short term decisions that lead to an overarching goal in the long run. These 
decision problems require continuous focus and attention. These types of decisions 
have not yet been investigated in relation to cognitive control. Furthermore, because 
such prolonged decision sequences may yield relatively rich process information, 
investigating them provides the opportunity to carefully investigate both decision 
strategies and outcomes. Finally, investigating decision problems in which a series of 
decisions has to be made has probably more practical relevance for managerial 
decisions than for life-style decisions in the health domain. 
For the purpose of testing the hypothesis that cognitive control facilitates goal 
pursuit in decision making, two decision tasks were designed. These decision tasks 
have a common thread, in that they both require a series of decisions that should be 
in line with an overarching goal. By making a number of sequential decisions, an 
eventual goal has to be attained. Imagine, for example, the mayor whose goal is the 
safety of the citizens. He or she has to make a number of decisions, concerning 
evacuations, police force or publicity about the situation. For all these decisions, the 
ultimate goal of guaranteeing safety is crucial.  
Furthermore, both decision tasks allow for inspection of decision strategies as 
well as decision outcomes. In most decision tasks, for example concerning decision 
biases such as the framing effect, no information can be obtained about the strategies 
that people use when making decisions. By administering a task where a series of 
decisions has to be made, the pattern of these decisions can be investigated. 
Consequently, these patterns provide useful insight into the decision strategies that 
people adopt. Finally, the developed decision tasks easily allow for manipulation of 
task goals. More details about the decision tasks can be found in Box: Beads and 
Projects.  
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
Beads and Projects 
In the Beads-in-a-Jar task, participants are presented with green and purple beads. 
These green and purple beads are drawn from one of two jars. Each jar represents a 
different ratio of green and purple beads. Based on the colors of the beads that are 
drawn, participants have to decide from which of the two jars the beads have been 
drawn. Participants can request new beads that provide additional information 
about the ratios in the jars, or make a decision concerning the jars. The task involves 
a number of rounds. In each of these rounds, a decision has to be made concerning 
the two jars. The task ends when the maximum number of rounds is completed or a 
maximum number of minutes has passed. Task goals can be manipulated by 
instructing participants to either play the Beads-in-a-Jar task with an accuracy goal 
or an efficiency goal in mind. Accuracy is reflected by requesting a large number of 
beads and thereby avoiding mistakes. Efficiency is reflected by requesting few 
beads, thereby allowing for more rounds and thus more correct decisions.  
In the Project Strategy Game, participants are presented with four stacks of projects. 
With each project, points for money and environment can be earned or lost. Each 
stack consists of projects with different expected values for money and environment, 
which have to be discovered by the participant during the game. Participants’ goal 
is to earn as many points as possible for either money or the environment without 
going bankrupt. Bankruptcy occurs when the number of points drops below zero for 
either money or environment after a round. The task involves five rounds of eleven 
project-decisions each. Choosing from the stacks of projects in a certain ratio leads to 
an optimal strategy for attaining the goal.  
 
 
To summarize, the aim of this dissertation is to explore how cognitive control and 
decision making are related by testing the idea that cognitive control facilitates goal 
pursuit in decision making. Individuals with high levels of cognitive control are 
expected to use strategies in line with the task goals, leading to improved decision 
making. We tested this hypothesis in a specific type of decision problem, involving a 
series of repeated decisions that have to be in line with an overarching goal.  
In addition to this general hypothesis, this dissertation explores which of the 
cognitive control components is especially related to decision strategies and 
outcomes in line with a goal in decision problems involving a series of decisions. 
Cognitive control comprises three key processes that each has unique characteristics. 
Previous research indeed indicated different roles of updating, switching, and 
inhibition for decision making (see Del Missier et al., 2010; Del Missier et al., 2012). 
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By investigating the relation between the three cognitive control components and 
goal pursuit in decision tasks that require a series of decisions, we aim to provide 
further insight into the relation between cognitive control and decision making. We 
do not have specific hypotheses about which component has the strongest relation 
with goal pursuit in the administered decision tasks. If we indeed find support for 
the general hypothesis that cognitive control fosters decision making by means of 
goal pursuit, an important question arises: “How does cognitive control lead to 
decision strategies and outcomes in line with a goal?” For this reason, we explore 
two possibilities. First, individuals with higher levels of cognitive control might be 
better able to attain goals in decision making as they are better able to translate goals 
into effective plans (or implementation intentions). Second, individuals with high 
levels of cognitive control might be better able to adhere to goals and concrete plans, 
leading to better decision making.  
Finally, we aim to better understand the relation between cognitive control and 
goal pursuit by investigating resource allocation. More specifically, this dissertation 
investigates when people exactly allocate effort while in the process of exerting 
control during the cognitive control tasks tapping into updating, switching, and 
inhibition. For this purpose, pupil dynamics was used; see Box: Pupil Dynamics of 
Cognitive Control. 
 
 
Pupil Dynamics of Cognitive Control 
Changes in the size of the pupil are a consequence of the relative contraction of two 
sets of muscles: the sphincter and dilator pupillae. Most changes in pupil size are 
due to changes in light and accommodation reflexes. However, many studies 
indicate that very small, visually undetectable, changes in the diameter of the pupil 
exist that do not seem to have a specific purpose. These small changes are usually 
less than 0.5 mm and reflect brain activation and cognition. These changes originate 
in the sympathetic and parasympathetic part of the nervous system and influence 
the two sets of muscles in different ways, leading to dilation or constriction of the 
pupil.    
The task-evoked pupillary responses that correlate with cognitive activity are now 
widely accepted and used as a psychophysiological reporter variable (Beatty & 
Lucero-Wagoner, 2000), and pupillometry is now widely used in a great variety of 
research areas. In this dissertation, pupil dynamics is used as a reporter variable for 
resource allocation in experimental tasks measuring cognitive control.  
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From Theory to Practice 
High levels of cognitive control might especially benefit decision makers who are 
confronted with new and complex decisions. Imagine the worker at the drilling rig 
who faced an unusual situation. Even when a situation is not critical, the decision 
process should be goal-directed and lead to desirable outcomes. For this reason, it is 
of relevance to replicate the findings from this dissertation with a group of decision 
makers for whom these findings are most applicable: decision makers in the field. 
These decision makers are likely to have more decision making experience, 
considering the high number of important decisions made on a daily basis. It might 
be the case that the decision process of decision makers in the field, such as mayors, 
is actually less dependent on cognitive control functions. Therefore, in addition to 
studies conducted with university students, this dissertation reports a study in which 
a group of Dutch mayors participated.  
 
Outline of this Dissertation 
The aim of this dissertation is to show how cognitive control often leads to better 
decision making. A number of chapters test and further explore the hypothesis that 
high cognitive control is related to better decision making because cognitive control 
facilitates goal pursuit in decision making. In all chapters we administered a decision 
task that involved a series of decisions. 
Chapter 2 aims at showing that individual differences in cognitive control are 
related to the use of decision strategies and outcomes in line with a goal. It was 
found that only the cognitive control component updating is involved in strategies 
and outcomes in line with the goal of either accuracy or efficiency. Subsequent 
chapters therefore especially (but not exclusively) focus on this cognitive control 
component in relation to goal-directed decision making. 
In Chapter 3, a possible underlying mechanism of the relation between cognitive 
control, specifically updating ability, and goal-directed decision making is explored: 
the formation of, and adherence to concrete goal-related plans (or implementation 
intentions). A study is described in which people perform a decision task with the 
instruction to form a plan, the instruction to stick to a plan or no extra instruction.  
Chapter 4 aims at replicating the finding that updating ability leads to enhanced 
goal-directed decision making with a different decision task involving repeated 
decisions and a different set of goals. Furthermore, Chapter 4 aims at providing a 
stronger claim for the role of updating ability in goal-directed decision making. 
Although the findings from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 provide useful insight 
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From Theory to Practice 
High levels of cognitive control might especially benefit decision makers who are 
confronted with new and complex decisions. Imagine the worker at the drilling rig 
who faced an unusual situation. Even when a situation is not critical, the decision 
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of relevance to replicate the findings from this dissertation with a group of decision 
makers for whom these findings are most applicable: decision makers in the field. 
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considering the high number of important decisions made on a daily basis. It might 
be the case that the decision process of decision makers in the field, such as mayors, 
is actually less dependent on cognitive control functions. Therefore, in addition to 
studies conducted with university students, this dissertation reports a study in which 
a group of Dutch mayors participated.  
 
Outline of this Dissertation 
The aim of this dissertation is to show how cognitive control often leads to better 
decision making. A number of chapters test and further explore the hypothesis that 
high cognitive control is related to better decision making because cognitive control 
facilitates goal pursuit in decision making. In all chapters we administered a decision 
task that involved a series of decisions. 
Chapter 2 aims at showing that individual differences in cognitive control are 
related to the use of decision strategies and outcomes in line with a goal. It was 
found that only the cognitive control component updating is involved in strategies 
and outcomes in line with the goal of either accuracy or efficiency. Subsequent 
chapters therefore especially (but not exclusively) focus on this cognitive control 
component in relation to goal-directed decision making. 
In Chapter 3, a possible underlying mechanism of the relation between cognitive 
control, specifically updating ability, and goal-directed decision making is explored: 
the formation of, and adherence to concrete goal-related plans (or implementation 
intentions). A study is described in which people perform a decision task with the 
instruction to form a plan, the instruction to stick to a plan or no extra instruction.  
Chapter 4 aims at replicating the finding that updating ability leads to enhanced 
goal-directed decision making with a different decision task involving repeated 
decisions and a different set of goals. Furthermore, Chapter 4 aims at providing a 
stronger claim for the role of updating ability in goal-directed decision making. 
Although the findings from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 provide useful insight 
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concerning the link between updating ability and goal-directed decision making, the 
results merely rely on correlational findings. Therefore, updating ability was 
manipulated in the administered decision task in Chapter 4 by adding a memory 
load. Furthermore, to improve the ecological validity of the results, a study is 
described in which a group of Dutch mayors participated. Finally, we further 
investigated the unique predictive value of updating ability for goal-directed 
decision making by exploring the role of fluid intelligence.  
To gain more insight into the findings from Chapter 2 through Chapter 4, it was 
investigated when people exactly allocate resources while in the process of updating. 
For this purpose, a pupil dynamics study was conducted that is described in Chapter 
5.  
For each study in this dissertation we report all data exclusions and all 
manipulations. When appropriate, we added a footnote stating what variables were 
measured in addition to the variables described in the method section.  
Table 1 provides an overview of the empirical chapters and their key elements1. 
The results of the empirical chapters in this dissertation will be discussed in Chapter 
6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The studies of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, as well as Study 4.1 and Study 4.2 of Chapter 4, are included in an 
article that will be submitted for publication. A modified version of Chapter 5 will be submitted for publication 
as a separate article. 
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Table 1. 
Chapter Decision task Task Goals Key element 
2 Beads-in-Jar task 
Accuracy 
Efficiency 
Manipulating goals 
3 Beads-in-Jar task 
Accuracy 
Efficiency 
Plan quality 
Manipulating plan instruction 
4 Project Strategy Game 
Money 
Environment 
Manipulating updating ability 
Exploring role of fluid 
intelligence 
Enhancing ecological validity 
5   
Measuring resource allocation 
by means of pupil dilation 
Overview of the key elements in this dissertation.  
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Chapter 2 
 
How Cognitive Control  
is Related to Decision Making 
as a Function of Task Goals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“A decision is an action you must take  
when you have information so incomplete  
that the answer does not suggest itself.” 
Arthur Radford 
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Abstract 
In this chapter, we tested the hypothesis that cognitive control facilitates goal pursuit 
in decision making. In two studies we investigated the relation between individual 
differences in the three cognitive control components (i.e., updating, switching, and 
inhibition) and decision strategies and outcomes in a “Beads-in-a-Jar” task. In this 
task, participants have to decide from which of two jars a sequence of colored beads 
is drawn. In each round, beads are drawn from a jar with 60 purple and 40 green 
beads, or a jar with 40 purple and 60 green beads. In a fixed time period, participants 
played several rounds of the Beads-in-a-Jar task, in which they could request 
additional beads until ready to decide. Participants performed the task with either an 
accuracy or an efficiency goal in mind. In Study 2.1 we induced the goal to be 
efficient and found that higher levels of cognitive control were related to requesting 
fewer beads and making more correct decisions. More specifically, only the cognitive 
control component updating was involved in the effects. In Study 2.2 we 
manipulated task goal (accuracy versus efficiency) between participants. Both studies 
show that updating ability, but not inhibition or switching ability, is related to 
strategies and outcomes in line with a task goal, explaining how cognitive control 
might be related to enhanced decision making.    
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Decision making often involves complex information processing such as exploring 
alternatives, weighing options and searching for additional information before 
selecting a course of action. Considering the complexity of these processes, decision 
making often requires a high degree of cognitive control (Tranel, Anderson, & 
Benton, 1994).  
Cognitive control refers to the ability to produce goal-oriented behavior (e.g., 
Cohen, 2001; Posner & Snyder, 1975) and comprises a variety of processes. Three 
processes have been postulated in the literature as the most important cognitive 
control functions, namely updating (or monitoring), switching (or shifting), and 
inhibition (see Miyake et al., 2000). Updating or monitoring involves the ability to 
monitor and encode new information and replace old irrelevant information. 
Switching or shifting refers to the ability to switch between different tasks, actions or 
mental states. Inhibition refers to the ability to inhibit dominant or automatic 
reactions when needed (Miyake et al., 2000).  
 
Cognitive Control and Decision Making 
A number of studies reveal a positive relation between cognitive control and decision 
making. Del Missier, Mäntylä, and Bruine de Bruin (2010) for example showed that 
cognitive control enhances successful application of decision rules. Other research 
showed that cognitive control is related to rational decisions in moral dilemmas 
(Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008), less susceptibility to 
decision biases (Stanovich & West, 1998; Del Missier, Mäntylä, & Bruine de Bruin, 
2012), less risk-taking behavior (Magar, Phillips, & Hosie, 2008), and to choosing a 
higher delayed reward as compared to a lower immediate reward (Hinson, Jameson, 
& Whitney, 2003; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). Yet other research studied the 
specific brain regions associated with cognitive control, such as the bilateral 
prefrontal cortex and the medial frontal cortex, in relation to decision performance 
(e.g., Yarkoni et al., 2005; Clark, Cools, & Robbins, 2004; Satterthwaite et al., 2007).  
Above mentioned studies suggest that increased cognitive control leads to “better” 
decision making. But what makes a decision a good decision? In the context of 
investigating cognitive control and decision making, we argue that a good decision is 
a decision in line with the goals of the decision maker. To better understand when 
and how cognitive control influences decision making, it is therefore of crucial 
importance to take the goals of the decision maker into account.  
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Goal Pursuit in Decision Making 
Goals are mental representations of behaviors that are desirable to engage in (Carver 
& Scheier, 1998; Custers & Aarts, 2010). Goals can be derived from internal sources of 
motivation (e.g., long term life goals) or from external sources of motivation (e.g., 
assignments of goals by others).  Several studies emphasize the relevance of goals in 
task performance and decision making. Locke and Bryan (1969) for example showed 
that explicit priming of a goal led to better task performance in terms of this goal. In 
their experiment, participants drove a car on a prescribed route while their 
performance was being measured on five different aspects, including trip time and 
using the brakes. When participants were either told to decrease or increase 
performance on one of these aspects, performance indeed decreased or increased 
accordingly. More recent studies focused on the directing function of goals on 
decision making performance, including goals related to cooperation (Bargh, 
Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trotschel, 2001), preserving the environment 
(Verplanken & Holland, 2002), promotion and prevention (Förster, Higgins, & 
Bianco, 2003; Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998), effort and accuracy (Creyer, 
Bettman, & Payne, 1990), and gain-maximizing versus loss-minimizing (Karlsson, 
Juliusson, Grankvist, & Gärling, 2002). 
The finding that goals have a directing function on decision making and that 
cognitive control is in the service of goal-directed behavior (e.g., Cohen, 2001, Banich, 
2009; Nieuwenhuis, Broerse, Nielen, & de Jong, 2004; Miller, 2000; Paxton, Barch, 
Racine, & Braver, 2008) suggests that decision makers benefit from high levels of 
cognitive control. The finding that high cognitive control often leads to better 
decision making could thus be explained by the idea that goals are better served 
when cognitive control is high. Although goals played a prominent role in literature 
on cognitive control and decision making, the idea that cognitive control leads to 
better decisions because of better goal attainment has yet to be investigated. To our 
best knowledge, none of the conducted studies on cognitive control and decision 
making directly manipulated the goals of the decision maker. Some research does 
address the relevance of the goals of the decision maker, such as research from 
Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, and Schmitt (2008). They found that 
individuals with high (as compared to low) working memory capacity acted less on 
impulse and more in line with an explicit health goal. Yet, although the goals of the 
decision maker obviously played a role here, goals were not manipulated.  
Furthermore, these kinds of studies typically involve impulse control during a 
single decision. The types of decisions that we focus on in the present research are of 
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a different kind. More specifically, the types of decisions that we focus on involve a 
series of repeated decisions that have to be made in order to attain an overarching 
goal. These types of decisions have not yet been investigated in previous research on 
cognitive control and decision making. These decision tasks allow for careful 
inspection of decision strategies and outcomes and have practical relevance for 
complex managerial decisions. 
Finally, in contrast to the research from Hofmann et al. (2008), we focus on 
individual differences in updating, switching, and inhibition, and not on other 
general cognitive abilities, such as working memory capacity (see e.g., Jaeggi, 
Buschkuehl, Perrig, & Meier, 2010). 
 
The Present Research 
The goal of the current research is to investigate whether cognitive control is related 
to enhanced decision making due to better goal attainment and to explore which of 
the cognitive control components (updating, switching, and inhibition) are involved 
in this effect. For this purpose, two studies were performed. A decision task was 
developed involving a series of decisions: the “Beads-in-a-Jar” task (adapted from 
Garety, Hemsley, and Wessely, 1991). This decision task can be played with different 
goals in mind. In the task, participants are told that they will be shown beads that are 
drawn from one of two jars. Both jars are filled with colored beads. One jar has a 
ratio of 60 green versus 40 purple beads; the other jar has a ratio of 60 purple versus 
40 green beads, see Figure 1 for a screenshot. Participants are then presented with 
beads drawn from one of the two jars. Participants have to decide from which jar 
they think the beads have been drawn. After having been shown one bead (either 
green or purple) participants are asked whether they want to see another bead (up to 
a maximum of 20 beads), or whether they want to make a decision concerning which 
jar the beads are being drawn from, see Figure 2 for a screenshot.  
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Figure 1. 
 
Screenshot of the two jars that are filled with purple (dark grey) and green (light grey) beads. 
One jar is filled with 60 green and 40 purple beads, one jar is filled with 60 purple and 40 
green beads. 
 
Figure 2. 
 
Screenshot of the Beads-in-a-Jar task. After requesting a bead, participants can either choose 
to request more beads or make a decision. Dark grey beads represent purple beads; light 
grey beads represent green beads.   
Click here to request more beads
Click here to make a decision
PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED BEADS
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The adjusted Beads-in-a-Jar task is played for a maximum number of rounds 
within a fixed amount of time. The number of requested beads per round, the 
number of correct decisions, and the number of incorrect decisions are recorded. 
Importantly, the Beads-in-a-Jar task can be played with different goals in mind, 
such as the goal to be accurate or the goal to be efficient. As a function of these 
different goals, the task can be approached with different strategies, ultimately 
leading to different outcomes. When the task goal is to be accurate, one can adopt a 
safe strategy by requesting a relatively large number of beads before making a 
decision. This way, incorrect decisions can be prevented. When the task goal is to be 
efficient, one can adopt an efficient strategy by requesting relatively few beads 
enabling one to play more rounds and thereby fostering the likelihood of making 
correct decisions.  
In the present experiments, participants played the Beads-in-a-Jar task with either 
an accuracy or an efficiency goal in mind. Beforehand, we measured individual 
differences in cognitive control. We expected that participants would be more likely 
to adopt strategies serving the instructed task goal when levels of cognitive control 
are high. In addition, we predicted decision outcomes to be more consistent with the 
task goal when levels of cognitive control are high. 
In Study 2.1, we measured individual differences in the three cognitive control 
components: updating, switching, and inhibition. This way, we could explore what 
specific components of cognitive control are involved in the influence of task goals 
on decision strategies and outcomes.  In Study 2.1 we induced the task goal of 
efficiency in the Beads-in-a-Jar task. We expected higher levels of cognitive control to 
be related to requesting fewer beads and making more correct decisions. In Study 2.2 
we used a between-participants manipulation of the task goal (accuracy versus 
efficiency).  
 
Study 2.1  
In Study 2.1 we investigated which component of cognitive control (updating, 
switching, or inhibition) is involved in goal attainment in decision making. For this 
purpose, we used three different cognitive control tasks.  
We induced the task goal of efficiency in the Beads-in-a-Jar task and hypothesized 
that individuals with high levels of cognitive control would adopt a strategy in 
which few beads per round would be requested. Consequently, higher levels of 
cognitive control should result in more correct decisions in the Beads-in-a-Jar task, 
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due to the fact that requesting fewer beads enables participants to make more 
(correct) decisions.  
Method 
Participants and design. In total, 127 students of Radboud University Nijmegen 
(103 females) participated in the study in exchange for money (5 euros) or course 
credits1. Ages ranged from 17 to 33, M = 21.8, SD = 3.2.  
Materials2. Cognitive control tasks. Switching task. To measure switching, we 
used a variation of the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST, see de Houwer, 2003). 
In this variation of the original task, a word with emotional valence was presented on 
the screen for 1000 ms in one of three colors (blue, green, or white). Participants were 
instructed to press a designated key on the left of the keyboard (“A”) when the word 
was presented in white and had a positive valence, whereas they had to press a 
designated key on the right of the keyboard (“6”) if the word was presented in white 
and had a negative valence. If the word was presented in blue or green, participants 
had to ignore the content of the word and respond to the color of the word. When 
participants responded outside of the time window (i.e., 1000 ms) or responded 
incorrectly, an error message was presented and the trial was coded as incorrect. 
Each word was preceded by a 100 ms fixation cross. Inter trial interval was set at 
1000 ms. If the current trial required responding to the color of the word and the 
previous trial required responding to the valence of the word or vice versa, the 
current trial was labeled as a switch trial. If the current trial required the same 
response rule as the previous trial, the current trial was labeled as a non-switch trial. 
Participants first performed 20 practice trials for each of the two sorting rules (color 
or valence). After the practice trials, participants performed three blocks of 30 
experimental trials. The difference in reaction times (only for correct responses) and 
errors on the switch trials versus the non-switch trials served as indicators of 
switching performance.  
Updating task. To measure updating, we used a 2-Back task (Jonides et al., 1997). 
In this task, participants were shown letters on the screen, presented consecutively. 
Each letter was presented for 1500 ms. For each letter, participants had to indicate 
                                                 
1 The original sample consisted of 129 participants. Two participants were older than 50 and were removed from 
the sample because of their deviating age. Including these participants in the analyses does not yield different 
results than reported. 
2 We also administered the Wisconsin Card Sorting task (after the Stroop task) and measured Action-State 
Orientation (after the 2-Back task). Furthermore, each time a decision was made in the Beads-in-a-Jar task, 
participants were asked about their confidence of this decision. Because these measures are beyond the scope of 
this dissertation and do not explain the reported effects, we chose to refrain from reporting them. 
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whether the letter on the screen was the same as the letter that was presented two 
trials before. Participants had to indicate, by pressing a designated key on the left 
(“A”) or right (“6”) of the keyboard, whether the letter did or did not match, 
respectively. When participants did not respond within the time window (i.e., 1500 
ms) the trial was coded as incorrect. Inter trial interval was set at 1500 ms. 
Participants performed 10 practice trials and 45 experimental trials. Feedback was 
only provided in the practice trials. Reaction times on the correct trials and the 
number of errors served as indicators of updating performance.  
Inhibition task. To measure inhibition, we used a mouse-click version of the Stroop 
task (Linnman, Carlbring, Ahman, Andersson, & Andersson, 2006). In this version of 
the Stroop task, words were displayed on the middle of the screen one by one. The 
words were displayed in one of four colors (green, yellow, blue, or red). At the 
bottom of the screen, the four color words were displayed in black ink. Participants 
were instructed to click (with the mouse) on the color word displayed at the bottom 
of the screen matching the color of the ink of the word displayed on the middle of the 
screen. There was no response window. Inter trial interval was set at 200 ms. 
Feedback was provided on the practice trials but not on the experimental trials. The 
task included 12 trials with neutral words (filler trials), 12 incongruent trials and 12 
congruent trials. Participants received 12 practice trials and 36 experimental trials. 
The reaction time difference between the (correct) incongruent and (correct) 
congruent trials served as indicator of inhibition performance.  
The Beads-in-a-Jar task. Participants performed the Beads-in-a-Jar task for five 
minutes or a maximum of 20 rounds in which they were shown a maximum of 20 
beads per round (depending upon their request for beads). Participants were aware 
that the task ended after five minutes, but not of the fact that the task ended after 20 
rounds. After each trial, participants could request more beads or make a decision by 
clicking on the desired option. The drawings were prearranged: the beads were taken 
out following a series of fixed sequences that was the same for all participants. After 
the maximum number of beads had been requested, the ratio of the beads 
represented the ratio in the jar that the beads were drawn from. Thus, in case all 20 
beads would be requested, there would always be 12 green and 8 purple beads or 
vice versa.  
Strategy measure. The number of requested beads served as indicator for the 
strategy used in the Beads-in-a-Jar task. As the number of requested beads over all 
rounds was skewed for some participants, we employed the median number of 
requested beads from all completed rounds in both studies in this chapter.  
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due to the fact that requesting fewer beads enables participants to make more 
(correct) decisions.  
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(103 females) participated in the study in exchange for money (5 euros) or course 
credits1. Ages ranged from 17 to 33, M = 21.8, SD = 3.2.  
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the maximum number of beads had been requested, the ratio of the beads 
represented the ratio in the jar that the beads were drawn from. Thus, in case all 20 
beads would be requested, there would always be 12 green and 8 purple beads or 
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Strategy measure. The number of requested beads served as indicator for the 
strategy used in the Beads-in-a-Jar task. As the number of requested beads over all 
rounds was skewed for some participants, we employed the median number of 
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Outcome measures. After 20 beads had been requested, the sample always 
consisted of 12 green and 8 purple beads or vice versa, determining which of the jars 
was labeled as the correct jar3. We labeled decisions as correct when the jar was 
chosen that correctly represented the ratio of green versus purple beads. A decision 
was labeled as incorrect when the jar was chosen that did not correctly represent the 
ratio of green versus purple beads. Participants did not receive feedback regarding 
the correctness of their choice. 
Procedure. Before the start of the experiment, all participants signed an informed 
consent form. The study was completely computerized and participants were 
informed that the study consisted of several parts. First, individual differences in 
cognitive control were measured in a fixed sequence: first the EAST, then the 2-Back 
task, and finally the Stroop task. After completion of the cognitive control tasks, 
participants received instructions for the Beads-in-a-Jar task. Participants were told 
that they could earn one point for every correct decision. To induce the task goal of 
efficiency, participants were instructed that they should earn as many points as 
possible, but that “drawing more beads would cause you to play fewer rounds and 
thus earn fewer points”. Participants then played the Beads-in-a-Jar task for five 
minutes or a maximum of 20 rounds after which they were shown the number of 
earned points. 
Results  
On average, participants completed 18.8 rounds (SD = 2.2) of the Beads-in-a-Jar task 
and 70.1% of the participants completed all rounds within the allotted five minutes. 
This ceiling effect was probably due to the fact that the “efficient” decisions were 
made quite fast. Participants who make very efficient and fast decisions in the first 
stage of the game are no longer able to score points after reaching the maximum 
number of rounds, whereas cautious and slow participants are still able to continue 
with the task. Therefore, individual differences in strategy and outcome measures 
remain unnoticed when the majority of the participants completes all rounds. For 
this reason we used a cut-off point of three and a half minutes. In other words, we 
analyzed data of the first three and a half minutes of the Beads-in-a-Jar task. In this 
                                                 
3 Theoretically speaking, it is possible that even when the majority of the 20 drawn beads is purple, the jar with 
the most green beads is the correct jar and vice versa. Nevertheless, choosing a specific jar in line with the 
majority color in the 20 beads sample is, probabilistically speaking, the best choice. Therefore, we qualified this 
as the correct choice. 
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first three and a half minutes of the task, only 29.1 % of the participants completed all 
rounds4. 
For the 2-Back task and the EAST, we removed reaction times below 300 ms from 
the analyses. Performance in terms of errors on the 2-Back task was skewed to the 
right and therefore transformed with a square root transformation. For the Stroop 
task, we excluded reaction time data that deviated more than 3 SDs from the total 
mean (1.4% and 3.5% for congruent and incongruent trials respectively). Participants 
who had a performance that deviated more than 3 SDs from the mean on the 
cognitive control measures were removed from the analyses concerning that specific 
cognitive control measure (N = 2 for errors on the 2-Back task)5. 
We conducted separate regression analyses in which performance on the EAST, 
the 2-Back task or the Stroop task were entered as predictors. The number of 
requested beads, the number of correct decisions, and the number of incorrect 
decisions were entered as criterion variables in separate regression analyses for each 
of the predictors. 
Strategy measure. Based on the idea that high levels of cognitive control would 
lead to a strategy in line with the efficiency task goal, we hypothesized that 
individuals with high cognitive control would request fewer beads in the Beads-in-a-
Jar task. Results indicated that faster reaction times on the 2-Back task were related to 
requesting fewer beads per round, β = .28, t(125) = 3.20, p = .002. Performance on the 
other cognitive control measures (EAST and Stroop task) was not related to the 
number of requested beads (all p’s > .42).   
Outcome measures. We hypothesized that high levels of cognitive control were 
related to more correct decisions. Results showed that faster reaction times on the 2-
Back task were related to more correct decisions, β = -.25, t(125) = -2.88, p = .005. 
Lower switch cost in terms of reaction times on the EAST was marginally 
significantly related to more correct decisions, β = -.16, t(125) = -1.80, p = .08. 
Performance on the Stroop task was not related to the number of correct decisions (p 
= .29). 
Faster reaction times on the 2-Back task were marginally significantly related to 
more incorrect decisions, β = -.15, t(125) = -1.73, p = .09. Performance on the other 
                                                 
4 We also performed analyses with other cut-off points. Cut-off points of four and a half, four, three, and two and 
a half minutes show a similar pattern of significant and non-significant results as the reported results for three 
and a half minutes. Although it is necessary to control for ceiling effects, our findings represent a robust effect 
that is not due to the selection of one specific cut-off point. 
5 Including these participants in the analyses yielded the same pattern of significant and non-significant results as 
reported.  
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right and therefore transformed with a square root transformation. For the Stroop 
task, we excluded reaction time data that deviated more than 3 SDs from the total 
mean (1.4% and 3.5% for congruent and incongruent trials respectively). Participants 
who had a performance that deviated more than 3 SDs from the mean on the 
cognitive control measures were removed from the analyses concerning that specific 
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We conducted separate regression analyses in which performance on the EAST, 
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requested beads, the number of correct decisions, and the number of incorrect 
decisions were entered as criterion variables in separate regression analyses for each 
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Strategy measure. Based on the idea that high levels of cognitive control would 
lead to a strategy in line with the efficiency task goal, we hypothesized that 
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Jar task. Results indicated that faster reaction times on the 2-Back task were related to 
requesting fewer beads per round, β = .28, t(125) = 3.20, p = .002. Performance on the 
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a half minutes show a similar pattern of significant and non-significant results as the reported results for three 
and a half minutes. Although it is necessary to control for ceiling effects, our findings represent a robust effect 
that is not due to the selection of one specific cut-off point. 
5 Including these participants in the analyses yielded the same pattern of significant and non-significant results as 
reported.  
38 
 
cognitive control measures was not related to the number of incorrect decisions (all 
p’s > .55).  
Discussion 
The results of Study 2.1 indicate that individuals with high (as compared to low) 
levels of cognitive control used a strategy and performed on the outcome measure in 
line with the task goal of efficiency, as indicated by fewer requested beads and more 
correct decisions.  
Moreover, only performance on the 2-Back task (updating) was significantly 
related to the strategies and outcome measures in the Beads-in-a-Jar task. A possible 
explanation for the role of updating is that it might have helped participants to keep 
the task goal active in mind throughout the whole task. Goal maintenance and 
keeping track of whether the performed behavior is in accordance with the task goal 
are key aspects of the Beads-in-a-Jar task.  
Performance on the EAST (switching) was not related to the used strategy and 
only marginally significantly related to the outcome measures A more elaborate 
discussion on why especially updating was involved in the findings is presented in 
the general discussion of this chapter. Most importantly, updating seems to be the 
most prominent cognitive control component related to goal-directed decision 
making in the Beads-in-a-Jar task, and we therefore only used an updating task in 
Study 2.2.  
An alternative explanation for the results of Study 2.1 is that people who 
performed better on the 2-Back task performed the Beads-in-a-Jar task according to 
the task goal due to general differences in the intention to achieve or perform well. 
However, the results provide evidence against this explanation. An explanation in 
terms of the intention to achieve or perform well suggests that the observed effect of 
updating ability on task performance could be brought about by the mechanism that 
participants who had a general intention to perform well, performed better on both 
the 2-Back task and the Beads-in-a-Jar task, explaining a relation between these tasks. 
However, if having the intention to perform well means doing better on any task, 
this explanation would entail that all cognitive control tasks would have been 
performed better by participants with a high intention to achieve or perform well. 
This was not the case. The fact that only a relation was found between 2-Back task 
performance and the dependent variables in the Beads-in-a-Jar task contradicts such 
an explanation. Furthermore, a number of studies have shown that the n-Back task is 
not sensitive to reward (see e.g., Pochon et al.; Mizonu et al., 2008). However, it is 
possible that especially an n-Back task taps into the ability to keep constant focus on 
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the task requirements or translating the task instructions into appropriate actions, 
concepts closely related to updating ability. 
As a final point, 70.1 % of all participants completed the maximum number of 20 
rounds in the Beads-in-a-Jar task. To prevent similar ceiling effects in Study 2.2, we 
adjusted the Beads-in-a-Jar task by including 30, instead of 20, rounds.  
 
Study 2.2  
The results from Study 2.1 indicate that higher levels of updating ability were related 
to decision strategies and outcomes that serve an instructed task goal. In Study 2.2 
we aim to extend the results from Study 2.1 by manipulating the task goal between 
participants. We measured individual differences in updating ability and induced 
either the task goal of accuracy or efficiency in the Beads-in-a-Jar task.  
Method 
Participants and design. In total, 97 students of the University of Amsterdam (59 
females) participated in the study in exchange for money (2 euros) or course credits6. 
Ages ranged from 17 to 35, M = 21.4, SD = 3.6. Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of two task goals (accuracy or efficiency). 
Procedure. Beforehand, all participants signed an informed consent form. The 
study was completely computerized and participants were informed that the study 
consisted of several parts. First, we measured individual differences in updating 
ability. For this purpose, the same 2-Back task was used as in Study 2.1. After the 
updating task, participants started the Beads-in-a-Jar task. Participants in the 
accuracy condition read the following instruction: “Only decide when you are certain 
about your choice. Avoid making incorrect decisions. Make sure to be accurate”. The 
instruction for the efficiency condition read: “Remember that requesting more beads 
causes you to play fewer rounds and earn fewer points. Make sure to be efficient.” 
Participants then played the Beads-in-a-Jar task for five minutes or a maximum of 30 
rounds. Again, participants were aware that the task ended after five minutes, but 
not of the fact that the task ended after 30 rounds. 
To check whether participants were indeed aware of the task goal, we 
administered an instruction check afterwards. After completion of the Beads-in-a-Jar 
task we asked participants in a multiple choice question to repeat the task 
                                                 
6 The original sample consisted of 99 participants. Two participants were above 50 and were removed from the 
sample because of their deviating age. Including these participants in the analyses does not yield different results 
than reported. 
238 
 
cognitive control measures was not related to the number of incorrect decisions (all 
p’s > .55).  
Discussion 
The results of Study 2.1 indicate that individuals with high (as compared to low) 
levels of cognitive control used a strategy and performed on the outcome measure in 
line with the task goal of efficiency, as indicated by fewer requested beads and more 
correct decisions.  
Moreover, only performance on the 2-Back task (updating) was significantly 
related to the strategies and outcome measures in the Beads-in-a-Jar task. A possible 
explanation for the role of updating is that it might have helped participants to keep 
the task goal active in mind throughout the whole task. Goal maintenance and 
keeping track of whether the performed behavior is in accordance with the task goal 
are key aspects of the Beads-in-a-Jar task.  
Performance on the EAST (switching) was not related to the used strategy and 
only marginally significantly related to the outcome measures A more elaborate 
discussion on why especially updating was involved in the findings is presented in 
the general discussion of this chapter. Most importantly, updating seems to be the 
most prominent cognitive control component related to goal-directed decision 
making in the Beads-in-a-Jar task, and we therefore only used an updating task in 
Study 2.2.  
An alternative explanation for the results of Study 2.1 is that people who 
performed better on the 2-Back task performed the Beads-in-a-Jar task according to 
the task goal due to general differences in the intention to achieve or perform well. 
However, the results provide evidence against this explanation. An explanation in 
terms of the intention to achieve or perform well suggests that the observed effect of 
updating ability on task performance could be brought about by the mechanism that 
participants who had a general intention to perform well, performed better on both 
the 2-Back task and the Beads-in-a-Jar task, explaining a relation between these tasks. 
However, if having the intention to perform well means doing better on any task, 
this explanation would entail that all cognitive control tasks would have been 
performed better by participants with a high intention to achieve or perform well. 
This was not the case. The fact that only a relation was found between 2-Back task 
performance and the dependent variables in the Beads-in-a-Jar task contradicts such 
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the task requirements or translating the task instructions into appropriate actions, 
concepts closely related to updating ability. 
As a final point, 70.1 % of all participants completed the maximum number of 20 
rounds in the Beads-in-a-Jar task. To prevent similar ceiling effects in Study 2.2, we 
adjusted the Beads-in-a-Jar task by including 30, instead of 20, rounds.  
 
Study 2.2  
The results from Study 2.1 indicate that higher levels of updating ability were related 
to decision strategies and outcomes that serve an instructed task goal. In Study 2.2 
we aim to extend the results from Study 2.1 by manipulating the task goal between 
participants. We measured individual differences in updating ability and induced 
either the task goal of accuracy or efficiency in the Beads-in-a-Jar task.  
Method 
Participants and design. In total, 97 students of the University of Amsterdam (59 
females) participated in the study in exchange for money (2 euros) or course credits6. 
Ages ranged from 17 to 35, M = 21.4, SD = 3.6. Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of two task goals (accuracy or efficiency). 
Procedure. Beforehand, all participants signed an informed consent form. The 
study was completely computerized and participants were informed that the study 
consisted of several parts. First, we measured individual differences in updating 
ability. For this purpose, the same 2-Back task was used as in Study 2.1. After the 
updating task, participants started the Beads-in-a-Jar task. Participants in the 
accuracy condition read the following instruction: “Only decide when you are certain 
about your choice. Avoid making incorrect decisions. Make sure to be accurate”. The 
instruction for the efficiency condition read: “Remember that requesting more beads 
causes you to play fewer rounds and earn fewer points. Make sure to be efficient.” 
Participants then played the Beads-in-a-Jar task for five minutes or a maximum of 30 
rounds. Again, participants were aware that the task ended after five minutes, but 
not of the fact that the task ended after 30 rounds. 
To check whether participants were indeed aware of the task goal, we 
administered an instruction check afterwards. After completion of the Beads-in-a-Jar 
task we asked participants in a multiple choice question to repeat the task 
                                                 
6 The original sample consisted of 99 participants. Two participants were above 50 and were removed from the 
sample because of their deviating age. Including these participants in the analyses does not yield different results 
than reported. 
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instruction.  The question read: “What were you instructed to pay attention to during 
the task?” Participants could choose between “accuracy” and “efficiency”.   
Results  
On average, participants completed 24.8 rounds (SD = 6.2) in the Beads-in-a-Jar task 
and 45.4 % of the sample completed the maximum number of 30 rounds. Because this 
present completion rate is about the same as in the three and a half minute cut-off 
point in Study 2.1, we analyzed data of the full five minutes of the Beads-in-a-Jar 
task. Fourteen participants (14.4 %) did not show a match between the task 
instruction and the instruction check. That is, these participants indicated that they 
were instructed to be efficient while they were actually instructed to be accurate or 
vice versa. Correct responses on the instruction check were not related to task goal 
condition, χ2 (1, N = 97) = .90, p = .34. Correct responses on the instruction check were 
also unrelated to individual differences in updating ability, r(97) = -.15, ns for errors 
on the 2-Back; r(97) = -.01, ns for reaction times on the 2-Back task. Participants with a 
mismatch between the task instruction and the instruction check were excluded from 
the analyses because we suspected that these participants did not read the 
instructions or were not seriously involved in the experiment7.  
For the 2-Back task, we removed reaction times below 300 ms. Three participants 
had a performance that deviated more than 3 SDs from the mean number of errors 
on the 2-Back task and were removed from the analyses8. Because the scores on the 2-
Back task in terms of errors were skewed to the right, we adopted the same square 
root transformation as in Study 2.1. Analyses were run on 82 participants, with 41 
participants in the accuracy condition and 41 participants in the efficiency condition.  
We hypothesized that individuals with high levels of updating ability would 
perform the Beads-in-a-Jar task more in line with the task goal of either accuracy or 
efficiency (depending upon the experimental condition) as compared to individuals 
with low levels of updating ability. More specifically, we expected individuals with 
high levels of updating ability who were instructed to focus on efficiency to request 
fewer beads and to make more correct decisions as compared to individuals with low 
levels of updating ability. We expected individuals with high levels of updating 
ability who were instructed to focus on accuracy to request more beads and make 
                                                 
7 Including these participants in the analyses yielded the same pattern of significant and non-significant results as 
reported. 
8 Including these participants in the analyses yielded the same pattern of significant and non-significant results as 
reported. 
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fewer incorrect decisions in the Beads-in-a-Jar task as compared to individuals with 
low levels of updating ability.   
To test these hypotheses, we created interaction terms (based on z scores) and 
entered these in regression analyses. Preliminary analyses indicated that only results 
in terms of errors on the 2-Back task interacted significantly with the task goal. 
Therefore, below we only discuss results in terms of errors on the 2-Back task. 
Regression analyses were conducted in which errors on the 2-Back task, task goal 
condition (accuracy versus efficiency) and their interaction were entered as 
predictors. The number of requested beads, the number of correct decisions and the 
number of incorrect decisions were entered as criterion variables in three separate 
regression analyses. 
Strategy measure. Beta coefficients for all predictors are displayed in Table 1. 
Participants in the accuracy condition requested significantly more beads than 
participants in the efficiency condition. Moreover, a significant interaction effect 
emerged between errors on the 2-Back task and task goal condition on the number of 
requested beads, β = .31, t(78) = 2.99, p = .004. To interpret this interaction effect, we 
followed the procedure of Aiken and West (1991). As expected, only participants 
with high (as compared to low) updating ability requested more beads in the 
accuracy condition as compared to the efficiency condition, see Figure 3a. Simple 
effects analyses indicated that fewer errors on the 2-Back task were related to 
requesting more beads in the accuracy condition, β = -.37, t(39) = -2.46,  p = .02, and, 
although marginally significantly, to requesting fewer beads in the efficiency 
condition, β = .26, t(39) = 1.69, p = .10. 
Outcome measures. Beta coefficients for all predictors on the number of correct 
and incorrect decisions in the Beads-in-a-Jar task are displayed in Table 1. 
Participants in the accuracy condition made fewer correct decisions and fewer 
incorrect decisions than participants in the efficiency condition. Fewer errors on the 
2-Back task were significantly related to fewer incorrect decisions and marginally 
significantly related to more correct decisions in the Beads-in-a-Jar task.  
We found an interaction between errors on the 2-Back task and task goal 
condition on the number of incorrect decisions, β = -.21, t(78) = -2.09, p = .04. As 
expected, only participants with high (as compared to low) levels of updating ability 
made fewer incorrect decisions in the accuracy condition as compared to the 
efficiency condition, see Figure 3b. Simple effects analyses indicated that the relation 
between errors on the 2-Back task and the number of incorrect decisions was 
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significant within the accuracy condition, β = .55, t(39) = 4.10, p < .001, but not within 
the efficiency condition, β = .08, t(39) = .47,  p = .64. 
The interaction between errors on the 2-Back task and task goal condition on the 
number of correct decisions was only marginally significant, β = -.18, t(78) = -1.75,  p = 
.09, though in the expected direction: participants with high (versus low) levels of 
updating ability tended to make more correct decisions in the efficiency condition, 
see Figure 3c. Follow-up analyses indicated that the relation between errors on the 2-
Back task and the number of correct decisions was significant within the efficiency 
condition, β = -.43, t(39) = -2.95, p = .005, but non-significant within the accuracy 
condition, β = -.01, t(39) = -.05, p = .96.  
 
 
Table 1.  
 Criterion 
                   
Predictor 
Requested      
Beads 
Correct     
Decisions 
Incorrect 
Decisions 
Task Goal  
(accuracy vs. efficiency) 
-.30** .40** .24* 
2-Back task errors -.10 -.18† .29** 
Task Goal x  
2-Back task errors 
.31** -.18† -.21* 
R2 .16** .19** .16** 
Model F 6.12** 7.35** 6.02* 
Beta coefficients of task goal condition (accuracy versus efficiency), errors on the 2-Back task, 
and their interaction in Study 2.2.  Coding of condition: Accuracy = -1, Efficiency = 1. N = 82; 
** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10. 
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Figure 3. 
a.  
b.  
c.  
Effects of the task goals of accuracy and efficiency on the number of requested beads (a), the 
number of incorrect decisions (b), and the number of correct decisions (c), for low and high 
updating ability. Low updating ability refers to 1 SD above the mean number of errors on the 
2-Back task; high updating ability refers to 1 SD below this mean (see also Aiken and West, 
1991). 
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Discussion 
In line with the findings from Study 2.1, we hypothesized that high (versus low) 
levels of updating ability were related to decision strategies and outcomes in line 
with a task goal in the Beads-in-a-Jar task. When we induced the task goal of 
accuracy, we found that high (as compared to low) updating ability was related to 
requesting more beads and making fewer incorrect decisions. When we induced the 
task goal of efficiency, we found that high (as compared to low) updating ability was 
related to requesting fewer beads and making more correct decisions. Thus, we 
replicated the finding from Study 2.1 that high updating ability enhances strategies 
and outcomes in line with an instructed task goal. 
Some findings from Study 2.2 deserve discussion. First, in the present study we 
found effects of errors on the 2-Back task, whereas in Study 2.1 we found effects of 
reaction times on the 2-Back task. Both errors and reaction times on the 2-Back task 
have been widely used as reliable measures of updating (Pronk, Karremans, 
Overbeek, Vermulst, & Wigboldus, 2010; Harvey et al., 2004). The current findings 
stress the importance of investigating both reaction times and errors on the 2-Back 
task when examining the role of updating in goal-directed decision making. 
Second, although in the expected direction, we did not find a significant 
interaction between task goal and updating ability on the number of correct 
decisions. However, and most importantly, as in Study 2.1, the results of Study 2.2 
revealed a significant relation between updating ability and the number of correct 
decisions in the efficiency condition. That is, individuals with high (versus low) 
levels of updating ability made more correct decisions in the efficiency condition, 
indicating that they acted in line with the instructed task goal. 
Finally, responses on the instruction check were not related to levels of updating 
ability, indicating that participants with lower performance on the 2-Back task did 
not read the instructions less well or were not less motivated to participate seriously 
in the experiment than those with high performance on the 2-Back task. These 
findings underscore the conclusion of Study 2.1 that the effects of updating ability on 
goal-directed decision making are not due to mere differences in the intention to 
achieve or perform well.  
 
General Discussion 
In this chapter, we investigated whether cognitive control fosters decision making 
because of better goal attainment. We expected cognitive control to be related to 
decision strategies and outcomes in line with a specific task goal. The studies in this 
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chapter confirm our hypothesis that cognitive control fosters attainment of specific 
task goals within a decision paradigm in which a series of decisions has to be made. 
When the task goal was accuracy, high (versus low) levels of cognitive control were 
related to requesting more beads and making fewer incorrect decisions in the Beads-
in-a-Jar task. When the task goal was efficiency, high (versus low) levels of cognitive 
control were related to requesting fewer beads and making more correct decisions.  
In this chapter we also aimed to explore which of the cognitive control 
components was related to goal-directed decision making in the administered 
decision task. The results of Study 2.1 indicate that only the cognitive control 
component updating was involved in the effects. Although switching ability was 
weakly related to the outcome measures, only updating ability was related to both 
the strategy and outcome measures in the Beads-in-a-Jar task. When trying to attain a 
goal, current behavior constantly has to be checked against the goal. This requires 
continuous monitoring of the extent to which the performed actions are in line with 
the task goal. Updating appears to be the component that is most involved in 
decision strategies and outcomes in decision tasks such as the Beads-in-a-Jar task.  
Switching might not have played a prominent role in the Beads-in-a-Jar task, as 
there was no need for switching in this task: only one goal had to be maintained and 
only one task had to be performed. The finding that inhibition was not related to 
decision strategies and outcomes in the Beads-in-a-Jar task can be explained by the 
fact that there was no need for inhibition in this specific task. Inhibition might prove 
useful in situations where temptations have to be resisted (see e.g., Von Hippel & 
Gonsalkorale, 2005), or irrelevant stimuli have to be ignored. No such element was 
present in the Beads-in-a-Jar task. In the administered Beads-in-a-Jar task, a series of 
decisions had to be made, and it is exactly this type of decision task that seems to 
require updating ability. However, it is important to note that the specific cognitive 
control components relevant for goal attainment in decision tasks may vary 
depending on the nature of the decision task. For example, in a task where irrelevant 
information has to be ignored, both updating and inhibition are likely to play a role.  
The findings from the present research provide more insight concerning the role 
of cognitive control in goal-directed decision making. Although previous research 
showed a relation between cognitive control and decision making, the present 
research is the first to show the relationship between cognitive control and decision 
making as a function of specific task goals, by manipulating the task goal between 
participants. By taking into account the goals of the decision maker, the decision 
process can be investigated and judged more reliably. The current results indicate the 
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relevance of taking goals into account when investigating the influence of cognitive 
control on decision making. The present findings suggest that the well-documented 
finding that cognitive control is related to better decision making performance can, at 
least in part, be ascribed to the fact that people with high (as compared to low) levels 
of updating ability are better able to act in line with specific task goals.  
Moreover, the focus of the present research was on decision making involving a 
series of decisions that serve an overarching goal. Focusing on these types of 
decisions serves three purposes. First, previous research did not address these types 
of decisions in relation to cognitive control. Therefore, the present research provides 
more insight into the relation between cognitive control and decision making. 
Second, these types of decisions allow for close inspection of both decision strategies 
and outcomes. Third, focusing on these types of decisions is relevant for practical 
implications, for example concerning managerial decisions.  
Although the present findings provide useful insight into the relation between 
cognitive control and decision making by emphasizing the relevance of goals, many 
aspects of the underlying process are still to be examined. That is, the way in which 
updating ability exactly facilitates decision strategies and outcomes in line with a 
goal is still to be unraveled. One possible avenue for investigating the underlying 
process is to focus on the role of planning in decision making. For example, 
implementation intentions (see e.g., Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006; Cohen, Bayer, 
Jaudas, & Gollwitzer, 2008) can be used to enhance goal attainment. It is possible that 
high updating ability leads to forming better implementation intentions, or to better 
adherence to such concrete action plans for goal-directed decision making.  
Furthermore, the findings from the present research apply to goals about 
efficiency and accuracy. Future research should focus on other types of goals to 
investigate whether the findings generalize over goals. Finally, future research 
should aim at establishing a causal link between cognitive control and decision 
strategies and outcomes in line with a goal, for example by manipulating cognitive 
control or updating. 
The present findings have some important implications for real life scenarios. 
Although most decisions and choices that people make can be classified as trivial, 
some decisions can have far reaching consequences. When the goals of a decision 
maker cannot be attained due to low levels of cognitive control, real life decisions, 
such as buying a house, can have negative consequences in terms of finances and 
well-being. These negative consequences of not being able to act according to a 
specific goal are especially prevalent in complex situations involving large 
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responsibilities. Imagine for example a customs officer who has to inspect arriving 
passengers from an incoming flight. Depending on the origin of the flight, the 
customs officer has to either adopt an efficient or an accurate way of inspecting 
passengers. When passengers arrive from a so-called “low risk” country, an efficient 
way of inspecting is desirable, whereas passengers from a “high risk” country should 
be checked more thoroughly. The customs officer should constantly keep the correct 
goal active in mind. Unfortunately, levels of cognitive control can be diminished by a 
large number of factors, including fatigue and mental load. In some situations this 
can have a major impact. The customs officer might overlook a suspicious passenger 
from a “high risk” country, because he or she did not keep the correct goal in mind, 
leading to possible dangerous situations. For this reason, it is crucial to better 
understand the role of cognitive control in decision making as a function of goals. In 
this chapter, a first step was made in understanding the underlying processes. 
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Chapter 3  
 
Updating Ability and Planning in 
Goal-Directed Decision Making 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“A goal without a plan is just a wish” 
Eleanor Roosevelt  
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Abstract 
The findings from Chapter 2 suggest that updating ability, a key component of 
cognitive control, fosters goal pursuit in decision making. In this chapter we explore 
a possibly underlying process of this finding: the idea that updating ability helps to 
form and adhere to concrete goal-related plans (or implementation intentions) for 
attaining goals in decision making. A study was conducted where individual 
differences in updating ability, switching ability, and inhibition ability were 
measured and a decision task was administered with one of two task goals (accuracy 
versus efficiency). One third of the participants was instructed to form an 
implementation intention for performing the task in line with the task goal, one third 
of the participants was given a predefined implementation intention by the 
experimenter, and one third of the participants did not receive any additional 
instructions. Results indicate that updating ability facilitated decision making in line 
with a task goal only when an implementation intention was provided by the 
experimenter. Neither updating ability, switching ability, nor inhibition ability was 
related to the quality of self-made implementation intentions. The findings suggest 
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Human beings often succeed in getting what they want and need. Yet, they also often 
fail to achieve their goals. Adopting a sportive and healthy life, spending more time 
with family or resisting that chocolate cake: all very recognizable situations in which 
people desire a specific goal but often have difficulties in attaining it.  
In order to perform goal-directed behavior, control over one’s behavior is needed. 
This control is referred to as cognitive control and comprises a set of cognitive 
processes that helps people to perform goal-directed behavior, especially in novel 
situations. An influential taxonomy of these cognitive processes comes from Miyake 
and colleagues (2000). In this taxonomy, three key components of cognitive control 
are postulated: updating (or monitoring), switching (or shifting), and inhibition. 
Updating refers to the ability to monitor and encode new information and replace 
old irrelevant information. Switching or shifting refers to the ability to switch 
between different tasks, actions or mental states. Inhibition refers to the ability to 
inhibit dominant or automatic reactions when needed (Miyake et al., 2000).  
A number of studies showed that cognitive control fosters decision making (e.g., 
Stanovich & West, 1998; Del Missier, Mäntylä, & Bruine de Bruin, 2012; Magar, 
Phillips, & Hosie, 2008; Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003; Mischel, Shoda, & 
Rodriguez, 1989). Yet, how cognitive control exactly fosters decision making is still 
not well understood. For this reason, Chapter 2 from this dissertation explicitly 
investigated the role of goals in the relation between cognitive control and decision 
making. In two studies, an adjusted version of the Beads-in-a-Jar task was 
administered. In this task, participants had to decide from which of two jars a 
sequence of colored beads is drawn. In each round, beads were drawn from a jar 
with 60 purple and 40 green beads, or a jar with 40 purple and 60 green beads. In a 
fixed time period participants played several rounds of the Beads-in-a-Jar task, in 
which they requested additional beads until ready to decide. Participants performed 
the Beads-in-a-Jar task with either an accuracy or an efficiency goal in mind. The task 
goal instructions were rather concrete and specific and contained some hints about 
how to attain the instructed task goal. Individuals with high (as compared to low) 
levels of cognitive control requested more beads and made fewer incorrect decisions 
in the accuracy condition, and requested fewer beads and made more correct 
decisions in the efficiency condition. In other words, people with high levels of 
cognitive control performed the task more in line with the instructed task goal than 
people with low levels of cognitive control. More specifically, only the cognitive 
control component updating was involved in the effects. It was proposed that the 
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ability to constantly update working memory is an important factor in keeping the 
task goal active in mind.  
The research described in Chapter 2 shed more light on the relation between 
cognitive control and decision making by showing that cognitive control, specifically 
updating ability, fosters goal pursuit in decision making. However, the processes by 
which updating ability improves goal pursuit are yet to be examined. The finding 
that high updating ability leads to decision strategies and outcomes in line with a 
goal can be explained by different processes. First, people with high (versus low) 
levels of updating ability might be better able to translate abstract goals, such as the 
goals of accuracy and efficiency, into a concrete plan. These concrete plans are also 
termed implementation intentions and are described in more detail below. Second, 
people with high (versus low) levels of updating ability might be better able to 
adhere to concrete plans. Third, it is possible that people with high (versus low) 
updating ability are both better able to translate abstract goals into concrete plans 
and to better adhere to these plans.  
In this chapter, we investigate which of the above mentioned processes might 
explain the finding that people with high (as compared to low) updating ability are 
more likely to adopt decision strategies and outcomes in line with a goal.   
 
Implementation Intentions and Goal-Directed Behavior 
A widely used and studied concept to aid goal-directed behavior is the use of 
implementation intentions, as introduced by Gollwitzer. Implementation intentions 
are specific “if-then” rules describing when and how goal-directed behavior should 
be performed. A specific behavior is coupled to a specific situation, enhancing goal-
directed behavior. For example, to reach the goal of receiving a good grade for an 
exam, the implementation intention “When I finish my dinner, I will study for two 
hours” can be formulated. Eventually, this coupling of specific behavior and a 
specific situation becomes automatized. Good implementation intentions are 
characterized by concreteness and goal-directedness (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999; 
Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). Plans are more effective when they are concrete and 
when the contents of the plans directly serve the goal. Ample research shows that 
these specific plans indeed prove to be successful in achieving a goal (see e.g., a 
meta-analysis by Gollwitzer and Sheeran, 2006).  
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Cognitive Control and Implementation Intentions 
In this chapter, we investigated whether people with high cognitive control are better 
able to form and/or adhere to implementation intentions. Because cognitive control is 
highly involved in planning behavior, we tested whether people with high (versus 
low) levels of cognitive control are better able to translate abstract goals into concrete 
plans. Thus, we investigated whether people with high (versus low) levels of 
cognitive control would make higher quality plans in terms of concreteness and goal-
directedness. More specifically, as the findings from Study 2.1 only indicated a role 
for updating (and not for inhibition or switching) in goal-directed decision making, 
we expected that, if anything, only updating ability would be related to plan quality.  
Regarding adherence to implementation intentions, research suggests that people 
with low self-regulatory skills benefit most from pre-defined implementation 
intentions (see e.g., Lengfelder & Gollwitzer, 2001; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). For 
example, in Lengfelder and Gollwitzer’s (2001) study, frontal lobe patients were 
given implementation intentions about performing a dual-task. Forming an 
implementation intention led to better performance on the dual-task for frontal lobe 
patients, similarly to a control group. Frontal lobe patients with low scores on an 
executive function task (the Tower of Hanoi task) benefited even more from the 
given implementation intentions. Therefore, it is possible that especially people with 
low (as compared to high) cognitive control benefit from receiving a predefined 
implementation intention by the experimenter. In other words, when an 
implementation intention is given, people with low cognitive control might be as 
successful in adopting a good decision strategy as people with high cognitive control.  
On the other hand, the implementation intention that was used in Lengfelder and 
Gollwitzer’s (2001) study was very concrete. Most situations might require more 
complex implementation intentions. In order to successfully implement such 
implementation intentions one must be able to remember this specific 
implementation intention and have it available in working memory. In such 
situations, cognitive control, specifically updating ability, might facilitate the process 
of keeping the relevant information concerning the implementation intention in 
mind. Thus, when a predefined implementation intention is given, people with high 
cognitive control, in particular high updating ability, might be more successful in 
adopting a good decision strategy as compared to people with low updating ability. 
If we would not give any hints about how to reach the instructed goals, one could 
expect that cognitive control, and in particular updating ability, would lead to better 
performance in line with the instructed task goal. This would replicate the finding 
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from Study 2.1 and Study 2.2 that updating ability facilitates goal-directed decision 
making. But note that in these studies a rather concrete task goal instruction was 
given to participants. Therefore, it may be the case that if any concrete instructions 
are lacking, updating ability does not lead to goal-directed decision making. 
Especially when goals are rather abstract, as can be assumed to be the case with the 
goals of accuracy and efficiency, updating ability might not be beneficial for goal 
attainment, because the goals are not concrete enough.  
Because the findings from Study 2.1 only showed a role of updating ability, and 
not of switching or inhibition ability, in goal-directed decision making, we expected 
that only updating ability would be related to decision strategies and outcomes in 
line with a goal in the present study.  
In Study 3.1 we instructed some of the participants to form an implementation 
intention for reaching the instructed task goal. Some of the participants were 
provided with a predefined implementation intention. The remaining participants 
did not receive additional instructions. The same Beads-in-a-Jar task was used as in 
Study 2.2. This task can be approached with either an accuracy or an efficiency goal 
in mind. These goals lead to different strategies for performing the task and 
differences in outcomes (see Study 2.2). 
 
Study 3.1 - Method 
Participants and Design 
In total, 130 students of the Radboud University Nijmegen (117 females) participated 
in the study in exchange for money (5 euros) or course credits1. Age ranged from 17 
to 48. The experiment used a 3 (plan: no plan, get plan, make plan) by 2 (goal: 
accuracy, efficiency) between-participants design. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of these six experimental conditions. 
Materials 
Cognitive control tasks. Switching task. To measure switching, we used a 
Number Switch task. In this task, participants had to respond to numbers (from 1 to 
10) according to different rules. When the number was printed in yellow, 
participants had to indicate whether the number was odd or even. When the number 
was printed in blue, participants had to indicate whether the number was greater 
                                                 
1 The original sample consisted of 132 participants. Two participants with an age above 50 were excluded from 
the dataset a priori. Including these participants in the analyses yielded the same pattern of significant and non-
significant results. 
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than five or smaller than/equal to five (see Monsell, Sumner, & Waters, 2003). Each 
number was presented for 3000 ms. When participants did not respond within this 
time window (i.e., 3000 ms), the trial was coded as incorrect. Inter trial interval was 
set at 150 ms. In order to learn the sorting rules, the first block contained only one 
sorting rule (odd/even), whereas the second block contained the other sorting rule 
(smaller/greater than 5). Next, participants performed two blocks of 32 experimental 
trials containing both sorting rules. Participants received 10 practice trials preceding 
block 1, block 2, and block 3. Feedback was provided on the practice trials but not on 
the experimental trials. A trial was labeled as a switch trial when it required a 
different response rule than the previous trial. A trial was labeled as a non-switch 
trial if the same response rule was required as on the previous trial. The difference in 
reaction times (for correct responses) and errors on the switch trials versus the non-
switch trials within block 3 and block 4 served as indicators of switching 
performance.  
Updating task. To measure updating, we used a 2-Back task (for more details see 
Study 2.1 in this dissertation). In this task, participants were shown letters on the 
screen and had to indicate whether the letter on the screen was the same as the letter 
that was presented two trials before. Participants performed 10 practice trials and 45 
experimental trials. Reaction times on the correct trials and the number of errors 
served as indicators of updating ability.  
Inhibition task. To measure inhibition, we used a mouse-click version of the 
Stroop task (for more details see Study 2.1 in this dissertation). In this version of the 
Stroop task, words were displayed on a screen one by one, in one of four colors 
(green, yellow, blue, or red). Participants were instructed to click (with the mouse) on 
the color word displayed at the bottom of the screen matching the color of the ink of 
the word displayed on the middle of the screen. Participants received 12 practice 
trials and 36 experimental trials. The experimental trials included 12 filler trials, 12 
incongruent trials, and 12 congruent trials. The reaction time difference between the 
(correct) incongruent and (correct) congruent trials served as indicator of inhibition 
ability.  
Beads-in-a-Jar task. In the Beads-in-a-Jar task (adapted from Garety, Hemsley, 
and Wessely, 1991), participants were told that they would be shown beads that are 
drawn from one of two jars. Both jars are filled with colored beads. One jar had a 
ratio of 60 green versus 40 purple beads; the other jar had a ratio of 60 purple versus 
40 green beads. Participants were then presented with beads drawn from one of the 
two jars. Participants had to decide from which jar they thought the beads have been 
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drawn. After having been shown one bead (either green or purple) participants were 
asked whether they wanted to see another bead (up to a maximum of 20 beads), or 
whether they wanted to make a decision concerning which jar the beads had been 
drawn from. The drawings were prearranged: the beads were taken out following a 
fixed sequence that was the same for all participants. After the maximum number of 
beads was requested, the ratio of the beads represented the ratio in the jar that the 
beads had been drawn from. Thus, in case all 20 beads would be requested, there 
would always be 12 green and 8 purple beads or vice versa. Participants played the 
Beads-in-a-Jar task for four minutes. In each round, participants could request more 
beads or make a decision. The maximum number of rounds was 80. None of the 
participants completed the maximum number of rounds within the allotted four 
minutes.  
Strategy measure. The number of requested beads served as an indicator for the 
strategy used in the Beads-in-a-Jar task. As the number of requested beads over all 
rounds was skewed for some participants, we employed the median number of 
requested beads from all completed blocks.  
Outcome measures. After 20 beads had been requested, the sample always 
consisted of 12 green and 8 purple beads or vice versa, determining which of the jars 
was labeled as the correct jar (for more details see Study 2.1). We labeled decisions as 
correct when the jar was chosen that correctly represented the ratio of green versus 
purple beads. A decision was labeled as incorrect when the jar was chosen that did 
not correctly represent the ratio of green versus purple beads. Participants did not 
receive feedback regarding the correctness of their decision. 
Procedure 
Before the start of the experiment, all participants signed an informed consent form. 
The study was completely computerized and participants were informed that the 
study consisted of several parts. Individual differences in cognitive control were 
measured in a fixed order: first the Stroop task, second the 2-Back task, and third the 
Number Switch task. Participants were then given four practice rounds of the Beads-
in-a-Jar task to get familiar with the task. After the practice rounds, participants 
received feedback on the number of correct responses. Consequently, participants 
were told that additional instructions would be given before the real task started. 
These additional instructions depended on the experimental condition and 
concerned the task goal and, for some participants, creating or receiving 
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implementation intentions. After the additional instructions, participants performed 
the Beads-in-a-Jar task for four minutes.  
Task goals. Participants in the accuracy condition read the following task 
instruction: “Try to work as accurately as possible. Only decide when you are certain about 
your choice. Try to make as few incorrect decisions as possible”. The task instruction for the 
efficiency condition read: “Try to work as efficiently as possible. Don’t wait too long before 
making a decision. Try to make as many correct decisions as possible.” 
Note that an accuracy goal is expected to lead to a safe strategy in which a 
relatively large number of beads will be requested (in order to avoid incorrect 
decisions) and few incorrect decisions will be made. An efficiency goal is expected to 
lead to requesting relatively few beads enabling one to play more rounds and 
increasing the likelihood of correct decisions (see also Chapter 2).   
Implementation intentions. After receiving instructions about one of the two 
task goals, participants in the make plan condition were instructed to write down a 
plan in order to attain the instructed goal. First, they were given an example about 
forming an implementation intention. The instruction then read: “Try to make a plan 
about how you will perform the Beads-in-a-Jar task as accurately (efficiently) as possible. You 
will be given two minutes. Please type below how you will perform the Beads-in-a-Jar task”.  
Participants in the get plan condition were given a predefined implementation 
intention. The predefined plan for the accuracy condition read: “When you request 
more beads, chances of making a good decision increase. Keep the following in mind while 
performing the task: I request a lot of beads. If I am sure from which jar the beads are being 
drawn, I will make a decision.” The predefined plan for the efficiency condition read: 
“When you request fewer beads, you can play more rounds and earn more points. Keep the 
following in mind while performing the task: I request few beads. If I have a clue from which 
jar the beads are being drawn, I make a decision.” Participants in the no plan condition 
did not receive additional instructions. 
Scoring of implementation intentions. Implementation intentions were scored by 
two raters who were given explicit and elaborate instructions about the scoring 
procedure. They were unaware of the hypothesis under investigation or task goal 
condition. Each implementation intention was scored on 1) concreteness (1 = very 
abstract; 7 = very concrete; interrater reliability, r(46) = .67), 2) the extent to which the 
implementation intention was in line with an accuracy goal (1 = not at all; 7 = very 
much; interrater reliability, r(46) = .74), and 3) the extent to which the implementation 
intention was in line with an efficiency goal (1 = not at all; 7 = very much; interrater 
reliability, r(46) = .63).  
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Procedure 
Before the start of the experiment, all participants signed an informed consent form. 
The study was completely computerized and participants were informed that the 
study consisted of several parts. Individual differences in cognitive control were 
measured in a fixed order: first the Stroop task, second the 2-Back task, and third the 
Number Switch task. Participants were then given four practice rounds of the Beads-
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were told that additional instructions would be given before the real task started. 
These additional instructions depended on the experimental condition and 
concerned the task goal and, for some participants, creating or receiving 
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implementation intentions. After the additional instructions, participants performed 
the Beads-in-a-Jar task for four minutes.  
Task goals. Participants in the accuracy condition read the following task 
instruction: “Try to work as accurately as possible. Only decide when you are certain about 
your choice. Try to make as few incorrect decisions as possible”. The task instruction for the 
efficiency condition read: “Try to work as efficiently as possible. Don’t wait too long before 
making a decision. Try to make as many correct decisions as possible.” 
Note that an accuracy goal is expected to lead to a safe strategy in which a 
relatively large number of beads will be requested (in order to avoid incorrect 
decisions) and few incorrect decisions will be made. An efficiency goal is expected to 
lead to requesting relatively few beads enabling one to play more rounds and 
increasing the likelihood of correct decisions (see also Chapter 2).   
Implementation intentions. After receiving instructions about one of the two 
task goals, participants in the make plan condition were instructed to write down a 
plan in order to attain the instructed goal. First, they were given an example about 
forming an implementation intention. The instruction then read: “Try to make a plan 
about how you will perform the Beads-in-a-Jar task as accurately (efficiently) as possible. You 
will be given two minutes. Please type below how you will perform the Beads-in-a-Jar task”.  
Participants in the get plan condition were given a predefined implementation 
intention. The predefined plan for the accuracy condition read: “When you request 
more beads, chances of making a good decision increase. Keep the following in mind while 
performing the task: I request a lot of beads. If I am sure from which jar the beads are being 
drawn, I will make a decision.” The predefined plan for the efficiency condition read: 
“When you request fewer beads, you can play more rounds and earn more points. Keep the 
following in mind while performing the task: I request few beads. If I have a clue from which 
jar the beads are being drawn, I make a decision.” Participants in the no plan condition 
did not receive additional instructions. 
Scoring of implementation intentions. Implementation intentions were scored by 
two raters who were given explicit and elaborate instructions about the scoring 
procedure. They were unaware of the hypothesis under investigation or task goal 
condition. Each implementation intention was scored on 1) concreteness (1 = very 
abstract; 7 = very concrete; interrater reliability, r(46) = .67), 2) the extent to which the 
implementation intention was in line with an accuracy goal (1 = not at all; 7 = very 
much; interrater reliability, r(46) = .74), and 3) the extent to which the implementation 
intention was in line with an efficiency goal (1 = not at all; 7 = very much; interrater 
reliability, r(46) = .63).  
60 
 
For each implementation intention, we first averaged the scores of the two raters 
for each of the criteria. Second, we obtained a goal score indicating the extent to 
which the implementation intention was in line with the instructed task goal. This 
score has a minimum value of 1, representing an implementation intention that is not 
at all in line with the instructed task goal, and a maximum value of 7, representing an 
implementation intention that is very much in line with the instructed task goal. 
Third, we created a score for quality of the implementation intention by calculating 
the product of the goal score and concreteness of the plan and taking the square root 
of this measure. The latter was done to approximate a normal distribution. These 
steps ultimately resulted in a score between 1 and 7. Low scores indicate a plan that 
is not at all in line with the instructed task goal and is also not concrete. High scores 
indicate a plan that is very much in line with the instructed task goal and is also very 
concrete. 
Additional checks. To check whether participants indeed understood the 
instructions, we added a short quiz-like test immediately after the task goal and plan 
instructions. In three questions, all participants were asked to repeat the general task 
goal instruction. In addition, in the make plan condition, participants had to repeat 
their plan. In the get plan condition, participants were asked three additional 
questions concerning the plan that was given to them.  
 
Results 
For the 2-Back task and the Number Switch task we removed reaction times below 
300 ms from the analyses. For the Stroop task, we excluded reaction time data that 
deviated more than 3 SDs from the mean (1.7% for congruent trials; 3.9 % for 
incongruent trials). Participants who had a performance deviating more than 3 SDs 
from the mean on the cognitive control measures were removed from the analyses 
concerning that cognitive control measure (N = 1 for errors on the 2-Back task; N = 1 
for switch cost in terms of correct responses; N = 2 for switch cost in terms of reaction 
times)2. Because the median number of requested beads was skewed to the right we 
performed a square root transformation. On average, participants completed 24.7 
rounds (SD = 8.7) in the Beads-in-a-Jar task. 
 
 
                                                 
2 Including these outliers in the analyses yielded the same pattern of significant and non-significant results. 
61 
 
Requested Beads in the Practice Rounds 
Preliminary analyses indicated that the number of requested beads in the practice 
rounds (which were administered before any manipulation) had a strong predictive 
value for the number of requested beads in the Beads-in-a-Jar task. Regression 
analysis indicated that the number of requested beads in the practice rounds 
explained 37% of the variance, β = .61, t(128) = 8.71, p < .001. Follow-up regression 
analysis indicated that there was no interaction with task goal, β = -.08, t(126) = -1.21, 
p = .23. Thus, the effect of the number of requested beads in the practice rounds on 
the number of requested beads in the experimental task was present in both task goal 
conditions. To correct for effects of the used strategy in the practice rounds on the 
dependent measures we included this variable in all further analyses concerning 
plan quality and strategy and outcome measures.  
Manipulation Check 
We checked whether participants correctly reported the instructions. Inspection of 
the three questions concerning the task goal manipulation shows that the open 
question: “I am going to perform the Beads-in-a-Jar task as … as possible. Please fill 
in the missing word”, (concerning the task goal of accuracy or efficiency) was often 
answered with “good”. This occurred both in the accuracy and efficiency condition 
(41.5% and 38.5% respectively). The other two questions regarding the instructions 
were correctly answered by 90% of all participants. In the get plan condition, 85.4% 
of the participants correctly answered all questions concerning the predefined 
implementation intentions. In the make plan condition, 93.5% of the participants 
correctly repeated their formed implementation intention. Most importantly, 
percentage of correct answers on the instruction check did not correlate with any of 
the cognitive control measures (all p’s > .09), strategy or outcome measures in the 
Beads-in-a-Jar task (all p’s > .29), or plan quality (p = .73).  
Cognitive Control and Plan Quality 
Average plan quality in the make plan condition was 4.24 (SD = 1.21) with a range 
between 1.94 to 6.75. Plan quality was higher in the efficiency condition (M = 4.58, SD 
= 1.43) than in the accuracy condition (M = 3.90, SD = .84), F(1, 43) = 6.72, p = .02, ηp2  = 
.14. Plan quality was not related to the number of requested beads in either task goal 
condition, number of incorrect decisions in the accuracy condition, or number of 
correct decisions in the efficiency condition (all p’s > .27). Contrary to the hypothesis 
that updating ability leads to better plan quality, performance on the 2-Back task in 
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terms of errors did not predict plan quality, β = -.16, t(43) = -1.08, p = .29, neither did 
performance on the 2-Back task in terms of reaction times, β = -.03, t(43) = -.21, p = .84. 
Performance on the other cognitive control measures (switching and inhibition) 
did also not predict plan quality (all p’s > .48).  
Cognitive Control, Decision Strategy, and Decision Outcomes  
Because Study 1 showed only significant effects of 2-Back task performance on 
strategies and outcomes in line with the task goal in the Beads-in-a-Jar task, and 
because of the large number of predictor variables, we first performed preliminary 
analyses. We performed stepwise regression analyses, including all cognitive control 
measures and their interactions with task goal condition and plan condition, and 
practice strategy as a covariate, to investigate which cognitive control components 
interacted significantly with task goal condition and plan condition. Because 
preliminary results only indicated significant effects for performance on the 2-Back 
task, and not for the other cognitive control components (all p’s > .28), we further 
only report results for this cognitive control measure.  
We investigated whether updating ability led to decision strategies and decision 
outcomes in line with an instructed task goal under different plan conditions. For this 
purpose we conducted GLM analyses with plan condition and task goal condition as 
between-participants factors, 2-Back task performance as continuous factor, and 
practice strategy as covariate.  
Strategy measure. First we subjected the number of requested beads in the Beads-
in-a-Jar task to a GLM analysis with only task goal condition and plan condition as 
between-participants factors, and practice strategy as covariate. As expected, a main 
effect of task goal was found: more beads were requested in the accuracy condition 
than in the efficiency condition, F(1, 123) = 47.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .28. Furthermore, a 
significant two-way interaction was found between task goal condition and plan 
condition, F(2, 123) = 4.59, p = .02, ηp2 = .07. Task goal condition had an effect on the 
number of requested beads in each plan condition, but the effect was stronger in the 
get plan condition, F(1, 38) = 22.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .38, than in the no plan condition, 
F(1, 40) = 11.25, p = .002, ηp2 = .22, and the make plan condition, F(1, 43) = 10.02, p = 
.003, ηp2 = .19.  
Subsequently, we subjected the number of requested beads in the Beads-in-a-Jar 
task to a GLM analysis with task goal condition and plan condition as between-
participants factors, performance on the 2-Back task as continuous factor, and 
practice strategy as covariate.  
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2-Back task errors. The two-way interaction task goal condition x 2-Back task 
errors was significant for the number of requested beads, F(1, 116) = 4.38, p = .04, ηp2 = 
.04. This two-way interaction was qualified by the significant three-way interaction 
task goal condition x plan condition x 2-Back task errors, F(2, 116) = 5.41, p = .006, ηp2 
= .09, see Figure 1. To interpret this significant three-way interaction we tested the 
underlying two-way interactions by the use of regression analyses. These analyses 
indicated that the interaction between task goal condition and 2-Back task errors was 
non-significant within the no plan condition, β = -.16, t(40) = -1.31, p = .20, and 
marginally significant within the make plan condition, β = .16, t(41) = 1.85, p = .08. 
Thus, higher 2-Back task performance did not lead to decision strategies in line with 
a task goal when participants received no additional instructions or had to make a 
plan themselves, see Figure 1a and Figure 1c. In the get plan condition, the 
interaction between task goal condition and 2-Back task errors was significant, β = 
.33, t(35) = 3.01, p = .005. Simple effects analyses indicated that fewer errors on the 2-
Back task were significantly related to requesting fewer beads in the efficiency 
condition, β = .45, t(17) = 2.75, p = .02, and marginally significantly to requesting more 
beads in the accuracy condition, β = -.32, t(17) = -2.02, p = .06, see Figure 1b.  
This finding supports the idea that when a predefined implementation intention 
is provided by the experimenter, updating ability fosters adherence to this plan and 
leads to decision strategies in line with the instructed task goal. These findings do not 
support the idea that predefined implementation intentions are especially beneficial 
for individuals with low (as compared to high) updating ability.    
2-Back task reaction times. Analysis concerning reaction times on the 2-Back task 
did not show any significant effects on the number of requested beads (all p’s > .09).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
362 
 
terms of errors did not predict plan quality, β = -.16, t(43) = -1.08, p = .29, neither did 
performance on the 2-Back task in terms of reaction times, β = -.03, t(43) = -.21, p = .84. 
Performance on the other cognitive control measures (switching and inhibition) 
did also not predict plan quality (all p’s > .48).  
Cognitive Control, Decision Strategy, and Decision Outcomes  
Because Study 1 showed only significant effects of 2-Back task performance on 
strategies and outcomes in line with the task goal in the Beads-in-a-Jar task, and 
because of the large number of predictor variables, we first performed preliminary 
analyses. We performed stepwise regression analyses, including all cognitive control 
measures and their interactions with task goal condition and plan condition, and 
practice strategy as a covariate, to investigate which cognitive control components 
interacted significantly with task goal condition and plan condition. Because 
preliminary results only indicated significant effects for performance on the 2-Back 
task, and not for the other cognitive control components (all p’s > .28), we further 
only report results for this cognitive control measure.  
We investigated whether updating ability led to decision strategies and decision 
outcomes in line with an instructed task goal under different plan conditions. For this 
purpose we conducted GLM analyses with plan condition and task goal condition as 
between-participants factors, 2-Back task performance as continuous factor, and 
practice strategy as covariate.  
Strategy measure. First we subjected the number of requested beads in the Beads-
in-a-Jar task to a GLM analysis with only task goal condition and plan condition as 
between-participants factors, and practice strategy as covariate. As expected, a main 
effect of task goal was found: more beads were requested in the accuracy condition 
than in the efficiency condition, F(1, 123) = 47.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .28. Furthermore, a 
significant two-way interaction was found between task goal condition and plan 
condition, F(2, 123) = 4.59, p = .02, ηp2 = .07. Task goal condition had an effect on the 
number of requested beads in each plan condition, but the effect was stronger in the 
get plan condition, F(1, 38) = 22.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .38, than in the no plan condition, 
F(1, 40) = 11.25, p = .002, ηp2 = .22, and the make plan condition, F(1, 43) = 10.02, p = 
.003, ηp2 = .19.  
Subsequently, we subjected the number of requested beads in the Beads-in-a-Jar 
task to a GLM analysis with task goal condition and plan condition as between-
participants factors, performance on the 2-Back task as continuous factor, and 
practice strategy as covariate.  
63 
 
2-Back task errors. The two-way interaction task goal condition x 2-Back task 
errors was significant for the number of requested beads, F(1, 116) = 4.38, p = .04, ηp2 = 
.04. This two-way interaction was qualified by the significant three-way interaction 
task goal condition x plan condition x 2-Back task errors, F(2, 116) = 5.41, p = .006, ηp2 
= .09, see Figure 1. To interpret this significant three-way interaction we tested the 
underlying two-way interactions by the use of regression analyses. These analyses 
indicated that the interaction between task goal condition and 2-Back task errors was 
non-significant within the no plan condition, β = -.16, t(40) = -1.31, p = .20, and 
marginally significant within the make plan condition, β = .16, t(41) = 1.85, p = .08. 
Thus, higher 2-Back task performance did not lead to decision strategies in line with 
a task goal when participants received no additional instructions or had to make a 
plan themselves, see Figure 1a and Figure 1c. In the get plan condition, the 
interaction between task goal condition and 2-Back task errors was significant, β = 
.33, t(35) = 3.01, p = .005. Simple effects analyses indicated that fewer errors on the 2-
Back task were significantly related to requesting fewer beads in the efficiency 
condition, β = .45, t(17) = 2.75, p = .02, and marginally significantly to requesting more 
beads in the accuracy condition, β = -.32, t(17) = -2.02, p = .06, see Figure 1b.  
This finding supports the idea that when a predefined implementation intention 
is provided by the experimenter, updating ability fosters adherence to this plan and 
leads to decision strategies in line with the instructed task goal. These findings do not 
support the idea that predefined implementation intentions are especially beneficial 
for individuals with low (as compared to high) updating ability.    
2-Back task reaction times. Analysis concerning reaction times on the 2-Back task 
did not show any significant effects on the number of requested beads (all p’s > .09).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
64 
 
Figure 1. 
a.  
b.  
c.  
Figure 1. Untransformed estimated marginal means for the number of requested beads in the 
no plan (a), get plan (b), and make plan (c) condition. Low updating ability refers to 1 SD 
above the mean number of errors on the 2-Back task; High updating ability refers to 1 SD 
below the mean number of errors on the 2-Back task.  
 
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
Low Updating Ability High Updating Ability
Re
qu
es
te
d 
Be
ad
s
No Plan Condition
Accuracy
Efficiency
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
Low Updating Ability High Updating Ability
Re
qu
es
te
d 
Be
ad
s
Get Plan Condition
Accuracy
Efficiency
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
Low Updating Ability High Updating Ability
Re
qu
es
te
d 
Be
ad
s
Make Plan Condition
Accuracy
Efficiency
65 
 
Outcome measures. Correct decisions. First we subjected the number of correct 
decisions in the Beads-in-a-Jar task to a GLM analysis with only task goal condition 
and plan condition as between-participants factors, and practice strategy as 
covariate. As expected, a main effect of task goal was found: more correct decisions 
were made in the efficiency condition than in the accuracy condition, F(1, 123) = 
56.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .31. Furthermore, a significant two-way interaction was found 
between task goal condition and plan condition, F(2, 123) = 5.24, p = .007, ηp2 = .08. 
Task goal condition had an effect on the number of correct decisions in each plan 
condition, but the effect was stronger in the get plan condition, F(1, 38) = 38.31, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .50, than in the no plan condition, F(1, 40) = 15.55, p < .001, ηp2 = .28, and the 
make plan condition, F(1, 43) = 5.90, p = .02, ηp2 = .12. 
Subsequently, we subjected the number of correct decisions in the Beads-in-a-Jar 
task to a GLM analysis with task goal condition and plan condition as between-
participants factors, performance on the 2-Back task as continuous factor and practice 
strategy as covariate. 
2-Back task errors. The two-way interaction plan condition x 2-Back task errors was 
significant for the number of correct decisions in the Beads-in-a-Jar task, F(2, 116) = 
6.47, p = .002, ηp2 = .10. Follow-up regression analyses indicated that fewer errors on 
the 2-Back task were marginally significantly related to more correct decisions in the 
get plan condition, β = -.31, t(37) = -1.96, p = .06, but not in the no plan condition, β = 
.22, t(40) = 1.49, p = .14, or the make plan condition, β = .17, t(43) = 1.14, p = .26. Thus, 
higher 2-Back task performance was marginally significantly related to more correct 
decisions in the get plan condition, irrespective of task goal condition.  
The three-way interaction task goal condition x plan condition x errors on the 2-
Back task was not significant, F(2, 116) = 1.81, p = .17, ηp2 = .03. Nevertheless, because 
the two-way interaction task goal condition x 2-Back task errors was significant in the 
get plan condition for the strategy measure, we tested whether this two-way 
interaction in the get plan condition was also significant for the number of correct 
decisions. Analysis indicated that this interaction was only marginally significant, β = 
-.19, t(35) = -1.85, p = .08.  
2-Back task reaction times. Analysis concerning reaction times on the 2-Back task 
showed only a main effect of reaction times on the 2-Back task on the number of 
correct decisions in the Beads-in-a-Jar task. Faster reaction times were related to more 
correct decisions, F(1, 117) = 4.77, p = .04, ηp2 = .04.  
Incorrect decisions. Concerning the number of incorrect decisions in the Beads-in-a-
Jar task we again first performed a GLM analysis including only the between-
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Outcome measures. Correct decisions. First we subjected the number of correct 
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interaction in the get plan condition was also significant for the number of correct 
decisions. Analysis indicated that this interaction was only marginally significant, β = 
-.19, t(35) = -1.85, p = .08.  
2-Back task reaction times. Analysis concerning reaction times on the 2-Back task 
showed only a main effect of reaction times on the 2-Back task on the number of 
correct decisions in the Beads-in-a-Jar task. Faster reaction times were related to more 
correct decisions, F(1, 117) = 4.77, p = .04, ηp2 = .04.  
Incorrect decisions. Concerning the number of incorrect decisions in the Beads-in-a-
Jar task we again first performed a GLM analysis including only the between-
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participants factors task goal condition and plan condition, and practice strategy as 
covariate. As expected, only a main effect of task goal was found: fewer incorrect 
decisions were made in the accuracy condition than in the efficiency condition, F(1, 
123) = 31.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .20.  
Subsequently, we subjected the number of incorrect decisions in the Beads-in-a-
Jar task to a GLM analysis with task goal condition and plan condition as between-
participants factors, performance on the 2-Back task as continuous factor, and 
practice strategy as covariate. 
2-Back task errors. The two-way interaction task goal condition x 2-Back task errors 
on the number of incorrect decisions in the Beads-in-a-Jar task was significant, F(1, 
116) = 4.24, p = .05, ηp2 = .04. Follow-up regression analyses indicated that fewer errors 
on the 2-Back task were non-significantly related to fewer incorrect decisions in the 
accuracy condition, β = .19, t(61) = 1.61, p = .11, and unrelated to the number of 
incorrect decisions in the efficiency condition, β = -.08, t(62) = -.73, p = .47.  
The three-way interaction plan condition x task goal condition x errors on the 2-
Back task was not significant, F(2, 116) = 1.71, p = .19, ηp2 = .03. Nevertheless, because 
we found a significant two-way interaction between task goal condition and errors 
on the 2-Back task within the get plan condition on the strategy measure, we 
investigated whether this two-way interaction was also significant within the get 
plan condition on the number of incorrect decisions. Analysis indicated that this 
interaction was indeed significant, β = -.26, t(35) = -2.04, p = .05. Follow-up regression 
analyses indicated that fewer errors on the 2-Back task were unrelated to the number 
of incorrect decisions in the accuracy condition, β = .17, t(17) = 1.17, p = .26, and 
marginally significantly related to more incorrect decisions in the efficiency 
condition, β = -.37, t(17) = -1.76, p = .10. 
2-Back task reaction times. Analysis concerning reaction times on the 2-Back task 
did not show any significant effect on the number of incorrect decisions. 
 
Discussion 
While the findings from Chapter 2 showed that updating ability facilitates goal-
directed decision making, the study in this chapter focused on a potential underlying 
mechanism of this effect, namely the quality of and adherence to concrete goal-
related plans (or implementation intentions) that people generate when having to 
attain a specific goal.  
In the present study we investigated whether people with high (versus low) 
levels of cognitive control, specifically updating ability, were better able to perform a 
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task in line with a goal because they are better able to form or adhere to plans for 
performing goal-directed behavior. In short, the results showed that updating ability 
enhanced adherence to a pre-defined plan. Updating ability or other cognitive 
control abilities did not lead to better plan quality for attaining a goal. 
Updating Ability and Adherence to Implementation Intentions 
Concerning plan adherence, we found that updating ability only facilitated decision 
strategies in line with a goal when a predefined plan was given, suggesting that 
updating ability especially serves to keep information active and accessible. When no 
extra instruction concerning the goal was given, updating ability did not help in 
attaining a goal. This suggests that updating ability is especially or only beneficial 
when people know what behavior is useful for attaining a goal.  
The finding that updating ability facilitates successful application of 
implementation intentions seems to contradict the finding that individuals with low 
levels of cognitive control benefit most from implementation intentions. Most 
research on implementation intentions uses very concrete and simple 
implementation intentions (e.g., “When I see the number 3, I press particularly fast”, 
Lengfelder & Gollwitzer, 2001; “When I have old paperwork, I put it in the paper 
recycling container”, Holland, Aarts, & Langendam, 2006). Furthermore, these 
implementation intentions often involve an external cue in the environment. 
However, some situations might require a behavioral response to an internal cue 
instead of an external cue. For example, when one has the goal to stay calm in a 
heated discussion, an implementation intention could be: “When I feel excitement, I 
take a deep breath or walk away”. Such implementation intentions might require 
more effort in order to be effective. In the present research we instructed people to 
link a certain impression about the current situation (having a clue versus being 
certain) to a behavioral response. This might have required working memory abilities 
and more deliberate processing. If we had used extremely concrete implementation 
intentions, such as “When I have requested 11 beads, I choose the jar in line with the 
majority color as represented in the beads on the screen”, the role of updating ability 
might have been weaker or even absent. In general, the more concrete the plan, the 
less cognitive control is needed. The present research used plans that were relatively 
complex and therefore may have required updating ability.  
Updating Ability and Quality of Implementation Intentions 
Because updating ability facilitates goal-directed behavior, one could assume that 
people with high (as compared to low) updating ability are better at forming specific 
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plans (or implementation intentions) to attain these goals. Our findings do not 
support this idea. The finding that updating ability, or other cognitive control 
abilities, did not predict the quality of the implementation intentions can be seen in 
light of other research showing that people often have difficulty in generating good 
implementation intentions (see e.g., de Ridder, de Wit, & Adriaanse, 2009; 
Ziegelmann, Lippke, & Schwarzer, 2006; de Vet et al., 2011). For example, de Ridder, 
Ouwehand, Stok, and Aarts (2011) found that plan quality was rather low when 
participants who had the goal to lose weight were asked to form implementation 
intentions. Even for people with high levels of cognitive control it seems difficult to 
translate an abstract goal into a concrete plan. The absence of good plan formation 
could also explain the finding that individuals with high (versus low) levels of 
updating ability who were not given any additional instructions about the task goal, 
did not perform the task more in line with the task goal. We suggest that other 
individual differences might play a role in translating abstract goals into concrete 
actions, such as creativity or intelligence.  
Limitations and Future Research 
A number of findings from the present study deserve discussion. First, although the 
findings concerning the strategy measure are quite clear, the results concerning the 
outcome measures are less straightforward. That is, interaction effects were found of 
2-Back task performance and task goal on the number of incorrect decisions but not 
on the number of correct decisions in the Beads-in-a-Jar task. Moreover, we found 
that better 2-Back task performance was marginally significantly related to more 
correct decisions in general in the get plan condition. It could be that updating ability 
measures, such as the 2-Back task, do not only tap into the ability to monitor and 
update information in working memory, but also benefit from concentrated task 
performance. Such concentrated task involvement could lead to better overall 
performance in terms of enhanced number of correct decisions.  
Second, whereas cognitive control was unrelated to plan quality, the present 
study showed that people made better plans when instructed to be efficient as 
compared to people who were instructed to be accurate. It might be the case that 
being efficient is a more natural goal than being accurate, and that forming plans in 
line with efficiency is somewhat easier as compared to forming plans in line with an 
accuracy goal. However, exploratory analyses indicated that the number of 
requested beads in the practice rounds (which may be an indicator of natural 
behavioral in this task) was not particularly in line with either an accuracy or an 
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efficiency goal3. Therefore, the status of this effect is not clear at this stage and more 
empirical evidence is needed.  
Practical Implications 
The findings from the present study have a number of implications for real life 
scenarios. People sometimes have difficulties in attaining their goals and concrete 
plans might help them to overcome these difficulties. But letting people form a 
specific plan themselves when the goal is rather abstract might not be very successful 
because creating concrete plans seems to be difficult, even for people with high levels 
of cognitive control. Instead, a plan should be used that has proven to be successful, 
perhaps because it was made by an expert. Think for example about the goal to lose 
weight. A large number of diets and books are available that contain schedules 
created by experts about when and what to eat. Nevertheless, even when a successful 
plan is available, a certain amount of control might be needed for one to successfully 
implement a plan. When levels of cognitive control are low, people are probably best 
off with extremely concrete if-then plans. Setting an alarm at certain times might for 
example trigger the response of eating an apple. Updating ability fosters successful 
implementation of a plan as it helps to keep relevant information active and 
accessible. For this reason, people with low updating ability might benefit from 
writing down their plan and check at pre-defined moments whether their behavior is 
in line with their plan.  
 
Conclusion 
In Chapter 2, updating ability was found to be related to decision strategies and 
outcomes in line with instructed task goals. The research in this chapter showed that 
updating ability or other cognitive control abilities did not lead to better formation of 
plans. Instead, it was found that updating ability enhanced adherence to plans for 
attaining goals in decision making. Implementation intentions have been proven to 
be a successful intervention in goal-directed behavior and the present research shows 
that implementation intentions can be especially useful when the applied plans have 
already been proven to be successful and updating abilities are high. People seem 
less successful at generating high quality plans themselves.  
To summarize, people with high (as compared to low) cognitive control abilities, 
specifically updating ability, are better able to act in line with their goals not because 
                                                 
3 The mean number of requested beads in the practice rounds was 8.84 whereas the mean number of requested 
beads in the accuracy condition and efficiency condition was 9.89 and 7.71 respectively.  
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they are such good plan makers, but because they have the ability to stick to plans 
that help them reach their goals in making decisions.   
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Chapter 4 
 
Updating Ability in Goal-Directed 
Decision Making:  
Conceptual Replication, Causality, and 
Ecological Validity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Success in any endeavor does not happen by accident.  
Rather, it’s the result of deliberate decisions, conscious 
effort, and immense persistence...all directed at specific 
goals.”  
Gary Ryan Blair 
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Abstract 
The findings from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 suggest that updating ability fosters goal 
pursuit in decision making. This chapter aims to replicate this finding with the use of 
a different decision making paradigm (the Project Strategy Game) and a different set 
of goals (earning money versus saving the environment). Second, to prove a causal 
link between updating ability and goal-directed decision making, updating ability 
was manipulated by inducing a memory load. Third, the potential confounding role 
of fluid intelligence in the administered Project Strategy Game was explored. Finally, 
to enhance ecological validity, a study was conducted with experienced decision 
makers.  
Study 4.1 replicated previous findings that updating ability fosters decision 
strategies and outcomes in line with an instructed task goal. In Study 4.2, decision 
strategies (but not decision outcomes) were less in line with the instructed task goal 
when a high memory load was induced. Furthermore, updating ability was found to 
uniquely predict goal-directed decision making, irrespective of fluid intelligence. 
Study 4.3 showed that updating ability facilitates goal-directed decision making in 
experienced decision makers. In sum, the results provide further empirical support 
for the idea that updating ability uniquely contributes to goal-directed decision 
making. The findings are discussed in relation to existing theories on cognitive 
control.    
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When it comes to making decisions, it is important to optimize the decision making 
process people engage in. Unfortunately, people do not always prove to be good 
decision makers. They might get distracted, gather insufficient information before 
making a decision, are too emotionally involved or are under too much time 
pressure. In addition to these situational factors, individual differences exist in 
decision making abilities. Some people seem to have fewer problems with making 
the right decision than others. What makes person A good at making decisions 
whereas person B regularly fails?  
 
Individual Differences in Decision Making 
Research on individual differences in decision making is abundant. Recently, Appelt, 
Milch, Handgraaf, and Weber (2011) provided an overview of the different measures 
that are used to examine individual differences in decision making. These individual 
difference measures include decision making style and decision approach (e.g., 
indecision, regret) but also decision making competence scales, such as the Adult 
Decision Making Competence (A-DMC, Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007). 
Individual difference measures concerning decision making also include risk attitude 
and cognitive ability. The latter can be divided into measures of global ability and 
measures of specific abilities. An example of a global ability is fluid intelligence and 
is often measured by the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven, & 
Court, 1998). Measures of specific skills include for example the Subjective Numeracy 
Scale (Fagerlin et al., 2007). Finally, motivation measures, such as self-regulation and 
social desirability, and personality inventories are widely used for predicting 
individual differences in decision making.  
Although the above measures provide useful insight into individual differences 
in decision making, they do not directly consider goal-directedness in decision 
making. As was highlighted in the previous chapters in this dissertation, the goals of 
the decision maker are a key aspect in determining the quality of the decision 
process. When investigating goal-directed decision making, one individual difference 
measure is of particular relevance, that is, the amount of control that is exerted 
during the decision process.  
 
Cognitive Control and Decision Making 
Cognitive control is also often referred to as executive functioning and a recent 
taxonomy of cognitive control postulates three basic executive functions: updating, 
switching, and inhibition. Updating refers to the ability to monitor and encode new 
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information and replace old irrelevant information; switching refers to the ability of 
switching between different tasks, actions or mental states, and inhibition refers to 
the ability to inhibit dominant or automatic reactions when needed (Miyake et al., 
2000; see also Hofmann, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012).  
Recently, a number of studies have pointed out the importance of these cognitive 
control abilities in decision making competence (Del Missier et al., 2010; 2012). The 
idea that cognitive control plays a role in decision making is not new (see e.g., 
Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Stanovich & West, 1998; 
Magar, Phillips, & Hosie, 2008; Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003; Mischel, Shoda, & 
Rodriguez, 1989). Nevertheless, the focus on individual differences regarding the 
three different components of cognitive control (updating, switching, and inhibition) 
provided more specific knowledge about the role of cognitive control in decision 
making. For example, Del Missier et al. (2012) found that updating and inhibition 
were related to resistance to framing effects, whereas switching was related to 
decision tasks involving risk perception.  
 
Updating Ability and Goal-Directed Decision Making 
The studies reported in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 specifically focused on the role of 
cognitive control in goal pursuit in decision making. In these studies, participants 
were instructed with the task goal of either accuracy or efficiency in an abstract 
decision task in which a series of decisions had to be made. It was found that better 
performance on an updating task was associated with decision strategies and 
outcomes in line with a task goal. These studies were the first to explicitly show the 
relationship between updating ability and decision making as a function of goals. It 
was suggested that the cognitive control component updating played a role because 
updating ability involves monitoring current actions and comparing them to the goal 
in mind. No effects were found for inhibition or switching ability, probably because 
the administered decision task did not require switching or inhibition.  
The studies from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 provide useful insight into the relation 
between updating ability and decision making. Nevertheless, a number of issues 
should be addressed in order to make a stronger claim for the role of updating ability 
in goal-directed decision making. First, the findings from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 
might be specific to the goals of accuracy and efficiency and the Beads-in-a-Jar task 
itself. For this reason, it should be investigated whether updating ability also predicts 
goal-directed decision making in a different decision task and with a different set of 
goals. In line with the current focus on tasks involving repeated decisions, this new 
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task should also consist of a series of smaller decisions that are made in the service of 
an overarching goal.  
Second, the findings from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 rely on correlations between 
individual differences in updating ability and decision strategies and outcomes. To 
provide evidence for a causal link between updating ability and goal-directed 
decision making, updating ability should be manipulated experimentally. For 
example, a memory load can be induced, taxing a person’s working memory and 
thereby decreasing updating ability. Some research has indeed used cognitive load to 
investigate the role of cognitive processes in decision making. For example, Shiv and 
Fedorikhin (1999) investigated the effect of cognitive load on healthy versus 
unhealthy consumer choices and found that cognitive load led to more unhealthy 
choices (see also Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt, 2008). However, 
the nature of the decisions that we investigate in this dissertation is different from 
that in research on consumer choices. That is, the current focus is on a series of 
decisions that have to be in line with an overarching task goal in order to attain that 
goal. Furthermore, we focus specifically on the role of updating ability in goal-
directed decision making. 
The administered task for measuring updating ability in the present study, but 
also the studies described in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, is an n-Back task. In this task, 
participants have to indicate whether a stimulus on a current trial is the same as the 
stimulus that was presented on n trials back. This task relies heavily on working 
memory processes. Different versions of the n-Back task rely on working memory 
abilities to different degrees. For example, a 1-Back task taxes working memory 
processes less than a 2-Back or 3-Back task (see e.g., Braver et al., 1997; Verhaeghen & 
Basak, 2005). This is because the presented stimuli have to remain active in working 
memory for a longer time in a 3-Back task than in a 1-Back task. Furthermore, 
administering a second task in combination with an n-Back task decreases 
performance on the n-Back task (see Jaeggi et al., 2003). Because findings from 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 show that performance on the 2-Back task predicts goal-
directed decision making, it is expected that inducing a memory load during the 
decision making process will tap into the very process of keeping relevant 
information active in working memory. As a consequence, the processes that are 
needed for successful updating will become “occupied”, in the sense that they are 
concurrently used for other purposes, and cannot be used to keep goal-relevant 
information active in mind.  
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task should also consist of a series of smaller decisions that are made in the service of 
an overarching goal.  
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Third, research indicates that fluid intelligence tasks and tasks such as the n-Back 
task, used to measure updating ability, often correlate (Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Perrig, & 
Meier, 2010). The findings from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 could therefore be 
explained by the shared characteristics between the 2-Back task and general cognitive 
abilities, instead of by the unique contribution of updating ability. For this purpose, 
we included a measure of fluid intelligence in the present research and investigated 
its role in goal-directed decision making.   
Finally, the findings from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are based on studies with 
university students. Although the findings provide useful insight into the role of 
updating ability in goal-directed decision making, it is relevant to replicate the 
findings with a group of experienced decision makers in the field. The suggestion 
that updating ability is predictive of goal-directed decision making might be of 
special relevance for a group of experienced decision makers, who encounter 
complex and new situations every day.  
 
The Present Research 
As outlined above, the aim of the present research is fourfold. First, the aim is to 
replicate the finding that updating ability facilitates goal-directed decision making by 
the use of a different decision making paradigm and different goals than used in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 (Study 4.1, Study 4.2, and Study 4.3 in this chapter). For this 
purpose, we developed a new decision task: the Project Strategy Game. Existing 
decision tasks do not easily allow for investigating decision making in light of 
specific task goals. Similar to the administered Beads-in-a-Jar task in the studies from 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, the Project Strategy Game has the characteristic of 
requiring a series of decisions that have to be in line with an instructed task goal. By 
investigating these series of decisions we are able to determine the strategies used, 
and whether these strategies are in line with the instructed goal. We hypothesize that 
updating ability, but not switching or inhibition ability, facilitates goal-directed 
decision making in the Project Strategy Game, as only updating ability seems to be 
involved in keeping a goal active in mind.  
Second, we aim to show a causal relationship between updating ability and goal-
directed decision making (Study 4.2). By inducing a memory load we tax the abilities 
that are needed to successfully engage in updating. Therefore, we hypothesize that 
by manipulating updating ability (by the use of a memory load), decision strategies 
and outcomes become less in line with the instructed task goal. We also explore a 
possible interaction between updating ability and memory load. First, people with 
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high updating ability might have extra resources available and will therefore be less 
affected by a memory load as compared to people with low updating ability. Second, 
it might be possible that especially people with high updating ability rely on this 
ability for performing a task in line with a task goal and therefore will be most 
affected by the memory load. Third, the memory load could be that high, or the 
decision task that difficult, that individuals with low updating ability as well as 
individuals with high updating ability are affected by the memory load.  
Third, we aim to explore the possible role of general cognitive abilities in goal-
directed decision making (Study 4.2). Individual differences in general cognitive 
abilities have been found to be predictive of decision making performance (see 
Appelt et al., 2011). However, the findings from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 underscore 
the specific relevance of updating ability in goal-directed decision making. We 
therefore hypothesize that updating ability uniquely predicts decision strategies and 
outcomes, irrespective of general cognitive abilities such as fluid intelligence.  
Fourth, we aimed to replicate the findings with a group of experienced decision 
makers in the field (Study 4.3). Validating the results concerning updating ability and 
goal-directed decision making with a group of experienced decision makers is a 
valuable approach as it enhances the ecological validity of the findings. Therefore, 
we report on a study in which a group of Dutch mayors participated.  
 
Study 4.1 
In Study 4.1 we attempted to replicate the finding that updating ability facilitates 
goal pursuit in decision making by the use of a different decision task and different 
goals than used in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. We measured individual differences in 
updating, switching, and inhibition and administered a decision task in which 
participants had to earn points for either financial purposes or environmental 
purposes by choosing from four stacks of projects.  
Method 
Participants and design. Eighty-nine students of the Radboud University 
Nijmegen (80 females) participated in the study in exchange for money (7.50 euros) 
or course credits1. Age ranged from 18 to 29, M = 21.2, SD = 2.7. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two task goal conditions (money or environment).  
                                                 
1 The original sample consisted of 90 participants. One participant had an age above 50 and was therefore 
removed from the dataset a priori. Including this participant in the analyses yielded similar results as reported.  
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it might be possible that especially people with high updating ability rely on this 
ability for performing a task in line with a task goal and therefore will be most 
affected by the memory load. Third, the memory load could be that high, or the 
decision task that difficult, that individuals with low updating ability as well as 
individuals with high updating ability are affected by the memory load.  
Third, we aim to explore the possible role of general cognitive abilities in goal-
directed decision making (Study 4.2). Individual differences in general cognitive 
abilities have been found to be predictive of decision making performance (see 
Appelt et al., 2011). However, the findings from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 underscore 
the specific relevance of updating ability in goal-directed decision making. We 
therefore hypothesize that updating ability uniquely predicts decision strategies and 
outcomes, irrespective of general cognitive abilities such as fluid intelligence.  
Fourth, we aimed to replicate the findings with a group of experienced decision 
makers in the field (Study 4.3). Validating the results concerning updating ability and 
goal-directed decision making with a group of experienced decision makers is a 
valuable approach as it enhances the ecological validity of the findings. Therefore, 
we report on a study in which a group of Dutch mayors participated.  
 
Study 4.1 
In Study 4.1 we attempted to replicate the finding that updating ability facilitates 
goal pursuit in decision making by the use of a different decision task and different 
goals than used in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. We measured individual differences in 
updating, switching, and inhibition and administered a decision task in which 
participants had to earn points for either financial purposes or environmental 
purposes by choosing from four stacks of projects.  
Method 
Participants and design. Eighty-nine students of the Radboud University 
Nijmegen (80 females) participated in the study in exchange for money (7.50 euros) 
or course credits1. Age ranged from 18 to 29, M = 21.2, SD = 2.7. Participants were 
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1 The original sample consisted of 90 participants. One participant had an age above 50 and was therefore 
removed from the dataset a priori. Including this participant in the analyses yielded similar results as reported.  
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Materials2. Cognitive control tasks. Switching task. To measure switching, we 
adopted a Number Switch task. In this task, participants had to respond to numbers 
(1 to 10) according to different rules. When the number was printed in yellow, 
participants had to indicate whether the number was odd or even. When the number 
was printed in blue, participants had to indicate whether the number was greater 
than five or smaller than or equal to five (for more details see Study 3.1). In order to 
learn the sorting rules, the first block contained only one sorting rule (odd/even) 
whereas the second block contained the other sorting rule (smaller/greater than 5). 
Next, participants performed two blocks of 32 experimental trials containing both 
sorting rules. Participants received 10 practice trials preceding block 1, block 2, and 
block 3. A trial was labeled as a switch trial when it required a different response rule 
than the previous trial. A trial was labeled as a non-switch trial if the same response 
rule was required as on the previous trial. The difference in reaction times and errors 
on the switch trials versus the non-switch trials from block 3 and block 4 served as 
indicators of switching performance.  
Updating task. To measure updating, we used a 2-Back task (for more details see 
Study 2.1). In this task, participants were shown letters on the screen, presented 
consecutively. For each letter, participants had to indicate whether the letter on the 
screen was the same as the letter that was presented two trials before. Participants 
had to indicate, with one of two key presses, whether the letter did or did not match. 
Participants performed 10 practice trials and 45 experimental trials. Reaction times 
on the correct trials and the number of errors served as indicators of updating 
performance.  
Inhibition task. To measure inhibition, we used a mouse-click version of the Stroop 
task (for more details see Study 2.1). In this version of the Stroop task, words were 
displayed on the middle of the screen one by one. The words were displayed in one 
of four colors (green, yellow, blue, or red). At the bottom of the screen, the four color 
words were displayed in black ink. Participants were instructed to click (with the 
mouse) on the color word displayed at the bottom of the screen matching the color of 
the ink of the word displayed on the middle of the screen. The task included 12 trials 
                                                 
2 For exploratory reasons we also included measures of creativity, subjective numeracy, sensation seeking, 
promotion-prevention focus, behavioral inhibition and activation, and action-state orientation. The results of 
these measures are not reported because they are beyond the scope of this dissertation. We also measured self-
reported motivation and intention after completion of the Project Strategy Game. Self-reported motivation and 
intention were related to outcome and strategy measures of the Project Strategy Game but not 2-Back task 
performance. Because self-reported motivation and intention were measured post-hoc, any causal relation with 
performance is doubtful. Importantly, self-reported motivation and intention did not explain the reported effects. 
We therefore chose to refrain from reporting these results. 
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with neutral words (filler trials), 12 incongruent trials, and 12 congruent trials. 
Participants received 12 practice trials and 36 experimental trials. The reaction time 
difference between the (correct) inconsistent and (correct) consistent trials served as 
indicator of inhibition performance.  
Project Strategy Game. In the Project Strategy Game, participants had to imagine 
being the owner of a company and carrying out projects. With each project, 
participants could earn or lose points for both money and environment. Participants 
were either instructed to obtain as many points as possible for financial purposes 
(money condition) or for environmental purposes (environment condition). 
Participants could choose between four stacks of projects. The stacks were named 
“North”, “South”, “West”, and “East” and were displayed on the screen as rectangles 
corresponding to the directions they represent: above, below, left, and right 
respectively. Participants played five rounds of the game, each round consisting of 11 
trials or choices. Participants could click on the stack of projects of their choice and 
were shown their earned or lost points for both money and environment on a new 
screen. Earnings and losses of each project were not known to the participants until 
clicked on. After this, they could make a new choice in the next trial. Participants 
were not allowed to let their company go bankrupt. This would be the case if 
participants in the money condition would drop below zero for the environment 
after 11 choices, or when participants in the environment condition would drop 
below zero for money after 11 choices. In other words, participants had to maximize 
their points on their focal goal, without dropping below zero on their non-focal goal. 
Bankruptcy meant that all collected points from that round were lost and not added 
to the total number of points in the Project Strategy Game. 
In addition to the stacks of projects presented on the screen, the current round 
number (1 to 5), trial number (1 to 11), and the number of points for money and 
environment gained in the current round were presented on the screen. After each 
round, participants were presented with their total round score, potential 
bankruptcy, and an interim score concerning the total number of points earned over 
all finished rounds and total number of bankruptcies. After completion of all five 
rounds they were shown their overall score.  
Because the Project Strategy Game was designed to investigate decision 
strategies, the four stacks of projects each had a different characteristic: 1) One stack 
contained “safe” projects with an expected value of 50 points for money and 15 
points for environment, 2) One stack contained “safe” projects with an expected 
value of 50 points for environment and 15 for money, 3) One stack contained “risky” 
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reported motivation and intention after completion of the Project Strategy Game. Self-reported motivation and 
intention were related to outcome and strategy measures of the Project Strategy Game but not 2-Back task 
performance. Because self-reported motivation and intention were measured post-hoc, any causal relation with 
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with neutral words (filler trials), 12 incongruent trials, and 12 congruent trials. 
Participants received 12 practice trials and 36 experimental trials. The reaction time 
difference between the (correct) inconsistent and (correct) consistent trials served as 
indicator of inhibition performance.  
Project Strategy Game. In the Project Strategy Game, participants had to imagine 
being the owner of a company and carrying out projects. With each project, 
participants could earn or lose points for both money and environment. Participants 
were either instructed to obtain as many points as possible for financial purposes 
(money condition) or for environmental purposes (environment condition). 
Participants could choose between four stacks of projects. The stacks were named 
“North”, “South”, “West”, and “East” and were displayed on the screen as rectangles 
corresponding to the directions they represent: above, below, left, and right 
respectively. Participants played five rounds of the game, each round consisting of 11 
trials or choices. Participants could click on the stack of projects of their choice and 
were shown their earned or lost points for both money and environment on a new 
screen. Earnings and losses of each project were not known to the participants until 
clicked on. After this, they could make a new choice in the next trial. Participants 
were not allowed to let their company go bankrupt. This would be the case if 
participants in the money condition would drop below zero for the environment 
after 11 choices, or when participants in the environment condition would drop 
below zero for money after 11 choices. In other words, participants had to maximize 
their points on their focal goal, without dropping below zero on their non-focal goal. 
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to the total number of points in the Project Strategy Game. 
In addition to the stacks of projects presented on the screen, the current round 
number (1 to 5), trial number (1 to 11), and the number of points for money and 
environment gained in the current round were presented on the screen. After each 
round, participants were presented with their total round score, potential 
bankruptcy, and an interim score concerning the total number of points earned over 
all finished rounds and total number of bankruptcies. After completion of all five 
rounds they were shown their overall score.  
Because the Project Strategy Game was designed to investigate decision 
strategies, the four stacks of projects each had a different characteristic: 1) One stack 
contained “safe” projects with an expected value of 50 points for money and 15 
points for environment, 2) One stack contained “safe” projects with an expected 
value of 50 points for environment and 15 for money, 3) One stack contained “risky” 
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projects with an expected value of 250 points for money and -125 for environment, 
and 4) One stack contained “risky” projects with an expected value of 250 points for 
environment and -125 for money (see the appendix for the full range of points for 
each project type). Participants did not have a priori knowledge about the 
characteristics of the stacks of projects. That is, they had to learn the expected values 
and characteristics of the stacks of projects by themselves throughout the game. The 
goal of earning as many points as possible for money or for the environment could 
be attained by adopting an optimal strategy concerning the four types of projects. 
Bearing in mind the expected values of each project type, the optimal strategy for 
participants was to choose from the two risky project types in a proportion of seven 
to four, that is, seven risky projects in favor of the focal goal and four risky projects in 
favor of the non-focal goal. For example, a participant in the money condition who 
would always choose the stack with safe projects in favor of money would earn 550 
points for money and 165 points for environment in one round. A participant in the 
money condition always choosing the stack with risky projects in favor of money 
would earn 2750 points for money and -1375 for environment and thus go bankrupt. 
However, the minus points for the environment could be compensated for by 
choosing the stack with risky projects in favor of the environment. A participant in 
the money condition who would choose the stack with risky projects in favor of 
money seven times and the stack with risky projects in favor of environment four 
times would earn 1250 points for money and 125 points for environment, thereby 
maximizing points for the money goal without dropping below zero on the 
environment.  
Five pseudorandom orders of 11 digits (one for each round) were created for the 
four types of values (highly positive, highly negative, slightly positive, and positive). 
As a result, the points for money and environment were presented in a different 
order in each round. Highly positive and highly negative values (risky projects) or 
positive and slightly positive values (safe projects) were coupled in five different 
pseudorandom orders. As a consequence, participants could not predict their exact 
earnings for money and environment when clicking on a project.  
By the use of a Latin square, it was determined what type of project was coupled 
with what wind direction. This resulted in four different versions of the Project 
Strategy Game, in which each of the project types had a different location on the 
screen. The first round of the game served as practice round and was not included in 
the analyses. 
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Strategy and outcome measures in the Project Strategy Game. To gain insight into 
participants’ decision strategies, we adopted a measure for investigating decision 
strategies in the Project Strategy Game. More specifically, we calculated a score 
representing participants’ decision strategy. This score was operationalized by 
counting the number of times participants choose the risky projects in favour of the 
focal goal and the risky projects in favour of the non-focal goal in a ratio of 2:1 within 
each round. The ratio 2:1 most closely resembles the optimal ratio of 7:4 (see above). 
Each time this ratio of 2:1 occurred within a round, a strategy point was assigned. For 
example, a participant in the environment condition who chose the risky project in 
favour of the environment 4 times, the risky project in favour of money 4 times and 
the safe project in favour of the environment 3 times would get a score of 2, because 
the ratio 2:1 occurred 2 times (i.e., 4 risky projects in favour of the focal goal and at 
least 2 risky projects in favour of the non-focal goal). No strategy points were 
assigned for choosing safe projects. For the outcome measure we obtained the 
number of earned points for the focal goal.  
Note that the above mentioned ratio of 2:1 pertains to 2 risky projects in favour of 
money and 1 risky project in favour of the environment in the money condition 
whereas the ratio of 2:1 pertains to 2 risky projects in favour of environment and 1 
risky project in favour of money in the environment condition. The number of earned 
points refers to points earned for money in the money condition and to points earned 
for environment in the environment condition. Materially speaking, this means that 
the number of strategy points and earned points already include an interaction with 
task goal.  
Understanding of the Project Strategy Game. To get more insight into participants’ 
understanding of the game we included several additional questions after 
completion of the Project Strategy Game. We asked participants to describe each of 
the stacks of projects in an open text box and to rate the safeness versus riskiness and 
usefulness of each stack of projects on 10-point Likert scales. Furthermore, we asked 
participants to indicate what they had to avoid and aim for in the game in an open 
text box and to indicate for which goal they had to earn the most points on a 2-point 
scale. Inspection of these data revealed that almost all participants understood the 
game. One participant indicated not to have paid attention during the Project 
Strategy Game and was therefore omitted from the data analyses3. 
                                                 
3 Including this participant in the analyses yielded the same pattern of significant and non-significant results as 
reported.  
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Strategy and outcome measures in the Project Strategy Game. To gain insight into 
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3 Including this participant in the analyses yielded the same pattern of significant and non-significant results as 
reported.  
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Procedure. Before the start of the experiment, all participants signed an informed 
consent form. The study was completely computerized and participants were 
informed that the study consisted of several parts. First, individual differences in 
cognitive control were measured in a fixed order: first the Number Switch task, then 
the Stroop task, and then the 2-Back task. After completing the cognitive control 
tasks, participants received instructions for the Project Strategy Game. Half of the 
participants was instructed to obtain as many points as possible for money; the other 
half was instructed to obtain as many points as possible for the environment. All 
participants then played the Project Strategy Game. To enhance motivation, 
participants were told that their performance on the Project Strategy Game could 
contribute to a donation to a charity of their choice. They were told that the charity 
for which most points were earned would receive a donation of 50 euros (see de 
Vries, Holland, Corneille, Rondeel, & Witteman, 2012). After the Project Strategy 
Game, participants were asked a number of additional questions regarding their 
understanding of the Project Strategy Game.  
Results 
For the 2-Back task and the Number Switch task we removed reaction times below 
300 ms. For the Stroop task, we excluded reaction time data that deviated more than 
3 SDs from the total mean (1.7% for congruent trials; 3.7% for incongruent trials). 
Participants who had a performance that deviated more than 3 SDs from the mean 
on the cognitive control measures were removed from the analyses concerning that 
specific cognitive control measure (N = 1 for errors on the 2-Back task; N = 1 for 
switch cost in terms of correct responses; N = 2 for switch cost in terms of reaction 
times) 4.  
We hypothesized that participants with high levels of updating ability would 
perform better on the strategy and outcome measures as compared to participants 
with low levels of updating ability. To test this hypothesis we conducted an analysis 
in which we entered the number of earned points and the number of strategy points 
as criterion in separate regression analyses and performance on the cognitive control 
measure as predictor. We also added the interaction term task goal condition (money 
versus environment) x cognitive control measure in the analyses to explore whether 
cognitive control was a stronger predictor for decision strategies and outcomes in 
                                                 
4 Including these participants in the analyses yielded the same pattern of significant and non-significant results as 
reported. 
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one of the task goals. Separate regression analyses were performed for the different 
cognitive control measures.  
Strategy measure. Analysis indicated that fewer errors on the 2-Back task were 
related to more strategy points in the Project Strategy Game, β = -.36, t(83) = -3.36, p = 
.001. The effect of task goal condition on the number of strategy points was non-
significant, β = -.15, t(83) = -1.47, p = .15. Furthermore, a marginally significant 
interaction effect was found between task goal condition and errors on the 2-Back 
task, β = -.18, t(83) = -1.69, p = .10. For exploratory reasons we further investigated this 
interaction. Simple effects analyses indicated that fewer errors on the 2-Back task 
were related to more strategy points in the environment condition, β = -.43, t(39) = -
2.98, p = .005. Fewer errors on the 2-Back task were non-significantly related to more 
strategy points in the money condition, β = -.22, t(44) = -1.48, p = .15. Thus, the effect 
of updating ability on the number of strategy points was more pronounced in the 
environment condition, see Figure 1a. 
Performance in terms of reaction times on the 2-Back task was unrelated to the 
number of strategy points, β = -.18, t(84) = -1.641, p = .11. The interaction with task 
goal condition was also non-significant, β = -.10, t(84) = -.96, p = .34.  
Switch cost in terms of correct responses was not related to the number of 
strategy points in the Project Strategy Game (p = .60). However, a significant 
interaction was found with task goal condition, β = .29, t(83) = 2.75, p = .007. Simple 
effects analyses indicated that lower switch cost in terms of correct responses was 
related to more strategy points in the money condition, β = -.38, t(44) = -2.68, p = .01, 
but not in the environment condition, β = .21, t(39) = 1.37, p = .18.  
Because both performance on the 2-Back task and the Number Switch task 
predicted strategy points in the Project Strategy Game, we investigated whether the 
effects of updating ability and switching ability uniquely predicted the number of 
strategy points. For this purpose we entered both predictors, including the two-way 
interaction with task goal condition, in a regression model. Results indicated that the 
main effect of errors on the 2-Back task as well as the interaction between switch cost 
in terms of errors and task goal condition remained significant, β = -.32, t(80) = -3.02, 
p = .003, and β = .25, t(80) = 2.45, p = .02, respectively. Both effects thus separately 
predicted strategy points in the Project Strategy Game.  
Switch cost in terms of reaction times and performance on the Stroop task were 
unrelated to the number of strategy points in the Project Strategy Game (all p’s > .40). 
All interactions with task goal condition were also non-significant (all p’s > .53).  
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Figure 1. 
a.  
b.  
The relation between updating ability and the number of strategy points (a) and number of 
earned points (b) in the Project Strategy Game for both task goal conditions. Low updating 
ability refers to 1 SD above the mean number of errors on the 2-Back task; high updating 
ability refers to 1 SD below this mean (see also Aiken and West, 1991). 
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Outcome measure. Next, we tested whether updating ability would predict the 
number of earned points in the Project Strategy Game. Analysis indicated that fewer 
errors on the 2-Back task were related to more earned points for the focal goal, β = -
.30, t(83) = -2.74, p = .007. The main effect of task goal condition was non-significant, β 
= -.08, t(83) = -.71, p = .48. A marginally significant interaction was found between 
task goal condition and errors on the 2-Back task, β = -.21, t(83) = -1.96, p = .06, see 
Figure 1b. Simple effects analyses indicated that fewer errors on the 2-Back task were 
related to more earned points in the environment condition, β = -.46, t(40) = -3.20, p = 
.003, but not in the money condition, β = -.09, t(44) = -.61, p = .54.  
Analysis concerning reaction times on the 2-Back task indicated that faster 
reaction times were marginally significantly related to more earned points in the 
Project Strategy Game, β = -.21, t(84) = -1.92, p = .06. The interaction with task goal 
condition was non-significant, β = -.04, t(84) = -.32, p = .75.  
Analyses indicated that switch cost in terms of correct responses or reaction 
times, and performance on the Stroop task were unrelated to the number of earned 
points in the Project Strategy Game (all p’s > .50). The interactions with task goal 
condition were also non-significant (all p’s > .11). 
Discussion 
In Study 4.1 we investigated whether individuals with high (versus low) updating 
ability show decision strategies and outcomes in line with a task goal in the Project 
Strategy Game. It was indeed found that participants with high updating ability 
were more likely to choose projects in favor of the focal and non-focal goal in an 
optimal combination (i.e., 2:1), thereby earning more strategy points, as compared to 
participants with low updating ability. Furthermore, participants with high (versus 
low) updating ability earned more points for the focal goal. The findings indicated 
that errors on the updating (2-Back) task were predictive of both strategies and 
outcomes in the Project Strategy Game. Reaction times on the updating task were 
only weakly related to outcomes in line with the task goal.  
We replicated the earlier finding that updating ability fosters efficient goal 
pursuit in decision making. Furthermore, we showed that the previous finding that 
updating ability facilitates goal pursuit in decision making is not restricted to the 
previously investigated goals of accuracy and efficiency (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 
3). In the current study we developed a new decision making paradigm. The goals of 
the task were earning money or saving the environment. Although updating ability 
especially had an effect on decision strategies when the focal goal was environment, 
the interaction between task goal and updating ability was not significant. However, 
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we do elaborate on the nature of different goals in the general discussion, as it seems 
possible that some goals might need more control than other goals.  
The findings from Study 4.1 also indicated an effect of switching ability on the 
number of strategy points. Switching ability especially led to better decision 
strategies in the money condition. Although we did not expect an effect of switching 
ability in the Project Strategy Game, the nature of the task might have evoked the 
need for switching. In the Project Strategy Game, participants had to choose projects 
that were either in favor of money or in favor of the environment. Even when the 
focal goal was money, participants had to switch to projects that were in favor of the 
environment to optimize their decision strategy. Note that the most optimal strategy 
consisted of switching between risky projects in favor of the focal goal and risky 
projects in favor of the non-focal goal. Possibly, switching ability helped to respond 
to relevant cues (i.e., the interim score of a round) and switch to the most appropriate 
projects, in this case projects that were at first sight not in line with a money goal. 
When the focal goal was environment, switching ability did not lead to better 
decision strategies. This might indicate that switching to projects that were in favor 
of money did not seem to require switching ability. Possibly, switching to more 
ordinary goals, such as earning money, requires less switching ability than switching 
to less ordinary goals, such as benefiting the environment. Nevertheless, the role of 
switching ability in goal-directed decision making is unclear and caution should be 
taken when interpreting these findings. Therefore, more research is needed to 
investigate the role of switching ability in goal-directed decision making.  
To summarize, in Study 4.1 we replicated the finding that updating ability 
facilitates goal pursuit in decision making with a new decision making paradigm 
using different goals. However, because this study relies on correlations between 
individual differences in updating ability and decision strategies and outcomes, it is 
difficult to infer causality from the findings. Therefore, in Study 4.2 we 
experimentally manipulated updating ability by inducing a memory load.  
 
Study 4.2 
In Study 4.2 we investigated whether a manipulation of updating ability would 
decrease decision strategies and outcomes in line with a task goal in the Project 
Strategy Game. We hypothesized that participants in a high load condition would 
perform less in line with the task goal as compared to participants in a low load 
condition, because a memory load taps into the very processes needed for successful 
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updating. Additionally, we investigated the role of fluid intelligence in the Project 
Strategy Game.  
Method 
Participants and design. One hundred and three students of the Radboud 
University Nijmegen (83 females) participated in the study in exchange for money 
(7.50 euros) or course credits. Age ranged from 17 to 29, M = 20.67, SD = 2.70. 
Participants were randomly assigned to a two (load: low versus high) by two (task 
goal: money versus environment) between-participants design.  
Materials and procedure5. Participants completed the same cognitive control 
tasks and Project Strategy Game as in Study 4.1. In the Project Strategy Game, 
participants were given an extra instruction which served as the load manipulation. 
Before each round of the Project Strategy Game, participants were given either a 1- or 
a 6-digit number which they were instructed to remember. In the low load condition, 
participants had to remember a 1-digit number; in the high load condition 
participants had to remember a 6-digit number. The number was presented for a 
duration of six seconds in the middle of the screen. After each round, participants 
were asked to report the number.  
To investigate whether fluid intelligence played a role in the Project Strategy 
Game, we administered a short version (12 items) of the Raven Progressive Matrices. 
The time limit for completion of the Raven Progressive Matrices was seven minutes. 
The maximum duration of the experiment was 45 minutes. Therefore, only 
participants who had enough time left after completion of the Project Strategy Game 
completed the Raven Progressive Matrices.   
The study was completely computerized and participants were informed that the 
study consisted of several parts. Beforehand, all participants signed an informed 
consent form. First, individual differences in cognitive control were measured in a 
fixed order: first the Number Switch task, then the 2-Back task, and then the Stroop 
task. After completion of the cognitive control tasks, participants received 
instructions for the Project Strategy Game. Half of the participants was instructed to 
obtain as many points as possible for money, the other half was instructed to obtain 
as many points as possible for the environment, without going bankrupt on the non-
                                                 
5 We also measured self-reported motivation and intention after completion of the Project Strategy Game. Self-
reported motivation and intention were not significantly related to strategy and outcome measures in the Project 
Strategy Game or 2-Back task performance. As in Study 4.1, self-reported motivation and intention were 
measured post-hoc and any causal relation with performance is therefore doubtful. Importantly, they did not 
explain the reported effects. We therefore do not report results concerning these measures. 
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focal category. Additionally, participants were instructed to either remember a 1-
digit (low load condition) or a 6-digit number (high load condition) before each 
round in the Project Strategy Game. Finally, if time permitted, participants 
completed the Raven Progressive Matrices.  
Results 
For the 2-Back task and the Number Switch task we removed reaction times below 
300 ms. For the Stroop task, we excluded reaction time data that deviated more than 
3 SDs from the mean  (1.8% for congruent trials; 2.7% for incongruent trials). 
Performance in terms of errors on the 2-Back task was skewed to the right and 
therefore transformed with a square root transformation. Participants who had a 
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before each round), the mean number of correctly reported 6-digit numbers was 3.9 
(i.e., about 80%, SD = 1.2). This indicates that participants indeed tried to remember 
the 6-digit numbers during the Project Strategy Game, taxing their working memory.   
To test our hypotheses, we created interaction terms based on z scores for each of 
the cognitive control measures and the load condition (low versus high). Because in 
Study 4.1 we found a non-significant interaction trend between task goal condition 
and updating ability, we performed regression analyses in which we included the 
three-way interaction task goal condition x load condition x cognitive control 
measure and all underlying two-way interactions and main effects (all based on z 
scores). Separate regression analyses were performed for the different cognitive 
control measures. 
Strategy measure. First, we investigated strategies in the Project Strategy Game 
and performed analysis on the number of strategy points. Effects concerning errors 
on the 2-Back task are displayed in Table 1. As expected, participants in the high load 
condition had fewer strategy points than participants in the low load condition, β = -
.19, t(94) = -2.03, p = .05, see Figure 2. The main effect of 2-Back task errors on strategy 
points was non-significant as was the main effect of task goal condition. The two-
way interaction between load condition and errors on the 2-Back task was also non-
                                                 
6 Including these participants in the analyses yielded the same pattern of significant and non-significant results. 
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significant. The two-way interaction between task goal condition and errors on the 2-
Back task was only marginally significant, β = -.18, t(94) = -1.91, p = .06. Simple effects 
analyses indicated that fewer errors on the 2-Back task were related to more earned 
points in the environment condition, β = -.42, t(46) = -3.14, p = .003, but not in the 
money condition, β = .06, t(52) = .40, p = .69. The three-way interaction task goal 
condition x load condition x 2-Back task errors was non-significant, as was the two-
interaction between task goal condition and load condition.  
We also tested a regression model that included performance on the Raven 
Progressive Matrices as a covariate. This model was tested for 86 participants who 
completed the Raven Progressive Matrices (excluding the outlier on the 2-Back task). 
Results indicated that performance on the Raven Progressive Matrices was not 
related to the number of strategy points in the Project Strategy Game, β = .17, t(81) = 
1.51, p = .14. After correcting for performance on the Raven, the load manipulation 
still affected strategy points, β = -.24, t(81) = -2.28, p = .03. All other predictors in the 
model were non-significant (all p’s > .17).  
Regression analyses including reaction times on the 2-Back task, switch cost in 
terms of correct responses, switch cost in terms of reaction times, or Stroop 
performance showed no significant effects on the number of strategy points 
concerning that cognitive control measure (all p’s > .09). 
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Table 1.  
 Criterion 
 Strategy Points Earned Points 
Predictor   
2-Back task errors -.15 -.22* 
Load Condition -.19* -.04 
Task Goal Condition -.12 -.12 
Load Condition x  
2-Back task errors 
-.11 -.07 
Task Goal Condition x 2-
Back task errors 
-.18† -.26* 
Task Goal Condition x 
Load Condition 
-.16 -.03 
Task Goal Condition x 
Load Condition x 2-Back 
task errors 
.07 -.03 
R2 .12* .08* 
Model F 2.95* 2.32* 
Beta coefficients of errors on the 2-Back task, task goal condition (money versus 
environment) and load condition (low versus high), and their interactions on the number of 
strategy points and number of earned points in Study 4.2.  Coding of conditions: Money and 
Low Load = -1, Environment and High Load = 1. N = 102; * p < .05, † p = .06. 
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Outcome measure. Next, outcomes in the Project Strategy Game were 
investigated and analyses were performed on the number of earned points. Effects 
concerning errors on the 2-Back task are displayed in Table 1. Contrary to our 
hypothesis, no main effect of load condition on the number of earned points was 
found, β = -.04, t(94) = -.38, p = .71. The main effect of task goal condition was also 
non-significant. The main effect of 2-Back task errors on the number of earned points 
was significant, β = -.22, t(94) = -2.26, p = .03. This main effect was qualified by the 
two-way interaction between task goal condition and 2-Back task errors, β = -.26, 
t(94) = -2.68, p = .009, see Figure 3. Simple effects analyses indicated that fewer errors 
on the 2-Back task were related to more earned points in the environment condition, 
β = -.48, t(46) = -3.69, p = .001, but not in the money condition, β = .05, t(52) = .37, p = 
.71, see Figure 3. The two-way interaction load condition x 2-Back task errors was 
non-significant, see Table 1. The three-way interaction task goal condition x load 
condition x 2-Back task errors was non-significant, as was the interaction between 
task goal condition and load condition, and the main effect of task goal.  
We again tested a regression model that included performance on the Raven as a 
covariate. Results indicated that higher performance on the Raven was only 
marginally related to more earned points in the Project Strategy Game, β = .22, t(81) = 
1.91, p = .06. After correcting for performance on the Raven, the main effect of errors 
on the 2-Back task on the number of earned points disappeared, β = -.11, t(81) = -.96, p 
= .34. The two-way interaction between task goal condition and errors on the 2-Back 
task remained significant, β = -.25, t(81) = -2.18, p = .04. Simple effects analyses 
(including the Raven as covariate) indicated that fewer errors on the 2-Back task were 
related to more earned points in the environment condition, β = -.37, t(36) = -2.29, p = 
.03, but not in the money condition, β = .14, t(44) = .91, p = .37. All other predictors in 
the model were non-significant (all p’s > .40).  
Regression analyses including reaction times on the 2-Back task, switch cost in 
terms of correct responses, switch cost in terms of reaction times or Stroop 
performance showed no significant effects on the number of earned points 
concerning that cognitive control measure (all p’s > .06). 
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Figure 3. 
 
Interaction between updating ability and task goal condition on the number of earned points 
in the Project Strategy Game. Low updating ability refers to 1 SD above the mean number of 
errors on the 2-Back task; high updating ability refers to 1 SD below this mean (see also 
Aiken and West, 1991). 
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finding supports a causal relationship between updating ability and goal-directed 
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was money. We elaborate on the role of updating ability for different goals in the 
general discussion. 
Contrary to our hypotheses, individuals under high memory load did not 
perform worse on the outcome measure than individuals under low memory load. 
We did find that, irrespective of load condition, individuals with high (versus low) 
updating ability earned more points in the Project Strategy Game. While the high 
memory load led to non-optimal decision strategies, individual differences may have 
affected the outcome measure. Even when one does not choose an optimal strategy 
(that is, switching between risky focal and risky non-focal projects), one could still 
earn points for the focal goal by (for example) only choosing safe projects in favor of 
the focal goal. Possibly, participants who performed well on the 2-Back task might 
have been better able to pay attention to the interim scores or the location of the 
projects. This is in line with the idea that the administered 2-Back task might tap into 
two processes: the ability to encode and update information, but also the ability to 
work concentrated (see also the discussion of Chapter 3). The former is reflected in 
the decision strategies whereas the latter is reflected in the decision outcomes. 
Although the induced memory load affected individuals’ updating ability, it did not 
affect the way in which the Project Strategy Game was approached by people who 
scored high on the 2-Back task: concentrated.   
We also investigated the role of fluid intelligence in predicting decision strategies 
and outcomes in the Project Strategy Game. The findings indicate that fluid 
intelligence only weakly predicted decision strategies and outcomes in the Project 
Strategy Game. Furthermore, when correcting for the effects of fluid intelligence, the 
load manipulation still affected decision strategies. Although the main effect of 
performance on the 2-Back task on the outcome measure in the Project Strategy 
Game disappeared after correcting for fluid intelligence, the 2-Back task still 
predicted decision outcomes in the environment condition after correcting for fluid 
intelligence. Thus, whereas updating ability did uniquely predict goal-directed 
decision making, fluid intelligence did not.  
 
Study 4.3 
The results from Study 4.1 and Study 4.2 support the idea that updating ability 
facilitates goal pursuit in decision making. To enhance ecological validity of the 
previous findings concerning updating ability and goal-directed decision making, 
Study 4.3 aimed to replicate the finding that updating ability facilitates goal pursuit 
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in decision making with a specific group of experienced decision makers in the field: 
Dutch mayors.  
Method 
Participants and design. In total, 42 mayors from several Dutch cities (12 females) 
participated in the study. Ages ranged from 34 to 69, M = 51.6, SD = 8.2. Participants 
were recruited with the help of the Dutch Association of Mayors (NGB) and 
consultancy agency Peak & Valley. The cities in which the mayors were situated 
were of different sizes and were located in different provinces of the Netherlands. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the low load or high load condition. 
Materials and procedure. The same cognitive control tasks and Project Strategy 
Game were used as described in Study 4.2. The instructions for the Project Strategy 
Game differed in that participants were not told that they could earn points for a 
good cause. Due to limited availability of the participants and because Study 4.2 
indicated more pronounced effects for the environment condition, we only 
administered the environment goal. That is, all participants were instructed to obtain 
as many points as possible for environment, without going bankrupt. Updating 
ability was manipulated as described in Study 4.2.  
Participants first signed an informed consent form and then completed the 
cognitive control tasks in a fixed order: first the Stroop task, then the Number Switch 
task and then the 2-Back task. Participants then performed the Project Strategy Game. 
During the experiment, the experimenter stayed in the same room as the mayor and 
responded to any questions concerning the instructions of the tasks. Afterwards, 
participants were given feedback on their performance. A short interview concerning 
cognitive control, goals and decision making in the mayor’s daily activities was also 
part of the session (qualitative data from these interviews will be reported 
elsewhere).   
Results 
Data were prepared as in Study 4.2. There were no outliers for any of the cognitive 
control tasks. Separate regression analyses were performed for the different cognitive 
control measures. Data of the Stroop task were missing for one participant because 
this participant was color blind. Two participants were removed from the data 
analyses due to severe disturbances during the experiment (e.g., people entering the 
room more than once or extensive noise due to drilling).  
Of the five 6-digit numbers that were presented in the Project Strategy Game (one 
before each round), the mean number of correctly reported 6-digit numbers was 2.95 
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(i.e., about 60%, SD = 1.2). Note that this is considerable lower than the mean number 
of correctly reported numbers in Study 4.27.    
Strategy measure. Unlike expected, no main effect was found of load condition 
on the number of strategy points in the Project Strategy Game, β = .14, t(36) = .96, p = 
.35. The main effect of 2-Back task errors on the number of strategy points was 
significant, β = -.45, t(36) = -2.98, p = .005, indicating that fewer errors on the 2-Back 
task were related to more strategy points. The two-way interaction between load 
condition and errors on the 2-Back task was non-significant, β = .07, t(36) = .46, p = 
.65.  
Regression analyses including reaction times on the 2-Back task, switch cost in 
terms of correct responses, switch cost in terms of reaction times, or Stroop 
performance showed no significant effects on the number of strategy points 
concerning that cognitive control measure. 
Outcome measure. Contrary to our hypothesis, we did not find a main effect of 
load condition on the number of earned points, β = .06, t(36) = .37, p = .72. The main 
effect of 2-Back task errors on the number of earned points was significant, β = -.33, 
t(36) = -2.11, p = .05, indicating that fewer errors on the 2-Back task were related to 
more earned points. The two-way interaction load condition x 2-Back task errors was 
non-significant, β = .20, t(36) = 1.28, p = .21.  
Regression analysis including reaction times on the 2-Back task indicated a 
marginally significant interaction between reaction times on the 2-Back task and load 
condition on the number of earned points, β = .31, t(36) = 1.96, p = .06. Simple effects 
analyses indicated that faster reaction times on the 2-Back task were non-significantly 
related to more earned points in the low load condition, β = -.33, t(18) = -1.49, p = .15. 
Faster reaction times on the 2-Back task were non-significantly related to fewer 
earned points in the high load condition, β = .28, t(18) = 1.26, p = .23. The main effects 
of load condition and reaction times on the 2-Back task on the number of earned 
points were non-significant (all p’s > .61). 
Regression analyses including switch cost in terms of correct responses, switch 
cost in terms of reaction times or Stroop performance showed no significant effects 
on the number of earned points concerning that cognitive control measure. 
 
 
                                                 
7 The mean correctly reported numbers from Study 4.2 and Study 4.3 indeed differed significantly from each 
other, p = .008. 
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Faster reaction times on the 2-Back task were non-significantly related to fewer 
earned points in the high load condition, β = .28, t(18) = 1.26, p = .23. The main effects 
of load condition and reaction times on the 2-Back task on the number of earned 
points were non-significant (all p’s > .61). 
Regression analyses including switch cost in terms of correct responses, switch 
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7 The mean correctly reported numbers from Study 4.2 and Study 4.3 indeed differed significantly from each 
other, p = .008. 
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Discussion 
In Study 4.3 we tried to replicate the finding that updating ability facilitates goal-
directed decision making with a group of experienced decision makers. The findings 
indicate that the load manipulation did not affect decision strategies and outcomes in 
the Project Strategy Game. This contradicts the finding from Study 4.2, in which the 
memory load did affect decision strategies. However, taking a closer look at the load 
manipulation check might shed light on this inconsistency. Whereas in Study 4.2 the 
mean correctly recalled 6-digit numbers was about 80%, the mean correctly recalled 
6-digit numbers was only 60% in Study 4.3. This might indicate that participants in 
Study 4.3 were less involved in the load manipulation. Indeed, some participants 
from Study 4.3 reported that they deliberately chose to focus entirely on the Project 
Strategy Game and not on trying to remember the 6-digit number. As a consequence, 
their working memory processes might not have been taxed by the memory load.  
Additionally, we found a trend for an interaction between reaction times on the 2-
Back task and load on the number of earned points in the Project Strategy Game. In 
the low load condition, faster reaction times on the 2-Back task were related to more 
earned points. In the high load condition, faster reaction times on the 2-Back task 
were related to fewer earned points. This might indicate that updating ability 
enhanced decision outcomes under low load, but decreased decision outcomes under 
high load. As was noted in the introduction of this chapter, especially individuals 
with high (versus low) updating ability might be affected by a memory load. Because 
especially these individuals rely on their updating ability for performing a task in 
line with a task goal, they might be most affected by such a memory load. Yet, it 
should be noted that the interaction was non-significant and that the underlying 
simple effects were also non-significant. Moreover, the observed interaction was 
based on relatively few participants. Future research could further explore the 
possible interaction between load and updating ability.  
Importantly, we did find that performance on the updating task, but not on the 
other cognitive control tasks, was related to strategies and outcomes in the Project 
Strategy Game. Thus, also in a group of experienced decision makers from the field, 
updating ability seems to facilitate goal pursuit in decision tasks such as the Project 
Strategy Game. This finding adds to the ecological validity of the previous findings 
concerning updating ability and goal-directed decision making.  
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General Discussion 
In this chapter, we aimed to replicate the finding from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 that 
updating ability is related to decision strategies and outcomes in line with a task 
goal, by the use of a different decision making game and different task goals. 
Furthermore, we investigated a causal relationship between updating ability and 
decision strategies and outcomes in line with a task goal. Additionally, we studies 
whether updating ability predicts goal-directed decision making, irrespective of 
general cognitive abilities such as fluid intelligence. Finally, we investigated the role 
of updating ability in goal-directed decision making among a group of experienced 
decision makers. 
Updating Ability and Decision Strategies 
The studies in this chapter confirm our hypothesis that updating ability is related to 
decision strategies in line with the instructed task goal. Individuals with high 
updating ability earned more strategy points as compared to those with low 
updating ability. That is, when the task goal of earning money was induced, 
participants with high (versus low) updating ability chose the stacks of projects more 
optimally in line with the money goal. When the task goal of saving the environment 
was induced, participants with high (versus low) updating ability were better at 
choosing the stacks of projects in line with the environment goal.  
Although the findings from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 indicated that updating 
ability facilitates decision strategies in line with a goal, the present studies showed 
that these findings are not limited to specific goals or decision making paradigms. 
Whereas in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 the task goals of accuracy and efficiency were 
adopted, the studies described in this chapter focused on the goals of earning money 
and saving the environment. Moreover, a new decision task was developed that, 
similarly to the Beads-in-a-Jar task that was used in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, 
involved a series of decisions that had to be made in line with an overarching goal. 
The present results show that the finding that updating ability fosters decision 
strategies in line with a goal is not limited to the Beads-in-a-Jar task and is probably 
generic for decision problems involving a series of decisions. 
Whereas the studies in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 in this dissertation used only 
correlational measures, two studies in the current chapter manipulated updating 
ability by inducing a memory load. The induced memory load presumable tapped 
into the same processes as needed for engaging in the process of updating. In order 
to successfully encode and retrieve information, working memory processes are 
4100 
 
Discussion 
In Study 4.3 we tried to replicate the finding that updating ability facilitates goal-
directed decision making with a group of experienced decision makers. The findings 
indicate that the load manipulation did not affect decision strategies and outcomes in 
the Project Strategy Game. This contradicts the finding from Study 4.2, in which the 
memory load did affect decision strategies. However, taking a closer look at the load 
manipulation check might shed light on this inconsistency. Whereas in Study 4.2 the 
mean correctly recalled 6-digit numbers was about 80%, the mean correctly recalled 
6-digit numbers was only 60% in Study 4.3. This might indicate that participants in 
Study 4.3 were less involved in the load manipulation. Indeed, some participants 
from Study 4.3 reported that they deliberately chose to focus entirely on the Project 
Strategy Game and not on trying to remember the 6-digit number. As a consequence, 
their working memory processes might not have been taxed by the memory load.  
Additionally, we found a trend for an interaction between reaction times on the 2-
Back task and load on the number of earned points in the Project Strategy Game. In 
the low load condition, faster reaction times on the 2-Back task were related to more 
earned points. In the high load condition, faster reaction times on the 2-Back task 
were related to fewer earned points. This might indicate that updating ability 
enhanced decision outcomes under low load, but decreased decision outcomes under 
high load. As was noted in the introduction of this chapter, especially individuals 
with high (versus low) updating ability might be affected by a memory load. Because 
especially these individuals rely on their updating ability for performing a task in 
line with a task goal, they might be most affected by such a memory load. Yet, it 
should be noted that the interaction was non-significant and that the underlying 
simple effects were also non-significant. Moreover, the observed interaction was 
based on relatively few participants. Future research could further explore the 
possible interaction between load and updating ability.  
Importantly, we did find that performance on the updating task, but not on the 
other cognitive control tasks, was related to strategies and outcomes in the Project 
Strategy Game. Thus, also in a group of experienced decision makers from the field, 
updating ability seems to facilitate goal pursuit in decision tasks such as the Project 
Strategy Game. This finding adds to the ecological validity of the previous findings 
concerning updating ability and goal-directed decision making.  
 
 
 
101 
 
General Discussion 
In this chapter, we aimed to replicate the finding from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 that 
updating ability is related to decision strategies and outcomes in line with a task 
goal, by the use of a different decision making game and different task goals. 
Furthermore, we investigated a causal relationship between updating ability and 
decision strategies and outcomes in line with a task goal. Additionally, we studies 
whether updating ability predicts goal-directed decision making, irrespective of 
general cognitive abilities such as fluid intelligence. Finally, we investigated the role 
of updating ability in goal-directed decision making among a group of experienced 
decision makers. 
Updating Ability and Decision Strategies 
The studies in this chapter confirm our hypothesis that updating ability is related to 
decision strategies in line with the instructed task goal. Individuals with high 
updating ability earned more strategy points as compared to those with low 
updating ability. That is, when the task goal of earning money was induced, 
participants with high (versus low) updating ability chose the stacks of projects more 
optimally in line with the money goal. When the task goal of saving the environment 
was induced, participants with high (versus low) updating ability were better at 
choosing the stacks of projects in line with the environment goal.  
Although the findings from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 indicated that updating 
ability facilitates decision strategies in line with a goal, the present studies showed 
that these findings are not limited to specific goals or decision making paradigms. 
Whereas in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 the task goals of accuracy and efficiency were 
adopted, the studies described in this chapter focused on the goals of earning money 
and saving the environment. Moreover, a new decision task was developed that, 
similarly to the Beads-in-a-Jar task that was used in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, 
involved a series of decisions that had to be made in line with an overarching goal. 
The present results show that the finding that updating ability fosters decision 
strategies in line with a goal is not limited to the Beads-in-a-Jar task and is probably 
generic for decision problems involving a series of decisions. 
Whereas the studies in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 in this dissertation used only 
correlational measures, two studies in the current chapter manipulated updating 
ability by inducing a memory load. The induced memory load presumable tapped 
into the same processes as needed for engaging in the process of updating. In order 
to successfully encode and retrieve information, working memory processes are 
102 
 
needed. These same processes are needed for remembering a long digit number. The 
processes used for updating might therefore become “occupied” by trying to 
remember the long digit number. Therefore, these processes cannot be used to keep a 
goal active in mind and acting upon it.   
When a memory load was induced, people performed worse in terms of decision 
strategies, indicating a causal link between updating ability and goal-directed 
decision strategies. No (significant) interaction between updating ability and load 
was found. This might indicate that the memory load in the present study was quite 
high, preventing people with high updating ability from using strategies in line with 
their goal. However, the findings from Study 4.3 indicate that, if anything, especially 
individuals with high (as compared to low) updating ability might be affected by a 
memory load. Nevertheless, the interaction was non-significant and future research 
should further explore the possible interaction between load and updating ability.  
The research results described in this chapter also indicate that updating ability 
predicted decision strategies irrespective of fluid intelligence. Fluid intelligence and 
cognitive control abilities are often believed to be related constructs. However, fluid 
intelligence was not related to decision strategies in the Project Strategy Game and 
could not explain the effect of the load manipulation on decision strategies. These 
findings suggest that fluid intelligence and cognitive control, specifically updating 
ability, are separate constructs. Moreover, these findings contribute to the unique 
predictive value of updating ability in goal-directed decision making.  
The research described in this chapter also showed that updating ability was 
predictive of decision strategies in experienced decision makers in the field: mayors. 
One could reason that the role of cognitive control is less apparent when an 
individual has great experience with important and complex decisions. The present 
findings indicate that even when people are experienced decision makers with large 
responsibilities, cognitive control, specifically updating ability, predicts the quality of 
the decision making process. This finding contributes to the ecological validity of the 
role of updating ability in goal-directed decision making. 
Some findings from the present research concerning decision strategies deserve 
extra discussion. First, the present research indicated a role of switching ability in 
goal-directed decision making. Switching ability especially seemed to facilitate 
switching from projects that were in favor of money to projects that were in favor of 
the environment. This might indicate that switching ability helps to shift from more 
ordinary goals (money) to less ordinary goals (environment). However, in Study 4.2 
we did not find any effects of switching ability on decision strategies. Furthermore, 
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the above findings should be interpreted with caution because a theory about 
switching ability and goal-directed decision making is lacking. In sum, more research 
is needed on the role of switching ability in goal-directed behavior.  
Second, although non-significant, we did find a trend that updating ability was 
especially predictive of decision strategies when the focal goal was environment. 
This might suggest that updating ability has distinct predictive value for different 
task goals. One could imagine that more natural goals, such as earning money, are 
more easily attained as compared to goals such as striving for a sporty and healthy 
lifestyle. It might be the case that cognitive control, in particular updating ability, is 
especially needed when goals are less natural or habitual.   
Updating Ability and Decision Outcomes 
The findings from Study 4.1 showed an effect of updating ability on the outcome 
measure in the Project Strategy Game. Furthermore, this effect was replicated with a 
group of experienced decision makers and could not be explained by individual 
differences in fluid intelligence. Nevertheless, the findings concerning the outcome 
measure of the Project Strategy Game deserve some extra discussion.  
Whereas in Study 4.1 we found that high (versus low) performance on the 2-Back 
task led to better decision outcomes, Study 4.2 did not show that individuals who 
were under high load performed worse on the outcome measure as compared to 
those who were under low load. Here, we found that high performance on the 2-
Back task led to better decision outcomes, irrespective of the load condition. Thus, 
individuals with high updating ability, even though their decision strategies became 
less optimal under high load, were still able to perform well on a decision task such 
as the Project Strategy Game. We propose that the 2-Back task as used in the present 
research taps into both updating ability as well as the ability to work concentrated. 
Whereas updating ability was indeed affected by the memory load, the ability to 
work concentrated was not. This may have caused individuals with a high (versus 
low) 2-Back task performance to obtain good outcomes in the Project Strategy Game.  
The findings from the studies described in this chapter, but also the studies from 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, suggest that updating ability is predictive of goal-directed 
decision making. More specifically, updating ability predicted decision strategies, 
and to a lesser extent decision outcomes, in line with a task goal. These findings 
evoke the question; what is so unique about updating ability that it has predictive 
value for goal-directed decision making?  
A number of research lines might provide useful insight concerning these 
findings. For example, Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, Segalowitz, and Carter 
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(2004) suggested that monitoring and comparing performance with internal goals is a 
critical aspect of decision making. Furthermore, brain areas important for cognitive 
control have been found to be related to keeping information in an active state until a 
goal is achieved (Miller & Cohen, 2001).  
Another line of research might provide more insight into the predictive value of 
the 2-Back task for goal-directed decision making. This research concerns the concept 
of goal activation. Goal activation refers to translating task instructions into an 
efficient task plan by activating appropriate goals (Duncan, Johnson, Swales, & Freer, 
1997). According to Miyake et al. (2000; see also Nieuwenhuis, Broerse, Nielen & de 
Jong, 2004), goal activation is central to the concept of cognitive control. They suggest 
that the ability to translate task instructions into a goal is a key underlying process of 
all cognitive control tasks. That is, updating tasks, inhibition tasks, and switching 
tasks might all require goal activation in order to perform well on the task. However, 
the present findings suggest that especially the 2-Back task, used to measure 
updating ability, might be able to tap into the concept of goal activation.  
The 2-Back task requires consistent focus on the task. More specifically, consistent 
monitoring of the presented stimuli is crucial for performance, because focussing on 
the current stimulus has consequences for performance on following stimuli. 
Therefore, especially the 2-Back task might be able to tap into the ability to activate 
goals and maintain these active throughout the task. For tasks that tap into other 
cognitive control components, such as the Stroop task and the Number Switch task, 
decreased goal activation is less damaging for overall performance. That is, loss of 
focus on one stimulus does not have consequences for following stimuli. Future 
research should therefore focus on the exact characteristics of these tasks to 
determine whether consistent focus and goal activation indeed explain the predictive 
value of the 2-Back task for goal-directed decision making.  
 
Conclusion 
The present research replicated the finding that updating ability facilitates goal 
pursuit in decision making with other goals and a different decision task. More 
importantly, it showed a causal link between updating ability and decision strategies 
in line with a goal. Furthermore, updating ability predicted goal-directed decision 
making irrespective of fluid intelligence. Finally, updating ability was also found to 
be predictive of goal-directed decision making in experienced decision makers in the 
field. We suggest that updating ability is involved in monitoring one’s own behavior 
and keeping a goal active in mind, thereby fostering goal-directed decision making. 
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Appendix 
 
For the risky projects we chose positive values with a mean of 250 and a range 
between 100 and 400. Consecutively, we added a random vector to these numbers to 
create perceived randomness. The vector was as follows:  
 
10, -10, 15, -15, 5, -5, 0, 15, 15, -15, 10, -10 
 
This led to the following points for the positive values of the risky projects:  
 
110, 90, 165, 185, 205, 245, 300, 315, 335, 410, 390 
 
For the negative values we chose a mean of -125 and a range from -225 to -25.  
From these numbers we subtracted the above mentioned vector. This led to the 
following points for the negative values of the risky projects:  
 
-235, -190, -215, -135, -155, -120, -100, -115, -35, -60, -15 
 
For the safe projects we chose values with a mean of 50 and a range from 40 to 60 for 
the positive numbers. We did not subtract the vector for the safe projects. This led to 
the following points for the positive numbers of the safe projects: 
 
40, 40, 45, 45, 50, 50, 50, 55, 55, 60, 60 
 
For the safe projects we chose values with a mean of 15 and a range from 5 to 30 for 
the slightly positive numbers. This led to the following points for the slightly positive 
numbers of the safe projects: 
 
5, 5, 10, 10, 15, 15, 15, 15, 20, 25, 30 
 
 
4104 
 
(2004) suggested that monitoring and comparing performance with internal goals is a 
critical aspect of decision making. Furthermore, brain areas important for cognitive 
control have been found to be related to keeping information in an active state until a 
goal is achieved (Miller & Cohen, 2001).  
Another line of research might provide more insight into the predictive value of 
the 2-Back task for goal-directed decision making. This research concerns the concept 
of goal activation. Goal activation refers to translating task instructions into an 
efficient task plan by activating appropriate goals (Duncan, Johnson, Swales, & Freer, 
1997). According to Miyake et al. (2000; see also Nieuwenhuis, Broerse, Nielen & de 
Jong, 2004), goal activation is central to the concept of cognitive control. They suggest 
that the ability to translate task instructions into a goal is a key underlying process of 
all cognitive control tasks. That is, updating tasks, inhibition tasks, and switching 
tasks might all require goal activation in order to perform well on the task. However, 
the present findings suggest that especially the 2-Back task, used to measure 
updating ability, might be able to tap into the concept of goal activation.  
The 2-Back task requires consistent focus on the task. More specifically, consistent 
monitoring of the presented stimuli is crucial for performance, because focussing on 
the current stimulus has consequences for performance on following stimuli. 
Therefore, especially the 2-Back task might be able to tap into the ability to activate 
goals and maintain these active throughout the task. For tasks that tap into other 
cognitive control components, such as the Stroop task and the Number Switch task, 
decreased goal activation is less damaging for overall performance. That is, loss of 
focus on one stimulus does not have consequences for following stimuli. Future 
research should therefore focus on the exact characteristics of these tasks to 
determine whether consistent focus and goal activation indeed explain the predictive 
value of the 2-Back task for goal-directed decision making.  
 
Conclusion 
The present research replicated the finding that updating ability facilitates goal 
pursuit in decision making with other goals and a different decision task. More 
importantly, it showed a causal link between updating ability and decision strategies 
in line with a goal. Furthermore, updating ability predicted goal-directed decision 
making irrespective of fluid intelligence. Finally, updating ability was also found to 
be predictive of goal-directed decision making in experienced decision makers in the 
field. We suggest that updating ability is involved in monitoring one’s own behavior 
and keeping a goal active in mind, thereby fostering goal-directed decision making. 
105 
 
Appendix 
 
For the risky projects we chose positive values with a mean of 250 and a range 
between 100 and 400. Consecutively, we added a random vector to these numbers to 
create perceived randomness. The vector was as follows:  
 
10, -10, 15, -15, 5, -5, 0, 15, 15, -15, 10, -10 
 
This led to the following points for the positive values of the risky projects:  
 
110, 90, 165, 185, 205, 245, 300, 315, 335, 410, 390 
 
For the negative values we chose a mean of -125 and a range from -225 to -25.  
From these numbers we subtracted the above mentioned vector. This led to the 
following points for the negative values of the risky projects:  
 
-235, -190, -215, -135, -155, -120, -100, -115, -35, -60, -15 
 
For the safe projects we chose values with a mean of 50 and a range from 40 to 60 for 
the positive numbers. We did not subtract the vector for the safe projects. This led to 
the following points for the positive numbers of the safe projects: 
 
40, 40, 45, 45, 50, 50, 50, 55, 55, 60, 60 
 
For the safe projects we chose values with a mean of 15 and a range from 5 to 30 for 
the slightly positive numbers. This led to the following points for the slightly positive 
numbers of the safe projects: 
 
5, 5, 10, 10, 15, 15, 15, 15, 20, 25, 30 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5  
 
Resource Allocation during  
Updating, Switching, and Inhibition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Obstacles are those frightful things you see  
when you take your eyes of your goal” 
Henry Ford 
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Abstract 
We build on the previous finding that updating ability fosters goal-directed decision 
making (see Chapter 2 through Chapter 4). In Chapter 5, we focus on the underlying 
process and investigate when or how people exactly allocate resources while in the 
process of updating. For this purpose we used pupillometry, as task-evoked 
pupillary responses are a reliable measure of the allocation of cognitive resources. 
We expected individual differences in pupil dilation during the 2-Back task to predict 
individual differences in overall performance on this task. In line with the previous 
studies in this dissertation that included all cognitive control components, we also 
explored pupil dynamics in an inhibition and switching task. The results indicated 
that pupil dilation during the 2-Back task indeed predicted performance on this task. 
High performance on the 2-Back task seemed to require consistent resource 
allocation. For performance on the Stroop task (measuring inhibition ability) we 
found that a higher pupillary Stroop effect was related to a stronger Stroop effect in 
reaction times. For the Number Switch task (measuring switching ability) we found 
pupil dilation to be higher for switch trials as compared to non-switch trials, but 
pupil dilation did not predict performance on this task. We also explored error-
related resource allocation in all cognitive control tasks. The findings provide useful 
insight into the relation between updating ability and goal pursuit. 
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Anyone who has ever tried to play a music instrument must have experienced the 
difficulty of reading the notes from sheet music and matching these with the proper 
hand movements. Clearly, this act requires a lot of effort. The music notes have to be 
encoded and translated into motor actions. Furthermore, the sound that is produced 
has to be checked against a reference tone. Although experienced musicians will find 
themselves at ease with playing tunes by their head, for novices, learning to play is 
an extremely difficult challenge that requires a lot of control.  
The constant encoding of information and checking it with a reference in working 
memory is not exclusive for learning to play a music instrument. It is actually a key 
component of how people regulate their behavior on a daily basis. The control that 
people exert over their own behavior is referred to as cognitive control. The ability to 
constantly encode new information and refresh working memory is one of its three 
key processes and is referred to as updating ability. The other two processes are 
inhibition and switching and refer to the ability to inhibit prepotent responses and 
the ability to mentally shift between different sets or tasks, respectively (Miyake et 
al., 2000).  
 
Updating Ability and Goal-Directed Decision Making 
The cognitive control components updating, switching, and inhibition each have 
distinguishable effects on behavior (see e.g., Hofmann, Smeichel, & Baddeley, 2012). 
One line of research focused more specifically on the link between cognitive control 
and decision making and found for example that high inhibition ability was related 
to better application of decision rules (Del Missier, Mäntylä, & Bruine de Bruin, 
2010). In fact, a lot of the findings concerning cognitive control and decision making 
seem to suggest that cognitive control enhances decision making (e.g., Stanovich & 
West, 1998; Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003). In Chapter 2 through Chapter 4, a 
possible explanation for these findings was investigated. In a number of studies, 
different goals and decision paradigms were used to investigate the role of cognitive 
control for goal pursuit in decision making. More specifically, decision making 
paradigms were used in which a series of repeated decisions had to be made that 
ultimately led to an overarching goal. It was found that especially updating ability 
was related to decision strategies and outcomes in line with a goal. It was suggested 
that updating ability leads to goal-directed decision making in such tasks because 
updating ability helps to check whether current behavior is in line with one’s goals. 
The findings were also interpreted in the light of goal activation: the ability to 
translate task requirements into concrete actions and goals, and to actively maintain 
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these during the whole task (see Duncan, Johnson, Swales, & Freer, 1997). It was 
suggested that especially updating might be related to the process of keeping a goal 
active in mind.   
Although empirical evidence suggests that better monitoring of current actions 
leads to enhanced goal-directed decision making (see e.g., the control theory, Carver 
& Scheier, 1981) it is yet to be investigated when or how people exactly exert control 
when in the process of updating. A key process of updating is the encoding of new 
information and keeping this information active in working memory (see e.g., 
Miyake et al., 2000). The amount of resources that is allocated in this stage could 
therefore serve as a reliable predictor for updating ability. Additionally, not only 
correct encoding of information is crucial, but also correct retrieval of this 
information. In the present research we investigated whether the extent to which 
resources are allocated to the correct encoding and retrieval of information is 
predictive for updating ability. In other words, we investigated whether individual 
differences in resource allocation in the encoding and retrieval phase would predict 
individual differences in updating ability.  
 
A Pupil Dynamics Approach 
In order to investigate the allocation of resources during the encoding and retrieval 
of stimuli in an updating task, we made use of pupil dynamics. As Kahneman (1973) 
suggested, pupil dilation is one of the most useful indications of resource allocation 
(see also Just, Carpenter, & Miyake, 2003). For example, in a short-term memory task, 
where people have to remember strings of 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7 digits, pupil dilation is 
highest when people have to remember 7-digit strings and lowest when people have 
to remember 3-digit strings (Kahneman & Beatty, 1966). This example illustrates that 
pupil dilation increases when a task is more difficult and more resources have to be 
allocated.  
If pupil dilation is indeed a reporter variable of resource allocation, then 
individual differences in pupil dilation should be reflected in individual differences 
in task performance. Studies on fluid intelligence support this idea. Van der Meer et 
al. (2010) for example, found that highly intelligent people show the same amount of 
dilation as less intelligent people on a simple task. However, on a difficult task, 
highly intelligent people show larger pupil dilation and indeed perform better on 
this difficult task as compared to less intelligent people.   
Of specific relevance to the current article is that pupillometry has also been used 
in relation to tasks that involve cognitive control, specifically updating ability, such 
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as the n-Back task (Karatekin, Marcus, & Couperus, 2007; Karatekin, Bingham, & 
White, 2009). 
Pupil Dynamics in the n-Back Task 
Karatekin and colleagues (Karatekin et al., 2007; Karatekin et al., 2009) report two 
studies in which pupil dilation was measured in an n-Back task. In their studies they 
used a spatial 0- and 1-Back task. The focus of their studies was to investigate 
differences in sustained attention between adults and 10-year olds (Karatekin et al., 
2007), and working memory abilities in 8-20 year-olds with youth-onset psychosis 
and ADHD (Karatekin et al., 2009). They found a positive correlation between pupil 
dilation and performance, but only for individuals with ADHD. A possible 
explanation for a lacking correlation for healthy controls is that Karatekin et al. (2007; 
2009) did not focus on the encoding of stimuli in the n-Back task. Another 
explanation for a lacking correlation between pupil dilation and performance in 
healthy controls is that the tasks in their studies (a spatial 0- and 1-Back task) were 
relatively easy for healthy controls. This is in line with the idea that pupil dilation 
might not be related to performance when available cognitive resources are high and 
the task is relatively simple (see van der Meer et al., 2010).  
 
The Present Research 
Although some studies did address pupil dynamics in an updating task (Karatekin et 
al., 2007; 2009), the findings concerning correlations between pupil dilation and 
overall performance were non-conclusive. The main focus of the present study is to 
investigate whether resource allocation during the encoding and retrieval of 
information in an n-Back task predicts overall performance on this task. As the tasks 
used in Karatekin et al. (2007; 2009) might have been relatively easy for healthy 
controls, we administered a more difficult version of the n-Back task, namely a 2-
Back task.  
Pupil Dynamics in an Inhibition and Switch Task 
In line with the studies in Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4, that measured all 
three cognitive control components, we also explored pupil dynamics in an 
inhibition task and a switching task. Hereby, we aim to show that the three 
components each have unique predictors in terms of resource allocation for overall 
task performance. Considering the unique features of the different cognitive control 
tasks, studying pupil dynamics in all three the cognitive control components might 
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provide new insight into the differentiation between updating ability and inhibition 
and switching ability.  
To measure inhibition we administered a Stroop task. In the Stroop task, people 
have to respond to congruent and incongruent stimuli. Previous research on pupil 
dynamics in the Stroop task indicated that pupil dilation is larger for incongruent 
stimuli as compared to congruent stimuli (see e.g., Brown et al., 1999; Laeng, Ørbo, 
Holmlund, & Miozzo, 2011). Laeng et al.’s (2011) research also showed that higher 
pupil dilation on incongruent as compared to congruent trials predicted a stronger 
Stroop effect. Higher pupil dilation in the Stroop task thus seems to reflect increased 
conflict which is in turn related to worse performance. 
To the best of our knowledge, research concerning pupil dynamics and the 
cognitive control component switching has not yet been conducted. In a typical 
paradigm for measuring switching ability, participants have to respond to stimuli, 
for example numbers, and have to use different rules for responding to these stimuli, 
depending on a specific feature (e.g., color). We do not have specific hypotheses 
concerning predictors in terms of pupil dynamics for overall performance in a 
switching task. 
Error-Related Pupil Dilation 
One aspect of cognitive control that might play a role in all cognitive control tasks is 
the monitoring of responses. Especially when an incorrect response is given, it is 
important to adapt behavior and improve performance. Previous research shows that 
making an error is related to certain brain potentials associated with monitoring 
actions and detecting errors, referred to as error-related negativity (ERN; see e.g., 
Gehring, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1990). The ERN reflects internal monitoring of 
behavior and may even be present without receiving feedback on the response (see 
e.g., Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994). There is still debate 
about what the ERN exactly represents: error detection (see e.g., Falkenstein, 
Hohnsbein, Hoorman, & Blanke, 1991), response conflict (see e.g., Botvinick, Braver, 
Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001) or error likelihood (see e.g., Brown & Braver, 2001). 
However, the ERN is assumed to be adaptive and serves as a signal to improve 
performance on a task (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). In terms of physiological measures, 
previous research suggests that measures of autonomic arousal, such as skin 
conductance response (SCR), heart rate (HR) deceleration, and pupil dilation are, 
similar to the ERN, higher when an incorrect response is given (Hajcak, McDonald, & 
Simons, 2003; Critchley, Tang, Glaser, Butterworth, & Dolan, 2005). We investigated 
whether errors in the three cognitive control tasks indeed lead to higher pupil 
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dilation and also explored whether the amount of error-related dilation was related 
to overall performance.  
 
Study 5.1 - Method 
Participants  
Forty-one students from Leiden University (35 females) participated in the study in 
exchange for money (7.50 euros). Ages ranged from 17 to 29, M = 20.98, SD = 2.81.  
Materials1  
For all stimuli we used isoluminant Teufel colors (Teufel & Wehrhahn, 2000). All 
inter trial intervals were set at 2000 ms. In all cognitive control tasks, participants 
received feedback in the practice trials but not in the experimental trials.  
Updating task. To measure updating, we used a 2-Back task. In this task, 
participants were shown letters on the screen, presented consecutively. Letters were 
presented on the screen for 1500 ms. For each letter, participants had to indicate 
whether the letter on the screen was the same as the letter that was presented two 
trials before. Participants had to indicate whether the letter did or did not match, by 
pressing a designated key on the left (“q”) or right (“p”) on the keyboard. 
Participants performed 10 practice trials and two blocks of 45 experimental trials. 
Reaction times on the correct trials and the number of errors served as indicators of 
updating performance. A trial was marked as correctly encoded when the target 
letter (n + 2) was correctly responded to. Please note that any trial is both a target trial 
(trial n), to be compared to a previous trial (trial n - 2), as well as an encoding trial to 
be memorized for future comparison (on trial n + 2).   
Switching task. To measure switching, we used the Number Switch task. In this 
task, participants had to respond to numbers (1 to 10) according to different rules. 
When the number was printed in yellow, participants had to indicate whether the 
number was odd or even. When the number was printed in blue, participants had to 
indicate whether the number was greater than five, or smaller than/equal to five. 
Numbers were presented for 3000 ms. In the first block of 32 trials the number was 
printed in yellow. In the second block of 32 trials the number was printed in blue. 
The third and fourth block consisted of 32 trials each with numbers printed in either 
                                                 
1 We also measured pupil dilation during the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST) and the Project Strategy 
Game and administered the Raven. Because we were specifically interested in resource allocation during 
updating, switching, and inhibition, we do not report results concerning resource allocation during the WCST 
and the Project Strategy Game or results concerning the Raven. 
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yellow or blue, presented in random order. Before the first, second, and third block, 
participants received ten practice trials. The first two blocks required no switching, 
whereas block three and four required switching between the two rules. Participants 
responded with a designated key on the left (“q”) or right (“p”) of the keyboard. A 
trial was labeled as a switch trial when it required a different response rule than the 
previous trial. A trial was labeled as a non-switch trial if the same response rule was 
required as on the previous trial. The difference in reaction times and errors on the 
switch trials versus the non-switch trials in the third and fourth block served as 
indicators of switching performance.  
Inhibition task. To measure inhibition, we used a button press version of the 
Stroop task. In this version of the Stroop task, words were displayed in the middle of 
the screen one by one for 3000 ms. The words were displayed in one of three colors 
(orange, blue, or green). At the bottom of the screen, the three ink colors were 
displayed with colored circles. Participants were instructed to press one of three 
designated keys on the keyboard. Colored stickers were attached to the keys. 
Participants had to press the button that corresponded to the ink color of the word 
displayed on the middle of the screen. The task consisted of three blocks of 18 
incongruent trials and 18 congruent trials each. Participants received 12 practice 
trials. The Stroop effect was obtained by calculating the difference between reaction 
times on correct incongruent trials and reaction times on correct congruent trials.  
Procedure 
Participants first signed an informed consent form after which eye tracker calibration 
took place. Calibration was repeated in case of eye tracking problems. Participants 
then completed the three cognitive control tasks in a fixed order: first the Stroop task, 
then the 2-Back task, and then the Number Switch task.  
Data Acquisition and Analysis 
All stimuli were presented with experimental control software E-Prime version 2.0. 
Pupil diameter was recorded at 60 Hz using a Tobii T120 eye tracker, integrated into 
a 17-inch TFT monitor. Participants sat on a chair behind the eye tracker in a 
darkened room at approximately 60 cm from the screen. They did not use a chin rest. 
Data obtained from the Tobii eye tracker were processed and analyzed by the use of 
Brain Vision Analyzer. Custom-made macros programmed in Brain Vision Analyzer 
were used. The artifacts and eye blinks that were detected by the Tobii eye tracker 
were corrected with linear interpolation. Trials with unreliable interpolated values 
were removed from the analyses.  
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Results 
Behavioral Data Preparation 
For the 2-Back task and the Number Switch task we removed reaction times below 
300 ms. For the Stroop task, we excluded reaction time data that deviated more than 
3 SDs from the mean  (1.9 % for congruent trials; 1.6 % for incongruent trials). 
Participants who had a performance that deviated more than 3SDs from the mean on 
the cognitive control measures were removed from the analyses concerning that 
specific cognitive control measure (N = 1 for errors on the 2-Back task; N = 1 for 
reaction times on the 2-Back task; N = 1 for switch cost in terms of reaction times). 
Performance on the 2-Back task in terms of errors was skewed to the right and we 
therefore applied a square root transformation.  
For six participants, severe technical problems occurred during the experiment. 
For example, pupil dilation was not recorded for a large part of the experiment, loud 
noise was produced in the adjacent room, or the participant’s cellphone was not 
switched off and disturbed the experiment. These participants were not included in 
the conducted analyses. 
Eye Track Data Preparation  
For all tasks we corrected for baseline pupil diameter by subtracting the average 
pupil diameter that was recorded during 500 ms before stimulus onset. For each of 
the tasks we visually inspected peaks and pupillary waveforms. On the basis of these 
pupillary waveforms we chose time intervals for the data analyses. For the 2-Back 
task, pupillary dilation was defined as the mean adjusted pupillary diameter 
between 800 ms and 1800 ms after stimulus onset. For the Stroop task, pupillary 
dilation was defined as the mean adjusted pupillary diameter between 1000 ms and 
1500 ms after stimulus onset. For the Number Switch task, pupillary dilation was 
defined as the magnitude of the adjusted maximum pupillary dilation between 500 
ms and 2500 ms after stimulus onset. Because reaction times on the Number Switch 
task varied largely between participants we used the observed peak value of the 
resulting pupillary waveform from this interval in further analyses (see e.g., Beatty & 
Lucero-Wagoner, 2000).  
For all tasks, trials on which more than 70% of the data points of the interval of 
interest were invalid were excluded from the analyses.  
 
 
5116 
 
yellow or blue, presented in random order. Before the first, second, and third block, 
participants received ten practice trials. The first two blocks required no switching, 
whereas block three and four required switching between the two rules. Participants 
responded with a designated key on the left (“q”) or right (“p”) of the keyboard. A 
trial was labeled as a switch trial when it required a different response rule than the 
previous trial. A trial was labeled as a non-switch trial if the same response rule was 
required as on the previous trial. The difference in reaction times and errors on the 
switch trials versus the non-switch trials in the third and fourth block served as 
indicators of switching performance.  
Inhibition task. To measure inhibition, we used a button press version of the 
Stroop task. In this version of the Stroop task, words were displayed in the middle of 
the screen one by one for 3000 ms. The words were displayed in one of three colors 
(orange, blue, or green). At the bottom of the screen, the three ink colors were 
displayed with colored circles. Participants were instructed to press one of three 
designated keys on the keyboard. Colored stickers were attached to the keys. 
Participants had to press the button that corresponded to the ink color of the word 
displayed on the middle of the screen. The task consisted of three blocks of 18 
incongruent trials and 18 congruent trials each. Participants received 12 practice 
trials. The Stroop effect was obtained by calculating the difference between reaction 
times on correct incongruent trials and reaction times on correct congruent trials.  
Procedure 
Participants first signed an informed consent form after which eye tracker calibration 
took place. Calibration was repeated in case of eye tracking problems. Participants 
then completed the three cognitive control tasks in a fixed order: first the Stroop task, 
then the 2-Back task, and then the Number Switch task.  
Data Acquisition and Analysis 
All stimuli were presented with experimental control software E-Prime version 2.0. 
Pupil diameter was recorded at 60 Hz using a Tobii T120 eye tracker, integrated into 
a 17-inch TFT monitor. Participants sat on a chair behind the eye tracker in a 
darkened room at approximately 60 cm from the screen. They did not use a chin rest. 
Data obtained from the Tobii eye tracker were processed and analyzed by the use of 
Brain Vision Analyzer. Custom-made macros programmed in Brain Vision Analyzer 
were used. The artifacts and eye blinks that were detected by the Tobii eye tracker 
were corrected with linear interpolation. Trials with unreliable interpolated values 
were removed from the analyses.  
117 
 
Results 
Behavioral Data Preparation 
For the 2-Back task and the Number Switch task we removed reaction times below 
300 ms. For the Stroop task, we excluded reaction time data that deviated more than 
3 SDs from the mean  (1.9 % for congruent trials; 1.6 % for incongruent trials). 
Participants who had a performance that deviated more than 3SDs from the mean on 
the cognitive control measures were removed from the analyses concerning that 
specific cognitive control measure (N = 1 for errors on the 2-Back task; N = 1 for 
reaction times on the 2-Back task; N = 1 for switch cost in terms of reaction times). 
Performance on the 2-Back task in terms of errors was skewed to the right and we 
therefore applied a square root transformation.  
For six participants, severe technical problems occurred during the experiment. 
For example, pupil dilation was not recorded for a large part of the experiment, loud 
noise was produced in the adjacent room, or the participant’s cellphone was not 
switched off and disturbed the experiment. These participants were not included in 
the conducted analyses. 
Eye Track Data Preparation  
For all tasks we corrected for baseline pupil diameter by subtracting the average 
pupil diameter that was recorded during 500 ms before stimulus onset. For each of 
the tasks we visually inspected peaks and pupillary waveforms. On the basis of these 
pupillary waveforms we chose time intervals for the data analyses. For the 2-Back 
task, pupillary dilation was defined as the mean adjusted pupillary diameter 
between 800 ms and 1800 ms after stimulus onset. For the Stroop task, pupillary 
dilation was defined as the mean adjusted pupillary diameter between 1000 ms and 
1500 ms after stimulus onset. For the Number Switch task, pupillary dilation was 
defined as the magnitude of the adjusted maximum pupillary dilation between 500 
ms and 2500 ms after stimulus onset. Because reaction times on the Number Switch 
task varied largely between participants we used the observed peak value of the 
resulting pupillary waveform from this interval in further analyses (see e.g., Beatty & 
Lucero-Wagoner, 2000).  
For all tasks, trials on which more than 70% of the data points of the interval of 
interest were invalid were excluded from the analyses.  
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Pupil Dynamics in the 2-Back Task  
Mean pupil dilation from all trials in the 2-Back task, pupil dilation during correct 
and incorrect target trials, and pupil dilation during correctly and incorrectly 
encoded trials were all significantly or marginally significantly related to the total 
number of  errors on the 2-Back task, see Table 1. However, extremely high 
correlations were found between some of these measures, especially between pupil 
dilation on all trials, pupil dilation on correct target trials, and pupil dilation on 
correctly encoded trials, see Table 1. These extremely high correlations cause the 
problem of collinearity, which entails that two or more predictors are strongly 
interrelated. For this reason we performed stepwise regression analysis and 
investigated which of the variables was the strongest in predicting the total number 
of errors on the 2-Back task.  
Stepwise regression analysis indicated that only mean pupil dilation on all trials 
in the 2-Back task was a strong predictor for the total number of errors on the 2-Back 
task, β = -.60, t(31) = -4.16, p < .001. Higher mean pupil dilation on all trials was 
related to fewer errors in the 2-Back task. Pupil dilation on correctly encoded trials 
was only marginally significantly related to the total number of errors on the 2-Back 
task in the stepwise regression model, β = 1.74, t(31) = 1.94, p = .07.  
Higher error-related pupil dilation was only marginally significantly related to 
fewer number of errors in the 2-Back task, β = -.31, t(31) = -1.75, p = .09. Furthermore, 
pupil dilation was not larger for incorrect responses (M = 0.085, SD = .136) than for 
correct responses (M = .077; SD = .074), F(1, 33) = .13, p = .73, ηp2 = .004. 
The above findings suggest that resource allocation during all trials in the 2-Back 
task, and not specifically resource allocation during the encoding or retrieval phase, 
was related to overall performance on the 2-Back task in terms of errors. Moreover, 
higher pupil dilation during an error was not significantly related to better 2-Back 
task performance. 
The same steps as above were performed for reaction times on the 2-Back task. 
Stepwise regression analysis indicated that none of the predictors reached 
significance. Thus, neither pupil dilation during correct or incorrect target trials, 
pupil dilation during correctly or incorrectly encoded trials, or pupil dilation during 
all trials combined was related to reaction times on the 2-Back task. Furthermore, 
higher error-related pupil dilation was not related to faster reaction times on the 2-
Back task, see also Table 1. 
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Pupil Dynamics in the 2-Back Task  
Mean pupil dilation from all trials in the 2-Back task, pupil dilation during correct 
and incorrect target trials, and pupil dilation during correctly and incorrectly 
encoded trials were all significantly or marginally significantly related to the total 
number of  errors on the 2-Back task, see Table 1. However, extremely high 
correlations were found between some of these measures, especially between pupil 
dilation on all trials, pupil dilation on correct target trials, and pupil dilation on 
correctly encoded trials, see Table 1. These extremely high correlations cause the 
problem of collinearity, which entails that two or more predictors are strongly 
interrelated. For this reason we performed stepwise regression analysis and 
investigated which of the variables was the strongest in predicting the total number 
of errors on the 2-Back task.  
Stepwise regression analysis indicated that only mean pupil dilation on all trials 
in the 2-Back task was a strong predictor for the total number of errors on the 2-Back 
task, β = -.60, t(31) = -4.16, p < .001. Higher mean pupil dilation on all trials was 
related to fewer errors in the 2-Back task. Pupil dilation on correctly encoded trials 
was only marginally significantly related to the total number of errors on the 2-Back 
task in the stepwise regression model, β = 1.74, t(31) = 1.94, p = .07.  
Higher error-related pupil dilation was only marginally significantly related to 
fewer number of errors in the 2-Back task, β = -.31, t(31) = -1.75, p = .09. Furthermore, 
pupil dilation was not larger for incorrect responses (M = 0.085, SD = .136) than for 
correct responses (M = .077; SD = .074), F(1, 33) = .13, p = .73, ηp2 = .004. 
The above findings suggest that resource allocation during all trials in the 2-Back 
task, and not specifically resource allocation during the encoding or retrieval phase, 
was related to overall performance on the 2-Back task in terms of errors. Moreover, 
higher pupil dilation during an error was not significantly related to better 2-Back 
task performance. 
The same steps as above were performed for reaction times on the 2-Back task. 
Stepwise regression analysis indicated that none of the predictors reached 
significance. Thus, neither pupil dilation during correct or incorrect target trials, 
pupil dilation during correctly or incorrectly encoded trials, or pupil dilation during 
all trials combined was related to reaction times on the 2-Back task. Furthermore, 
higher error-related pupil dilation was not related to faster reaction times on the 2-
Back task, see also Table 1. 
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Pupil Dynamics in the Stroop Task  
Analysis indicated that pupil dilation was larger on incongruent trials (M = .142 mm; 
SD = .072 mm) than on congruent trials in the Stroop task (M = .103 mm; SD = .062 
mm), F(1, 34) = 31.76, p < .001, ηp2 = .48. 
Follow-up analysis concerning only correct trials also indicated that pupil dilation 
was larger on incongruent trials (M = .136 mm; SD = .072 mm) than on congruent 
trials (M = .100 mm; SD = .062 mm), F(1, 34) = 29.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .47. No differences 
were found in pupil dilation for incorrect responses between incongruent and 
congruent trials, F < 1. 
Next, we performed regression analysis to test the relation between the pupillary 
Stroop effect (i.e., the difference in pupil dilation between correct incongruent and 
correct congruent trials) and the Stroop effect in terms of reaction times (concerning 
only correct trials). Zero order correlations can be found in Table 2. The results 
indicated that the pupillary Stroop effect positively predicted the Stroop effect in 
terms of reaction times, β = .45, t(33) = 2.89, p = .007. Thus, a larger difference in pupil 
dilation between incongruent and congruent trials was related to a larger difference 
in reaction time between incongruent and congruent trials. 
We also investigated whether mean pupil dilation during all trials in the Stroop 
task predicted the Stroop effect. To avoid problems with collinearity we again 
performed stepwise regression analysis including mean pupil dilation during all 
trials (both correct and incorrect), pupil dilation during correct responses, and pupil 
dilation during incorrect responses. Results indicated that only pupil dilation during 
incorrect responses was predictive of the Stroop effect, β = -.49, t(29) = -2.98, p = .006, 
see also Table 2. However, the number of incorrect responses is very likely to be 
confounded by trial type. We therefore used a different approach for investigating 
error-related pupil dilation. 
To investigate error-related pupil dilation, we first compared mean pupil dilation 
during all incorrect responses to mean pupil dilation during all correct responses. 
However, calculating the difference in pupil dilation between incorrect and correct 
responses would be confounded by trial type. That is, most correct responses will 
entail congruent trials whereas most incorrect responses would entail incongruent 
trials. Comparing correct and incorrect responses would thus merely reflect a 
comparison between incongruent and congruent trials. We therefore compared 
correct and incorrect responses within the incongruent trials. Note that some 
participants did not make any errors. Analyses were run for 29 participants.  
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Mean pupil dilation was found to be larger for incorrect incongruent responses 
(M = .290, SD = .170) than for correct incongruent responses (M = .132; SD = .072), F(1, 
28) = 31.25, p < .001, ηp2 = .53. Finally, we tested whether error-related pupil dilation 
during incongruent trials was related to performance on the Stroop task. We again 
performed stepwise regression, now including mean pupil dilation during 
incongruent trials, pupil dilation during correct incongruent trials and pupil dilation 
during incorrect incongruent trials. Error-related pupil dilation during incorrect 
(incongruent) trials negatively predicted the Stroop effect in terms of reaction times, 
β = -.51, t(27) = -3.07, p = .005. Thus, higher pupil dilation during an error was related 
to a weaker Stroop effect. Higher pupil dilation during an error was only marginally 
significantly related to fewer errors in the Stroop task, β = -.34, t(27) = -1.87, p = .08.  
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Pupil Dynamics in the Stroop Task  
Analysis indicated that pupil dilation was larger on incongruent trials (M = .142 mm; 
SD = .072 mm) than on congruent trials in the Stroop task (M = .103 mm; SD = .062 
mm), F(1, 34) = 31.76, p < .001, ηp2 = .48. 
Follow-up analysis concerning only correct trials also indicated that pupil dilation 
was larger on incongruent trials (M = .136 mm; SD = .072 mm) than on congruent 
trials (M = .100 mm; SD = .062 mm), F(1, 34) = 29.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .47. No differences 
were found in pupil dilation for incorrect responses between incongruent and 
congruent trials, F < 1. 
Next, we performed regression analysis to test the relation between the pupillary 
Stroop effect (i.e., the difference in pupil dilation between correct incongruent and 
correct congruent trials) and the Stroop effect in terms of reaction times (concerning 
only correct trials). Zero order correlations can be found in Table 2. The results 
indicated that the pupillary Stroop effect positively predicted the Stroop effect in 
terms of reaction times, β = .45, t(33) = 2.89, p = .007. Thus, a larger difference in pupil 
dilation between incongruent and congruent trials was related to a larger difference 
in reaction time between incongruent and congruent trials. 
We also investigated whether mean pupil dilation during all trials in the Stroop 
task predicted the Stroop effect. To avoid problems with collinearity we again 
performed stepwise regression analysis including mean pupil dilation during all 
trials (both correct and incorrect), pupil dilation during correct responses, and pupil 
dilation during incorrect responses. Results indicated that only pupil dilation during 
incorrect responses was predictive of the Stroop effect, β = -.49, t(29) = -2.98, p = .006, 
see also Table 2. However, the number of incorrect responses is very likely to be 
confounded by trial type. We therefore used a different approach for investigating 
error-related pupil dilation. 
To investigate error-related pupil dilation, we first compared mean pupil dilation 
during all incorrect responses to mean pupil dilation during all correct responses. 
However, calculating the difference in pupil dilation between incorrect and correct 
responses would be confounded by trial type. That is, most correct responses will 
entail congruent trials whereas most incorrect responses would entail incongruent 
trials. Comparing correct and incorrect responses would thus merely reflect a 
comparison between incongruent and congruent trials. We therefore compared 
correct and incorrect responses within the incongruent trials. Note that some 
participants did not make any errors. Analyses were run for 29 participants.  
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Mean pupil dilation was found to be larger for incorrect incongruent responses 
(M = .290, SD = .170) than for correct incongruent responses (M = .132; SD = .072), F(1, 
28) = 31.25, p < .001, ηp2 = .53. Finally, we tested whether error-related pupil dilation 
during incongruent trials was related to performance on the Stroop task. We again 
performed stepwise regression, now including mean pupil dilation during 
incongruent trials, pupil dilation during correct incongruent trials and pupil dilation 
during incorrect incongruent trials. Error-related pupil dilation during incorrect 
(incongruent) trials negatively predicted the Stroop effect in terms of reaction times, 
β = -.51, t(27) = -3.07, p = .005. Thus, higher pupil dilation during an error was related 
to a weaker Stroop effect. Higher pupil dilation during an error was only marginally 
significantly related to fewer errors in the Stroop task, β = -.34, t(27) = -1.87, p = .08.  
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Pupil Dynamics in the Number Switch Task 
Pupil dilation was larger on switch trials (M = .102 mm; SD = .063 mm) than on non-
switch trials in the Number Switch task (M = .067 mm; SD = .066 mm), F(1, 34) = 
15.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .31. 
Follow-up analysis concerning only correct trials also indicated that pupil dilation 
was larger for switch trials (M = .101 mm; SD = .064 mm) than on non-switch trials 
(M = .062 mm; SD = .070 mm), F(1, 34) = 23.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .41. No differences were 
found in pupil dilation for incorrect responses between the switch trials and the non-
switch trials, F < 1.  
Next, we tested whether the difference in pupil dilation between correct switch 
trials and correct non-switch trials predicted overall performance on the Number 
Switch task. Zero order correlations can be found in Table 3. Results indicated that 
the difference in pupil dilation between correct switch trials and correct non-switch 
trials was not predictive of switch cost in terms of correct responses or switch cost in 
terms of reaction times, see also Table 3.  
We again investigated whether mean pupil dilation during all trials predicted 
performance. Stepwise regression analyses were performed including mean pupil 
dilation during all trials (both correct and incorrect), pupil dilation during correct 
trials, and pupil dilation during incorrect trials. Neither mean pupil dilation during 
all trials, pupil dilation during correct trials or pupil dilation during incorrect trials 
predicted switch cost in terms of correct responses or switch cost in terms of reaction 
times, see Table 3. Only higher pupil dilation during incorrect responses was related 
to fewer number of errors in the Number Switch task, β = -.56, t(31) = -3.80, p = .001. 
However, similar as in the Stroop task, the number of incorrect responses is very 
likely to be confounded by trial type. Therefore, we used the same approach as for 
the Stroop task to investigate error-related pupil dilation. 
To investigate error-related pupil dilation, we first compared mean pupil dilation 
during all incorrect responses and mean pupil dilation during all correct responses. 
However, most correct responses will entail non-switch trials, whereas most 
incorrect responses would entail switch trials. Comparing correct and incorrect 
responses would thus merely reflect a comparison between non-switch and switch 
trials. We therefore compared correct and incorrect responses within the switch 
trials. Note that some participants did not make any errors. Analyses were run for 33 
participants. 
Pupil dilation was larger for incorrect (switch) responses (M = .170, SD = .136) 
than for correct (switch) responses (M = .104; SD = .064), F(1, 32) = 8.18, p = .007, ηp2 = 
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Pupil Dynamics in the Number Switch Task 
Pupil dilation was larger on switch trials (M = .102 mm; SD = .063 mm) than on non-
switch trials in the Number Switch task (M = .067 mm; SD = .066 mm), F(1, 34) = 
15.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .31. 
Follow-up analysis concerning only correct trials also indicated that pupil dilation 
was larger for switch trials (M = .101 mm; SD = .064 mm) than on non-switch trials 
(M = .062 mm; SD = .070 mm), F(1, 34) = 23.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .41. No differences were 
found in pupil dilation for incorrect responses between the switch trials and the non-
switch trials, F < 1.  
Next, we tested whether the difference in pupil dilation between correct switch 
trials and correct non-switch trials predicted overall performance on the Number 
Switch task. Zero order correlations can be found in Table 3. Results indicated that 
the difference in pupil dilation between correct switch trials and correct non-switch 
trials was not predictive of switch cost in terms of correct responses or switch cost in 
terms of reaction times, see also Table 3.  
We again investigated whether mean pupil dilation during all trials predicted 
performance. Stepwise regression analyses were performed including mean pupil 
dilation during all trials (both correct and incorrect), pupil dilation during correct 
trials, and pupil dilation during incorrect trials. Neither mean pupil dilation during 
all trials, pupil dilation during correct trials or pupil dilation during incorrect trials 
predicted switch cost in terms of correct responses or switch cost in terms of reaction 
times, see Table 3. Only higher pupil dilation during incorrect responses was related 
to fewer number of errors in the Number Switch task, β = -.56, t(31) = -3.80, p = .001. 
However, similar as in the Stroop task, the number of incorrect responses is very 
likely to be confounded by trial type. Therefore, we used the same approach as for 
the Stroop task to investigate error-related pupil dilation. 
To investigate error-related pupil dilation, we first compared mean pupil dilation 
during all incorrect responses and mean pupil dilation during all correct responses. 
However, most correct responses will entail non-switch trials, whereas most 
incorrect responses would entail switch trials. Comparing correct and incorrect 
responses would thus merely reflect a comparison between non-switch and switch 
trials. We therefore compared correct and incorrect responses within the switch 
trials. Note that some participants did not make any errors. Analyses were run for 33 
participants. 
Pupil dilation was larger for incorrect (switch) responses (M = .170, SD = .136) 
than for correct (switch) responses (M = .104; SD = .064), F(1, 32) = 8.18, p = .007, ηp2 = 
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.20. Finally, we tested whether error-related pupil dilation during switch trials was 
related to performance on the Number Switch task. We again performed stepwise 
regression analysis, now including mean pupil dilation during switch trials, pupil 
dilation during correct switch trials and pupil dilation during incorrect switch trials. 
The results indicated that pupil dilation on incorrect (switch) trials was not related to 
switch cost in terms of errors or switch cost in terms of reaction times, see Table 3. 
Thus, higher pupil dilation during an error was not related to better switching 
performance. We also investigated whether error-related pupil dilation was related 
to the total number of errors in the Number Switch task. Stepwise regression analysis 
indicated that higher error-related pupil dilation in the switch trials was related to 
fewer errors in the Number Switch task, β = -.55, t(31) = -3.70, p = .001. 
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.20. Finally, we tested whether error-related pupil dilation during switch trials was 
related to performance on the Number Switch task. We again performed stepwise 
regression analysis, now including mean pupil dilation during switch trials, pupil 
dilation during correct switch trials and pupil dilation during incorrect switch trials. 
The results indicated that pupil dilation on incorrect (switch) trials was not related to 
switch cost in terms of errors or switch cost in terms of reaction times, see Table 3. 
Thus, higher pupil dilation during an error was not related to better switching 
performance. We also investigated whether error-related pupil dilation was related 
to the total number of errors in the Number Switch task. Stepwise regression analysis 
indicated that higher error-related pupil dilation in the switch trials was related to 
fewer errors in the Number Switch task, β = -.55, t(31) = -3.70, p = .001. 
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Discussion 
In the present study we aimed to investigate how individuals exactly allocate 
resources while in the process of exerting control. Because previous findings 
indicated a role for updating ability, as measured by the 2-Back task, in goal-directed 
decision making, we were specifically interested in the pupil dynamics of this 
cognitive control task. We predicted that resource allocation during the encoding and 
retrieval phase in the 2-Back task would be related to overall performance on the 2-
Back task.  
We found that mean pupil dilation recorded after stimulus onset of all trials in the 
2-Back task, and not specifically during the encoding or retrieval phase, was related 
to fewer errors on the 2-Back task. This finding suggests that the 2-Back task requires 
consistent resource allocation each time a stimulus is presented in order to perform 
well. With consistent resource allocation we mean here, and in subsequent text, that 
resources must be allocated immediately upon stimulus presentation for each 
stimulus, to ensure proper encoding for future comparison and to enable adequate 
comparison with previously presented stimuli. The finding that pupil dilation was 
related to performance in the 2-Back task is not completely in line with the finding 
from Karatekin et al. (2007, 2009), where no relation was found between pupil 
dilation and overall performance for healthy controls on an n-Back task. However, 
the n-Back tasks they used in their studies, a spatial 0- and 1-Back task, were 
probably quite easy for healthy controls. We showed that for a more difficult version 
of the n-back task, namely a 2-Back task, pupil dilation was indeed predictive of 
performance on the 2-Back task. These findings support the idea that only when a 
task is cognitively demanding, resource allocation, as measured by pupil dilation, is 
related to overall performance (see for example van der Meer et al., 2010).  
In the Stroop task, incongruent trials were related to higher pupil dilation as 
compared to congruent trials, probably indicating that incongruent trials involve 
conflict and more resource allocation. Moreover, we replicated the results from 
Laeng et al. (2011), who found that a higher pupillary Stroop was related to a 
stronger Stroop effect in terms of reaction times. Mean pupil dilation during all trials 
in the Stroop task did not predict overall performance on this task.  
In the Number Switch task, switch trials (i.e., trials on which a different response 
rule had to be used as compared to the previous trial) elicited higher pupil dilations 
than non-switch trials (i.e., trials on which the same response rule had to be applied 
as on the previous trial), indicating that the former require more resource allocation. 
However, this difference in pupil dilation between the switch versus the non-switch 
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trials did not predict performance on the Number Switch task in terms of switch cost. 
Moreover, mean pupil dilation during all trials did not predict overall performance 
on the task.  
Error-Related Pupil Dilation 
In line with the idea that the ERN might be evident in all cognitive control tasks, we 
investigated error-related pupil dilation. We found that pupil dilation was only 
larger for incorrect responses as compared to correct responses in the Stroop task and 
the Number Switch task, but not in the 2-Back task. This might be explained by the 
fact that most errors were made in the 2-Back task (M = 11) as compared to the Stroop 
task (M = 5) and the Number Switch Task (M = 6). If only few errors are made, the 
error-related pupil dilation might have been an effect of a rare occasion rather than 
allocating resources as a result of an incorrect response. Although this explanation 
would be incompatible with the finding that a higher error likelihood is related to a 
higher ERN (see Brown & Braver, 2005), it would be in line with Notebaert et al.’s 
(2009) orienting account, which suggests that when fewer errors are made, people 
take more time to reorient to the task.  
An alternative explanation why we did not find error-related pupil dilation in the 
2-Back task might be that people are less likely to be aware of the errors they make in 
this task. Note that participants did not receive feedback on their responses in any of 
the cognitive control tasks. However, in the 2-Back task, one could simply forget the 
stimulus that was presented two trials back, and therefore not know whether the 
given response on a current trial is correct or incorrect. This lack of awareness of an 
error might explain the absence of error-related resource allocation (see also 
Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band, & Kok, 2001). 
Because the ERN is assumed to be adaptive and serves to improve task 
performance we also investigated whether pupil dilation on incorrect responses 
predicted overall performance. The results indicated that higher pupil dilation 
during incorrect responses was related to a decreased Stroop effect. Higher pupil 
dilation during incorrect responses was not related to fewer errors or faster reaction 
times on the 2-Back task or to lower switch cost in the Number Switch task. Thus, 
error-related pupil dilation only seemed to have an adaptive function for 
performance on the Stroop task.  
We also found that error-related pupil dilation was marginally significantly 
related to the total number of errors in the Stroop task. This is in line with the finding 
of Hajcak et al. (2003): although their observed relationship between Skin 
Conductance Response (SCR) and number of errors in a Stroop task was non-
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significant, the observed relationship was in the same direction as in the present 
study. 
The results from the present study did indicate that error-related pupil dilation 
was significantly related to the total number of errors in the Number Switch task. We 
found that higher pupil dilation on an incorrect response was related to fewer errors. 
This could indicate that for people who only make few errors, making an error is 
more salient and, subsequently, the physiological reaction is stronger.  
Consistent Resource Allocation  
The findings from the present study highlight the diversity of the cognitive control 
components in terms of resource allocation. Pupil dilation in the Stroop task and the 
Number Switch task were related to the characteristics of the presented stimuli. More 
specifically, in the Stroop task, incongruent trials were related to higher pupil 
dilation as compared to congruent trials; in the Number Switch task, switch trials 
were related to higher pupil dilation as compared to non-switch trials. In the 2-Back 
task, the presented stimuli did not differ in characteristics, but it was found that the 
higher the pupil dilation each time a stimulus was presented, the better the 
performance on the task. In sum, findings concerning both the Stroop task and the 
Number Switch task show that pupil dilation in these tasks seems to reflect resource 
allocation as a consequence of the specific features of the presented stimuli, whereas 
the observed pupil dilations in the 2-Back task seem to reflect consistent focus on the 
task. 
This consistent focus on the task might be closely related to the idea of goal 
activation: the ability to keep the task requirements active in mind throughout the 
whole task (Duncan, Johnson, Swales, & Freer, 1997). Miyake et al. (2000) claimed 
that keeping goal-relevant and task-relevant information in mind might be a 
common task requirement of all cognitive control tasks. However, the present 
findings seem to suggest that particularly a task such as the 2-Back task, in which 
consistent monitoring of the stimulus is crucial for performance, taps into the ability 
to activate goals and maintain these goals active throughout the task. This finding 
provides useful insight into the results from the previous studies reported in this 
dissertation, which indicated that updating ability predicted goal pursuit in decision 
tasks in which a series of decisions had to be made (see Chapter 2 through Chapter 
4).  
For the Number Switch task and the Stroop task we did not find that consistent 
resource allocation during the task was related to overall performance on that task. 
In the Stroop task, we found that a higher pupillary Stroop effect was related to a 
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higher Stroop effect in reaction times. In the Number Switch task, we did not find 
pupil dilation to be related to overall performance. The finding that consistent 
resource allocation during all trials of the Stroop task and Number Switch task was 
not that crucial for overall performance as in the 2-Back task is in line with the 
constructs that these tasks are trying to tap into. In the Stroop task and Number 
Switch task, one can temporarily experience decreased goal activation during a 
specific stimulus. However, this does not affect performance on the following trials. 
In the 2-Back task, failure to focus on a stimulus has consequences for both the ability 
to indicate whether the stimulus is the same as the stimulus presented n trials ago, as 
for the ability to correctly encode the stimulus, which is needed to perform correctly 
on n trials later. Thus, decreased goal activation during one stimulus has 
consequences for performance on following trials. This is exactly what updating 
grasps: the ability to constantly monitor incoming information.  
The results concerning error-related pupil dilation indicated that not all tasks 
evoke error-related resource allocation and that error-related resource allocation 
might be task specific. Furthermore, the results indicated that the ERN may not have 
an adaptive function in all investigated cognitive control tasks and might thus also be 
task specific. In other words, the administered cognitive control tasks in the present 
research do not seem to share a common mechanism of error-related resource 
allocation. However, research concerning the specific relation between pupil dilation 
and the ERN has not yet been conducted. Therefore, future research should indicate 
whether error-related pupil dilation is indeed a reliable measure of the ERN. 
 
Conclusion 
The present study aimed at getting more insight into the process of resource 
allocation during the 2-Back task, a task used to measure updating ability. In the 
studies described in Chapter 2 through Chapter 4, performance on the 2-Back task 
predicted goal-directed decision making. The present study, by using pupillometry, 
indicated that consistent resource allocation during the 2-Back task was highly 
related to performance on this task. For the Stroop task, measuring inhibition, we 
found other predictors for overall performance, being related to the congruency of 
the presented stimulus. For the Number Switch task, measuring switching, we did 
not find reliable predictors for overall performance. Apparently, performance on 
these tasks does not depend that highly on consistent resource allocation. The 
findings support the idea that updating ability is closely related to keeping 
appropriate task goals active in mind throughout the whole task. The findings 
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suggest that a 2-Back task might tap very well into this ability, thereby explaining the 
finding that updating ability fosters goal-directed decision making.  
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Chapter 6 
 
General Discussion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Many are stubborn in the pursuit of the path they have 
chosen, few in pursuit of the goal” 
Friedrich Nietzsche 
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The aim of this PhD project was to investigate whether cognitive control enhances 
decision making because it fosters goal attainment. Previous research on cognitive 
control and decision making suggested that cognitive control leads to good decisions. 
However, the underlying process by which cognitive control facilitates good decision 
making was not yet clear. We proposed a new approach for unravelling the 
underlying processes of the relation between cognitive control and decision making: 
taking the goals of the decision maker into account. As was argued in the 
introductory chapter of this dissertation, we suggested that a good decision is a 
decision wherein the process and outcome are in line with the goals of the decision 
maker. We proposed that taking the goals of the decision maker into account is a key 
component in investigating the relationship between cognitive control and decision 
making. As cognitive control serves goals and goals direct decision making, we 
hypothesized that cognitive control is beneficial for decision making because it 
facilitates goal pursuit in decision making. We expected that high (as compared to 
low) levels of cognitive control were related to decision strategies and outcomes in 
line with a specific task goal.  
Furthermore, although empirical evidence suggested unique roles for the three 
key cognitive control components (updating, switching, and inhibition) for various 
decision making aspects (see Del Missier, Mäntylä, & Bruine de Bruin, 2012), it was 
not yet clear what underlying processes explained these relations. We suggested that, 
in order to make progress in unravelling these processes, the decision making 
problem under investigation should be clearly defined. For this reason we focused on 
the role of the three different cognitive control components, namely updating, 
switching, and inhibition, in one specific type of decision problems. More 
specifically, we studied a series of smaller short term decisions. These short term 
decisions had to be made in order to achieve an overarching goal in the long run. 
Such decision problems require continuous focus and attention, instead of a short 
period of concentrated deliberation, relying on gut feelings, or attention without 
deliberation. The type of decision problems that were investigated in this dissertation 
are also to be distinguished from decisions concerning impulse control, where a 
trade-off has to be made between impulsive and deliberative behavior. Decision 
tasks in which a series of decisions has to be made that ultimately lead to an 
overarching goal have not yet been explicitly investigated in relation to cognitive 
control. Furthermore, focusing on this type of decision problems provides useful 
insight into both decision strategies and outcomes and has practical relevance for 
managerial decisions.  
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To test the hypothesis that cognitive control facilitates goal pursuit in decision 
making, two decision tasks were developed: the Beads-in-a-Jar task and the Project 
Strategy Game. Both decision tasks a) required a series of decisions that had to be in 
line with a goal, b) allowed for inspection of decision strategies as well as decision 
outcomes, and c) easily allowed for manipulation of task goals.  
In this final chapter I will provide an overview of the key findings from this 
dissertation. I discuss possible alternative explanations of the findings, such as the 
role of fluid intelligence or a general intention to achieve or perform well. 
Furthermore, I discuss the findings in light of existing theories on cognitive control. 
Finally, I discuss the ecological validity of the findings and some possible practical 
applications.  
 
Overview of the Key Findings 
One of the key questions raised in the introduction of this dissertation was whether 
cognitive control is beneficial for goal-directed decision making because of better 
goal attainment. Virtually all studies in this dissertation indicated that high (as 
compared to low) cognitive control was indeed related to decision strategies and 
outcomes in line with an instructed task goal. Three studies indicated that high (as 
compared to low) cognitive control was related to strategies and outcomes in line 
with the task goal of either accuracy or efficiency in the Beads-in-a-Jar task (i.e., 
Study 2.1, Study 2.2, and Study 3.1). Another three studies conceptually replicated 
the role of cognitive control in goal-directed decision making using a different set of 
goals and another decision task. A new decision making paradigm (i.e., the Project 
Strategy Game) was designed, in which participants could adopt the task goals of 
either optimizing monetary gains or saving the environment. These studies indicated 
that cognitive control, either measured or manipulated, was related to goal-directed 
decision making in the Project Strategy Game (i.e., Study 4.1, Study 4.2, and Study 
4.3). That is, high (as compared to low) cognitive control was related to decision 
strategies and outcomes that were more in line with the instructed task goal. 
A second key question in this dissertation concerned which of the cognitive 
control components is especially involved in goal-directed decision making. Virtually 
all studies described in this dissertation indicated that only updating ability, but not 
inhibition or switching ability, was related to the strategy and, although to a lesser 
extent, outcome measures in line with the task goals, see Table 1. More specifically, in 
most studies (Study 2.2, Study 3.1, Study 4.1, Study 4.2, and Study 4.3) it was found 
that errors on the administered updating task, i.e., the 2-Back task, were related to 
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decision strategies and outcomes in the administered decision tasks. Some studies 
found that reaction times on the 2-Back task predicted goal-directed decision making 
(Study 2.1, Study 3.1, and Study 4.1). Switching ability predicted decision strategies 
in only one of the conducted studies (see Study 4.1) but not in others.  
To provide stronger proof for the relation between updating ability and goal-
directed decision making, we aimed at showing a causal relationship between 
updating ability and decision strategies. For this purpose we induced a memory load 
that presumably tapped into the same processes as needed for engaging in the 
process of updating. The findings indicated that people performed worse in terms of 
decision strategies when a high memory load was induced (Study 4.2). No 
interaction between updating ability and load was found, indicating that the memory 
load was indeed quite high, preventing even people with high updating ability from 
using strategies in line with their goal. However, the findings from Study 4.3 
indicated that, if anything, especially individuals with high updating ability might be 
affected by a memory load. No effect of load was found on the decision outcomes. The 
dissociation between decision strategies and outcomes is discussed in more detail 
later in this chapter.  
This dissertation also aimed to further explore how cognitive control facilitates 
goal pursuit in decision making. We investigated whether individuals with high 
levels of cognitive control, specifically high updating ability, were better able to 
translate abstract goals (i.e., accuracy and efficiency) into concrete action plans (or 
implementation intentions). It was also investigated whether individuals with high 
(as compared to low) updating ability might be better able to adhere to 
implementation intentions. The findings from this dissertation indicated that 
updating ability or other cognitive control abilities were not related to better plan 
quality for attaining a goal (Study 3.1). Thus, individuals with high (versus low) 
levels of updating ability were not better able to translate the task goals into effective 
implementation intentions. However, it was found that people with high (versus 
low) updating ability were better able to adhere to implementation intentions, as 
was reflected in decision strategies that were more in line with the task goal when a 
pre-made plan was provided by the experimenter (Study 3.1). Effects were also 
found for updating ability on decision outcomes in the Beads-in-a-Jar task, although 
these effects were less strong.  
As can be seen in Table 1, only updating ability consistently predicted decision 
strategies and, to a lesser extent, decision outcomes. These results raise the question 
what is so unique about updating ability that it has predictive value for goal-directed 
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decision making. To further test the unique contribution of updating ability to goal-
directed decision making, we investigated whether general cognitive abilities, such 
as fluid intelligence, could explain the findings. It was found that updating ability 
uniquely predicted goal-directed decision making, apart from fluid intelligence 
(Study 4.2).  
To further explore the unique characteristics of updating ability as compared to 
inhibition and switching ability, we closely inspected the cognitive control tasks that 
were adopted in this dissertation (i.e., a 2-Back task, a Stroop task, and a Number 
Switch task). A pupil dynamics approach was adopted, that allowed for measuring 
resource allocation. By investigating when or how people exactly allocate resources 
while in the process of updating we aimed at getting more insight into the predictive 
value of updating ability for goal-directed decision making. 
The findings indicated that resource allocation (as measured by pupil dilation) 
during the 2-Back task was highly related to performance on this task in terms of 
errors (Study 5.1). Resource allocation during the 2-Back task was not related to 
reaction times on the 2-Back task. From this, it may be inferred that performing better 
(i.e., making few errors) on the 2-Back task requires resource allocation each time a 
stimulus is presented. For the Stroop task we found that a higher pupillary Stroop 
effect was related to a higher Stroop effect in reaction times; for the Number Switch 
task we did not find predictors in terms of pupil dilation for overall performance. 
Apparently, performance on these tasks does not depend on consistent resource 
allocation on each single trial. Implications of these findings are described in more 
detail later in this chapter. 
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decision making. To further test the unique contribution of updating ability to goal-
directed decision making, we investigated whether general cognitive abilities, such 
as fluid intelligence, could explain the findings. It was found that updating ability 
uniquely predicted goal-directed decision making, apart from fluid intelligence 
(Study 4.2).  
To further explore the unique characteristics of updating ability as compared to 
inhibition and switching ability, we closely inspected the cognitive control tasks that 
were adopted in this dissertation (i.e., a 2-Back task, a Stroop task, and a Number 
Switch task). A pupil dynamics approach was adopted, that allowed for measuring 
resource allocation. By investigating when or how people exactly allocate resources 
while in the process of updating we aimed at getting more insight into the predictive 
value of updating ability for goal-directed decision making. 
The findings indicated that resource allocation (as measured by pupil dilation) 
during the 2-Back task was highly related to performance on this task in terms of 
errors (Study 5.1). Resource allocation during the 2-Back task was not related to 
reaction times on the 2-Back task. From this, it may be inferred that performing better 
(i.e., making few errors) on the 2-Back task requires resource allocation each time a 
stimulus is presented. For the Stroop task we found that a higher pupillary Stroop 
effect was related to a higher Stroop effect in reaction times; for the Number Switch 
task we did not find predictors in terms of pupil dilation for overall performance. 
Apparently, performance on these tasks does not depend on consistent resource 
allocation on each single trial. Implications of these findings are described in more 
detail later in this chapter. 
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Exploring Alternative Accounts  
One could argue that the reported findings in this dissertation can be explained by 
other individual differences than updating ability, such as those related to fluid 
intelligence or a general intention to achieve or perform well.  
Cognitive control and fluid intelligence are related constructs. Indeed, tasks that 
measure both concepts are often correlated. For example, the n-Back task often 
correlates with fluid intelligence tasks (Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Perrig, & Meier, 2010). 
However, first and foremost, although fluid intelligence was weakly related to 
decision strategies and outcomes in the administered Project Strategy Game in this 
dissertation, fluid intelligence did not account for the relation between updating 
ability and decision strategies and outcomes (see Study 4.2). The finding that the 2-
Back task is not simply a measure of fluid intelligence or some general cognitive 
capacity is supported by a number of other studies. For example, research implies 
that updating ability has a distinct predictive value for performance on decision 
tasks, even after correcting for the predictive value of fluid intelligence (see Del 
Missier, Mäntylä, & Bruine de Bruin, 2012). Moreover, research has shown that 
cognitive control components have a genetic variance that is not inherent to general 
cognitive capacities or intelligence (Friedman et al., 2008). Thus, although general 
cognitive abilities, such as fluid intelligence, probably play a role in decision making, 
they cannot explain the findings in this dissertation.   
One might also claim that the findings in this dissertation are caused by 
individual differences in the intention to perform well or to achieve 1 . Some 
individuals have a general desire to achieve or perform well on any given task 
whereas others do not. This might explain the finding in this dissertation that 
performance on the 2-Back task was related to decision strategies and outcomes in 
the administered decision tasks. Individuals who wanted to perform well on the 2-
Back task also wanted to perform well on the administered decision tasks, explaining 
the correlation between these tasks. The observed correlation between these tasks 
might thus simply be due to the sensitivity of both tasks for individual differences in 
the intention to perform well.  
A number of arguments may be raised against the idea that individual differences 
in the intention to perform well explain the findings in this dissertation. First, an 
explanation in terms of the intention to perform well would imply that all 
administered tasks in the described studies in this dissertation (i.e., the Stroop task, 
                                                 
1 One might also think of the term “motivation” here. However, motivation is a much broader and theoretically 
more complex concept than simply “wanting to perform well” (see e.g., Mizonu et al., 2008).  
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the Number Switch task or the EAST, the 2-Back task and the administered decision 
tasks) were related. This was not the case. Nevertheless, one could claim that 
especially the 2-Back task might tap into the extent to which an individual wants to 
achieve or perform well. In Study 5.1 we indeed observed that participants who 
allocated more resources in the 2-Back task performed better on this task. However, 
research indicates that performance on the n-Back task is not sensitive to monetary 
reward, or reward in the form of academic appreciation (Pochon et al., 2002; see also 
Mizonu et al., 2008). Even when individuals want to perform better on the n-Back 
task as a consequence of rewards, the mere intention to perform better does not lead 
to better performance on this task. Thus, the n-Back task specifically seems to tap into 
a person’s ability to constantly update working memory processes, instead of merely 
the intention to do so. The findings in this dissertation can therefore not be explained 
by individual differences in the intention to achieve or perform well. The finding that 
more resource allocation, as measured by pupil dilation, is related to better 
performance on the 2-Back task (see Study 5.1) is thus more likely to reflect the ability 
to consistently focus on task requirements than the mere intention to perform well.  
In sum, we argue that individual differences in fluid intelligence or the intention 
to achieve or perform well cannot explain the findings in this dissertation. Hence, we 
conclude that the 2-Back task was found to be related to decision strategies and 
outcomes because the 2-Back task taps into a specific ability, namely updating ability. 
Note that we do not claim that individual differences in fluid intelligence or the 
intention to achieve or perform well do not influence the decision making process in 
any way. We merely suggest that updating ability has a unique role in goal-directed 
decision making.  
 
A Unique Role for Updating Ability  
As highlighted above, only updating ability was consistently related to decision 
strategies and, to a lesser extent, decision outcomes in the administered decision 
tasks in this dissertation. Although switching ability was related to decision 
strategies in one of the conducted studies (Study 4.1), the findings concerning this 
cognitive control component were inconsistent. Switching ability might not have had 
a prominent role in the Beads-in-the-Jar task, as there was no need for switching in 
this task. However, in the Project Strategy Game, switching between different 
projects was part of the decision task. The fact that inhibition was not related to the 
strategies and outcome measures can be explained by the fact that there was no need 
for inhibition in the administered decision tasks in this dissertation. Inhibition ability 
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might play a role in decision making when temptations have to be resisted (see e.g., 
Von Hippel & Gonsalkorale, 2005), or irrelevant stimuli have to be ignored. No such 
element was present in the administered decision tasks in this dissertation. In the 
administered decision tasks, a series of decisions had to be made while keeping the 
task goal active in mind. The characteristics of this type of decision tasks might 
therefore especially tap into updating ability.  
Theoretical Implications 
The finding that updating ability plays an important role in goal pursuit in decision 
making becomes more evident when putting this finding in the light of theories such 
as control theory. The basic construct of control theory (Carver & Scheier, 1981) is a 
discrepancy-reducing feedback loop that helps to attain goals. Monitoring of own 
behavior in order to reach a goal is the key component of many theories that 
incorporate the idea of discrepancy between an actual state and a desired end state 
(e.g., Scheier & Carver, 1988; Klein, 1989). More recent studies suggest that this 
monitoring is indeed related to cognitive control. In a cognitive neuroscience review 
on cognitive control and decision making, Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, 
Segalowitz, and Carter (2004) state that “the ability to monitor and compare ongoing 
actions and performance outcomes with internal goals and standards is critical for 
optimizing decision making” (p. 135). Furthermore, neuroimaging studies suggest 
that the lateral prefrontal cortex, an important brain area related to cognitive control, 
is responsible for maintaining representations in an active state until the goal is 
achieved (Miller & Cohen, 2001).  
Although the above findings support the notion that cognitive control is related 
to performance monitoring, research on individual differences in performance 
monitoring is scarce. Some studies do address the role of individual differences in 
goal achievement, such as individual differences in locus of control, self-esteem or 
self-efficacy (see e.g., Kalnbach & Hinsz, 1999).  Research by Converse, Steinhauser, 
and Pathak (2010), for example, shows that people scoring high on conscientiousness 
mobilize more effort when there is a negative discrepancy between goal and 
performance. Conscientiousness is a personality trait believed to be closely related to 
effortful control (see e.g., Kochanska & Knaack, 2003; Rothbart, Ahadi, & Evans, 
2000). This finding might suggest that conscientiousness is also closely related to 
updating ability. However, correlations between conscientiousness and performance 
on the 2-Back task have not been found to be significant (see e.g., DeYoung, 
Shamosh, Green, Braver, & Gray, 2009). The studies described in this dissertation are 
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the first to show the possible role of individual differences in updating ability for 
monitoring goal-performance discrepancies.  
Another line of research provides further insight into the finding that updating 
ability is involved in goal-directed decision making. The finding that updating ability 
facilitates decision strategies in line with a goal corresponds to the idea that constant 
focus on the task goals is needed in order to perform well on a task. This idea is 
captured in the concept of goal activation: the ability to translate task instructions 
into a plan by activating the proper goals and keeping these goals active throughout 
the task (see Duncan, 1995; Duncan, Johnson, Swales & Freer, 1997). The concept of 
goal activation seems to be closely related to the finding that updating ability 
facilitates goal-directed decision making. The ability to activate goals and keep these 
active in mind is also a key component of the decision tasks that were administered 
in the studies described in this dissertation. The goal of the decision task had to be 
kept in mind constantly in order to perform well. That is, each time a decision had to 
be made, the goal had to be active in order for the participant to know what to do 
and how to act. This might explain the predictive role of updating ability in these 
decision tasks. Although Miyake et al. (2000) suggested that this concept of goal 
activation might be a key component in all cognitive control tasks, the findings of 
this dissertation suggest that especially an updating task taps into the concept of goal 
activation.  
Updating Ability and Planning 
The findings in this dissertation concerning implementation intentions indicate that 
updating ability fostered goal-directed decision making when a predefined plan was 
given by the experimenter. That is, only when a concrete plan was given to the 
participant and levels of updating ability were high (as compared to low), goal-
directed decision making was enhanced. This finding suggests that updating ability 
especially serves to keep relevant information about the goal active in mind. It 
should be emphasized that the implementation intention that was given to 
participants in Study 3.1 was still rather abstract. The findings suggest that when the 
task goal instructions provide useful information, but are still rather nonconcrete, 
updating ability might foster goal-directed behavior. On the other hand, when the 
task goal instructions are very abstract and additional information is lacking, 
updating ability might not foster goal-directed behavior. The findings from Study 3.1 
indeed suggest that updating ability does not lead to better plans for goal-directed 
decision making. Thus, updating ability is related to goal activation during the task, 
but not to the ability to translate an abstract goal into a concrete plan. Other 
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might play a role in decision making when temptations have to be resisted (see e.g., 
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individual differences might have played a role in translating abstract goals into 
concrete actions, such as creativity or intelligence. 
Updating Ability and Resource Allocation  
It is emphasized above that updating ability might be closely involved in keeping a 
goal active in mind. The findings from Study 5.1 suggest that consistent focus each 
time a stimulus is presented is indeed predictive of updating performance. In the 2-
Back task, recurrent lapses of focus have consequences not only for the current trial 
but also for following trials, as information from the current trial has to be compared 
to information from following trials. Hence, consistent focus on the task goal is 
required in order to perform well on the 2-Back task. The results from the eye track 
study indeed indicate that people perform better on the 2-Back task, when resources, 
as measured by pupil dilation, are consistently allocated to the stimuli presented in 
the 2-Back task. That is, the pupil dilation that was measured at stimulus onset, as 
compared to pupil dilation prior to stimulus onset, strongly correlated with overall 
performance on the 2-Back task. More specifically, consistent resource allocation was 
related to fewer errors on the 2-Back task, but not to faster reaction times. 
The findings from Study 5.1 provide evidence that especially the 2-Back task is a 
powerful measure for the concept of goal activation, because individual differences 
in resource allocation were strongly related to individual differences in updating 
ability. That is, the 2-Back task seems to tap into the process of consistent focus on the 
task requirements. The findings from Study 5.1 might also explain why especially 
errors, and not reaction times, on the 2-Back task are predictive of goal-directed 
decision making. Consistent resource allocation was found to be related to errors in 
the 2-Back task, but not reaction times. This indicates that consistent focus on the task 
requirements and task goals is better reflected in the errors on the 2-Back task as 
compared to reaction times on the 2-Back task. 
The findings from this dissertation also show the uniqueness of the 2-Back task in 
relation to goal activation or consistently keeping a goal in mind, as consistent 
resource allocation was not a reliable predictor of performance in an inhibition task 
(Stroop task) or switch task (Number Switch task). Please note that we do not claim 
that goal activation does not play a role in other cognitive control tasks. We merely 
point to the relevance and predictive value of the 2-Back task in measuring and 
predicting goal activation in relation to goal-directed behavior. Furthermore, the 
findings from this dissertation support the diversity of the concept of cognitive 
control instead of a unifying framework. That is, the findings support the notion that 
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cognitive control consists of separate and unique sub processes (see also Miyake et 
al., 2000). 
 
Strategies versus Outcomes 
All studies described in this dissertation either indicated that updating ability 
predicted decision strategies in line with the administered task goal, or that reduced 
updating ability (by inducing a memory load) decreased decision strategies, see 
Table 1. The findings concerning decision outcomes are more equivocal. Thus, there 
seems to be a dissociation between decision strategies and decision outcomes.  
One possible explanation for this dissociation is that decision strategy is a more 
proximal measure of goal-directedness in decision making because it refers to the 
decision making process itself. The decision outcome, on the other hand, is the result 
of the decision making process, and is therefore a more distal measure of goal-
directedness in decision making. The decision outcome has other predictors than 
only the decision strategy we measured, such as the speed with which decisions are 
made (Beads-in-a-Jar task), the speed with which people learn the most optimal 
strategy (Project Strategy Game) or the care with which the provided information is 
processed (both decision tasks). These predictors might explain the dissociation 
between decision strategies and decision outcomes.   
The decision making processes investigated in this dissertation consisted of a 
sequence of decisions in which each decision had to be in line with an overarching 
goal. Updating ability is closely related to monitoring current behavior and checking 
it with the desired goal and to keeping a goal active in mind. These processes are 
especially pronounced in the decision making process itself.  This could explain why 
updating ability was found to be more strongly related to decision strategies as 
compared to outcomes.  
Some of the findings concerning decision outcomes deserve some extra 
discussion. In Study 3.1, it was found that performance on the administered 2-Back 
task was marginally significantly related to decision outcomes irrespective of the task 
goals of accuracy and efficiency. This was not in line with the hypothesis, which 
predicted different effects on the outcome measures for different task goals. More 
specifically, it appeared that participants with high levels of updating ability made 
more correct decisions than participants with low levels of updating ability. In Study 
4.2 we found that updating ability, as measured by the 2-Back task, was related to 
decision outcomes irrespective of a memory load manipulation. Thus, although the 
memory load decreased decision strategies, it did not decrease decision outcomes. 
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A possible explanation for these findings is that the administered 2-Back task 
does not only tap into the ability to update new information and keep consistent 
focus on the task goals, but also into the ability to work concentrated, irrespective of 
the task goal. Note that in Study 4.2 it was found that decision strategies were 
affected by the memory load, but decision outcomes were not. We suggest that a 
working memory load taps into the process of keeping a goal active in mind, thereby 
“occupying” this ability. On the other hand, the ability to work concentrated is less 
likely to be affected by a working memory load. Although the 2-Back task taps into 
both processes, the results from Study 4.2 suggest that updating ability is especially 
related to decision strategies, whereas the ability to work concentrated might be 
more related to decision outcomes.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Although the findings from this dissertation underscore the importance of updating 
ability in goal-directed decision making, some limitations should be addressed. First, 
the decision tasks adopted in this dissertation involved a series of decisions that 
required keeping a goal active in mind. This allowed for a predictive role of updating 
ability in these tasks. Nevertheless, most real life decision problems may involve 
multiple aspects that require more than one cognitive control ability. One should 
therefore be cautious concerning the claim that only updating ability predicts goal-
directed decision making. The specific cognitive control components that are 
predictive of goal attainment in decision tasks may vary depending on the 
characteristics of the decision task.  
For example, switching ability might facilitate, as Hoffman, Schmeichel, and 
Baddeley (2012) suggest, the disengagement from short term goals in favor of more 
long term goals. However, another possibility is that switching ability facilitates 
pursuing less natural or habitual goals by disengaging from more natural or habitual 
goals. The latter is supported by the findings in this dissertation, specifically by the 
findings of Study 4.1. This Study indicated that switching ability helped individuals 
to switch to projects that were in favor of (the perhaps less ordinary goal of) 
benefiting the environment, which was needed to attain the (perhaps more natural) 
overarching goal of earning money in the Project Strategy Game. These findings 
suggest that more research is needed to investigate the role of switching ability in 
goal-directed decision making. In a similar reasoning, inhibition ability might play a 
role in inhibiting certain goals in favor of others, especially when these goals are 
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conflicting or are less habitual. Again, future research could shed more light on the 
role of inhibition ability in goal pursuit in decision making.  
Second, the present research only focused on two sets of goals: accuracy versus 
efficiency and earning money versus saving the environment. The findings suggest 
that more control might be needed for some goals (e.g., environment) as compared to 
others (e.g., money). This suggests that the predictive value of updating ability for 
goal-directed decision making might depend on the nature of the goals. Some goals 
might be less natural or habitual than others. Future research could further explore 
whether some goals indeed require more control than others and whether updating 
ability might be especially predictive of goal attainment concerning less natural or 
habitual goals.    
Third, the present research found a positive role of updating ability for decision 
making. Yet, it has to be noted that the positive effects of high levels of cognitive 
control might have its limits, for example when the instructed goal is to rely on 
affective responses, something that might contradict high levels of cognitive 
processing (see e.g., Kahneman, 2011; Norman & Shallice, 1980; Strack & Deutsch, 
2004). Future research could therefore focus on the boundary conditions of the 
positive effect of updating ability, or cognitive control in general, for decision 
making.   
 
A Practical Perspective 
The findings described in this dissertation provide insight into the role of cognitive 
control, specifically updating ability, in goal-directed decision making. It was found 
that updating ability facilitates decision strategies and outcomes in line with a goal. 
In Chapter 2, we described an example of a real life scenario where continuous 
monitoring of the situation in line with a goal is important: a customs officer 
inspecting incoming passengers. Such real life scenarios illustrate the relevance of the 
conducted research for real life decision making in which a series of decisions has to 
be made. But also imagine the mayor who was mentioned in the introductory 
chapter, and who had to monitor ongoing activities and guarantee safety for his or 
her citizens.  
In order to improve the ecological validity of the findings from this dissertation, 
we intended to replicate the finding that updating ability facilitates goal-directed 
decision making with a group of decision makers in the field. For this purpose, a 
study was conducted with a group of Dutch mayors. In the Netherlands, mayors are 
responsible for the safety of a city in case of a larger incident or crisis situation. But 
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study was conducted with a group of Dutch mayors. In the Netherlands, mayors are 
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also in daily life, a mayor is responsible for a wide range of important decisions.  
Furthermore, mayors encounter new situations every day, with varying themes 
about health, safety, education etc. These new situations are very likely to require a 
certain amount of control. Therefore, this group of decision makers is ideal when 
validating the finding that updating ability is involved in goal-directed decision 
making. The findings from Study 4.3 with mayors as participants indeed indicated 
that updating ability is predictive for decision strategies in a group of experienced 
decision makers. Examples of decisions given by the mayors who participated also 
provided useful insight into the practical implications of the role of updating ability 
in goal-directed decision making. For example, it was suggested that “keeping an eye 
on the goal” is crucial, as it is very common to take unnecessary side-paths. For 
example, when a city has to cut down expenses, each decision concerning 
investments in health, safety, or education has to be made with the overarching goal 
of cutting down expenses in mind. The findings from this dissertation provide useful 
insight into the role of cognitive control, specifically updating ability, in goal-directed 
decision making for such a group of experienced decision makers. 
The implication that updating ability plays a role in real life managerial decisions 
calls for a practical approach that explores ways to enhance goal-directedness in such 
decisions. In the following paragraphs, a number of potentially promising directions 
are outlined. Please note that we did not explicitly investigate these practical 
applications as such and that more research is needed to prove their effectiveness 
and/or relevance.   
Avoiding High Workload Situations 
A possible recommendation for decision makers is to protect themselves from high 
workload situations. For example, one could choose to perform tasks serially and not 
in parallel, because the decision making process might suffer from performing more 
than one task at the same time. Additionally, tasks might be re-distributed to other 
individuals involved in the situation, who are not under high workload. Recall the 
engineer in the introduction of this dissertation who worked for a drilling rig. The 
engineer had to stick to a tight deadline and had to save costs. This probably led to a 
perceived high workload. The engineer advised fewer materials than usual and 
things went terribly wrong. It was probably one of the reasons that ultimately led to 
the explosion of the drilling rig. The engineer could have asked for a second opinion 
from someone not that closely involved in the project, who did not experience a high 
workload. Of course, the effectiveness of the above mentioned suggestions relies on a 
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person’s ability to recognize a particular situation as a high workload situation and 
the ability to withdraw from such a situation.  
Using Concrete Action Plans 
The findings from this dissertation suggest that letting decision makers make a plan 
themselves might not be very effective for improving goal-directed decision making. 
It can therefore be suggested that a plan should be used that has already been proven 
to be successful. Such a plan can be formed for example by an expert with a lot of 
situational knowledge. In the case of the drilling rig, a plan could have been created 
where an expert defines what steps should be taken at what time. In fact, check-lists 
including concrete action plans are often used in such situations. Nevertheless, even 
when a successful plan is available, control is needed for a decision maker to 
successfully implement a plan. The findings from this dissertation suggest that 
updating ability is needed to keep relevant information active and accessible. People 
with low updating ability might therefore benefit from writing down the very 
concrete plan that was provided to them and checking at pre-defined moments 
whether their behavior is in line with their plan.  
Training 
One possibility for improving goal-directed decision making might be to train 
people’s updating ability. Some studies indeed show that performance on an 
updating task can be improved by training (see for example Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, 
Jonides, & Perrig, 2008). However, it is yet to be investigated whether this training 
generalizes to performance apart from that on the trained updating task. Although 
Jaeggi et al. (2008) found that training on an updating task generalized to fluid 
intelligence tasks, other research does not replicate these findings (see e.g., Redick et 
al., 2012). In addition, it is yet to be investigated whether training on updating tasks 
also generalizes to goal-directed decision making.   
Another training approach concerns goal-directedness in decision making. For 
example, GMT training (based on the Goal Management Theory, Robertson, 1996) 
consists of a number of stages, such as becoming aware of the goal, planning actions 
and checking current behavior against the goal. This training leads to increased 
performance for patients with brain injuries on simulated real life tasks, such as 
setting up a carpool list (Levine et al., 2007). However, GMT training effects for 
healthy participants are less clear. GMT training might thus be especially useful for 
patients with serious cognitive control problems, but less effective for healthy adults.  
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workload situations. For example, one could choose to perform tasks serially and not 
in parallel, because the decision making process might suffer from performing more 
than one task at the same time. Additionally, tasks might be re-distributed to other 
individuals involved in the situation, who are not under high workload. Recall the 
engineer in the introduction of this dissertation who worked for a drilling rig. The 
engineer had to stick to a tight deadline and had to save costs. This probably led to a 
perceived high workload. The engineer advised fewer materials than usual and 
things went terribly wrong. It was probably one of the reasons that ultimately led to 
the explosion of the drilling rig. The engineer could have asked for a second opinion 
from someone not that closely involved in the project, who did not experience a high 
workload. Of course, the effectiveness of the above mentioned suggestions relies on a 
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person’s ability to recognize a particular situation as a high workload situation and 
the ability to withdraw from such a situation.  
Using Concrete Action Plans 
The findings from this dissertation suggest that letting decision makers make a plan 
themselves might not be very effective for improving goal-directed decision making. 
It can therefore be suggested that a plan should be used that has already been proven 
to be successful. Such a plan can be formed for example by an expert with a lot of 
situational knowledge. In the case of the drilling rig, a plan could have been created 
where an expert defines what steps should be taken at what time. In fact, check-lists 
including concrete action plans are often used in such situations. Nevertheless, even 
when a successful plan is available, control is needed for a decision maker to 
successfully implement a plan. The findings from this dissertation suggest that 
updating ability is needed to keep relevant information active and accessible. People 
with low updating ability might therefore benefit from writing down the very 
concrete plan that was provided to them and checking at pre-defined moments 
whether their behavior is in line with their plan.  
Training 
One possibility for improving goal-directed decision making might be to train 
people’s updating ability. Some studies indeed show that performance on an 
updating task can be improved by training (see for example Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, 
Jonides, & Perrig, 2008). However, it is yet to be investigated whether this training 
generalizes to performance apart from that on the trained updating task. Although 
Jaeggi et al. (2008) found that training on an updating task generalized to fluid 
intelligence tasks, other research does not replicate these findings (see e.g., Redick et 
al., 2012). In addition, it is yet to be investigated whether training on updating tasks 
also generalizes to goal-directed decision making.   
Another training approach concerns goal-directedness in decision making. For 
example, GMT training (based on the Goal Management Theory, Robertson, 1996) 
consists of a number of stages, such as becoming aware of the goal, planning actions 
and checking current behavior against the goal. This training leads to increased 
performance for patients with brain injuries on simulated real life tasks, such as 
setting up a carpool list (Levine et al., 2007). However, GMT training effects for 
healthy participants are less clear. GMT training might thus be especially useful for 
patients with serious cognitive control problems, but less effective for healthy adults.  
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A Decision Support System  
Another approach in enhancing the decision making process is to support the 
decision maker while he or she is in the process of making decisions. The idea of 
supporting a decision maker while in the actual process of making a decision is 
suggested in Rondeel, Kempen, Wijngaards, Nieuwenhuis, and Holland (2009). They 
describe the characteristics and requirements of a software agent that is capable of 
measuring the mental state of a decision maker and, if necessary, intervening in the 
decision making process. In the context of this dissertation, this software agent might 
be able to measure resource allocation in a low intrusive manner while a person is 
performing a task. Measuring resource allocation by the use of pupil dynamics might 
be a possible approach for developing such a system. Consequently, the software 
agent could assess whether the level of resource allocation is sufficient, for example 
by comparing it to the baseline level of that person. Subsequently, the software agent 
could provide feedback about the level of resource allocation of the decision maker 
and thereby create awareness about possible failures in the decision making process. 
Note however that such a decision support system relies on the extent to which the 
environment of the decision maker can be controlled, as pupil dilation can be 
influenced by other factors than resource allocation. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
In this dissertation, the hypothesis was tested that cognitive control fosters decision 
making because it facilitates goal pursuit in decision making. This hypothesis was 
confirmed. The studies described in this dissertation indicate that high (as compared 
to low) cognitive control was related to decision strategies and outcomes in line with 
an instructed task goal. Although previous research showed a relation between 
cognitive control and decision making, the present research is the first to show the 
relationship between cognitive control and decision making as a function of specific 
task goals. The results described in this dissertation indicate the relevance of taking 
goals into account when investigating the influence of cognitive control on decision 
making. The findings also suggest that the well-documented finding that cognitive 
control is related to better decision making can, at least in part, be ascribed to the fact 
that people with high (as compared to low) levels of cognitive control are better able 
to act in line with specific task goals. More specifically, it was found that especially 
the component updating facilitated goal pursuit in decision making. Furthermore, 
the findings show that updating ability might be closely related to keeping a goal 
active in mind, which is especially helpful when a series of decisions has to be made. 
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When the quality of the decision process should be optimized, consistent focus on 
the task goals is crucial.  
Imagine again the mayor from the introduction in this dissertation, who was 
confronted with a large group of people, gathering in the city and disturbing public 
order. Keeping the goal of safety active in mind was crucial for bringing the situation 
to a good end. This dissertation shows that the ability to do this is not self-evident, as 
such situations might involve high workload, for example due to time pressure and 
stress. Moreover, the goal might be too abstract and concrete plans may be lacking. 
This dissertation might increase awareness about the risks of decreased levels of 
cognitive control and might contribute to understanding and optimizing the decision 
making process that people engage in. 
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Veel handelingen in het dagelijkse leven kunnen zonder veel aandacht en nadenken 
adequaat worden uitgevoerd. Denk aan een ritje naar de supermarkt, of het koken 
van rijst. Maar in sommige gevallen moet er meer moeite worden gedaan. Denk 
bijvoorbeeld aan een wegversperring op de route naar de supermarkt, of het 
bereiden van een ingewikkeld recept. In deze gevallen is meer aandacht en moeite 
nodig om tot het gewenste resultaat te komen. Met andere woorden: deze situaties 
vergen meer controle over het eigen gedrag. Deze controle over het gedrag wordt 
ook wel cognitieve controle genoemd en behelst een aantal cognitieve processen die 
in dienst staan van doelgericht gedrag.  
Er zijn drie verschillende componenten van cognitieve controle te onderscheiden: 
updating, inhibitie, en switching. Updating verwijst naar het kunnen monitoren en 
opslaan van nieuwe informatie en het vervangen van oude informatie in het 
werkgeheugen. Inhibitie verwijst naar het kunnen onderdrukken van dominante of 
impulsieve reacties wanneer dat nodig is. Switching verwijst naar het snel kunnen 
wisselen tussen verschillen taken of acties. 
Verschillende onderzoeken laten een positieve relatie zien tussen de mate van 
cognitieve controle van een persoon en diens besluitvorming. Zo leidt een hogere 
cognitieve controle bijvoorbeeld tot meer rationele belissingen, gezondere 
voedselkeuzes, en het vermijden van risico’s. Deze onderzoeken hebben echter niet 
aangetoond waarom een hoge mate van cognitieve controle leidt tot betere 
beslissingen. Dit proefschrift tracht meer inzicht te geven in de positieve relatie 
tussen cognitieve controle en besluitvorming. Hierbij is gekozen voor een invalshoek 
waarbij rekening wordt gehouden met de doelen van de beslisser. Een belangrijk 
uitgangspunt is dat de kwaliteit van een beslissing kan worden afgemeten aan de 
doelen die de beslisser beoogt te bereiken. De voornaamste hypothese van dit 
proefschrift is dan ook dat een hoge mate van cognitieve controle gerelateerd is aan 
goede besluitvorming omdat cognitieve controle mensen in staat stelt doelgericht te 
werk te gaan bij het nemen van beslissingen.  
Daarnaast werd onderzocht hoe cognitieve controle kan leiden tot het beter 
bereiken van doelen in de besluitvorming. Het is bijvoorbeeld mogelijk dat personen 
met een hoge mate van cognitieve controle doelgerichter zijn bij het nemen van 
beslissingen omdat ze goed zijn in het maken van effectieve en concrete plannen om 
die doelen te bereiken. Aan de andere kant is het mogelijk dat personen met een 
hoge mate van cognitieve controle beter in staat zijn om zich te houden aan die 
effectieve en concrete plannen, waardoor zij betere beslissingen nemen.  
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Om meer inzicht te krijgen in de relatie tussen cognitieve controle en besluitvorming 
is er in dit proefschrift gekozen voor een afbakening van het type beslissingen dat 
wordt onderzocht. De focus van dit proefschrift ligt op een bepaald type 
beslissingen: beslissingen die bestaan uit een reeks van kleine beslissingen die 
uiteindelijk tot een overkoepelend doel moeten leiden. Dit type beslissingen vereist 
aandacht en focus, en verschaft tevens uitgebreide informatie over zowel strategieën 
als uitkomsten van de besluitvorming. Twee beslistaken werden ontwikkeld en/of 
aangepast voor het toetsen van de hypothese dat cognitieve controle is gerelateerd 
aan goede besluitvorming omdat cognitieve controle leidt tot doelgerichtheid. Deze 
beslistaken bestaan beide uit een reeks beslissingen met een overkoepelend doel.  
In een aantal studies werd de kralentaak (“Beads-in-a-Jar” taak) afgenomen. In de 
kralentaak kregen proefpersonen kralen te zien die afkomstig waren van één van 
twee vazen gevuld met groene en paarse kralen. Eén vaas was gevuld met 
overwegend paarse kralen, de andere vaas met overwegend groene kralen. Door 
middel van het inspecteren van kralen moesten proefpersonen proberen te 
achterhalen uit welke vaas de getoonde kralen afkomstig waren. Proefpersonen 
bepaalden zelf hoeveel kralen zij inspecteerden voordat zij een keuze maakten voor 
één van de twee vazen. Hoe meer kralen zij inspecteerden, hoe kleiner de kans dat ze 
een foute beslissing maakten. Maar als proefpersonen minder kralen inspecteerden, 
konden zij meer rondes van de kralentaak spelen en daardoor vaker de goede vaas 
kiezen. De kralentaak kon dus met verschillende taakdoelen worden uitgevoerd. In 
de afgenomen studies werd proefpersonen gevraagd om ofwel het doel efficiëntie 
(veel goede beslissingen) of het doel accuraatheid (weinig foute beslissingen) na te 
streven.  
In een aantal andere studies werd de “Project Strategy Game” afgenomen. In deze 
beslistaak moesten proefpersonen kiezen tussen vier verschillende stapels met 
projecten. Met elk project konden zij punten winnen of verliezen in de categorieën 
geld en milieu.  Elke stapel met projecten had andere verwachte uitkomsten in 
termen van winst en verlies in de categorieën geld en milieu. Proefpersonen hadden 
ofwel het doel om zoveel mogelijk punten te behalen in de categorie milieu of in de 
categorie geld. Voorwaarde was dat zij niet failliet mochten gaan. Dat zou gebeuren 
wanneer er na een ronde van het spel in één van de categorieën (ofwel geld of 
milieu) een negatieve score werd behaald.  
Dit proefschrift beschrijft een aantal studies waarin individuele verschillen in 
updating, inhibitie en switching werden gemeten en proefpersonen één van 
bovengenoemde beslistaken uitvoerden. De studies in Hoofstuk 2 en Hoofdstuk 3 
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lieten zien dat een hoge mate van cognitieve controle, meer specifiek een hoge mate 
van updating, gerelateerd was aan strategieën en uitkomsten in lijn met de 
taakdoelen van accuraatheid of efficiëntie in de kralentaak. Dat wil zeggen, naarmate 
proefpersonen beter waren in de updating taak, inspecteerden zij meer kralen en 
maakten minder fouten bij een accuraatheidsdoel. Bij een efficiëntiedoel 
inspecteerden proefpersonen juist minder kralen en maakten meer goede keuzes 
naarmate zij beter presteerden op de updating taak. De resultaten van Studie 4.1 en 
Studie 4.2 (Hoofdstuk 4) bevestigden de rol van cognitieve controle bij doelgerichte 
besluitvorming. Ook hier was voornamelijk de cognitieve controle component 
updating voorspellend voor strategieën en uitkomsten in lijn met een doel. Ditmaal 
ging het om de taakdoelen milieu of geld in de Project Strategy Game. Naarmate 
proefpersonen beter presteerden op de updating taak, waren zij beter in staat om 
succesvolle strategieën toe te passen bij het kiezen tussen de verschillende stapels 
met projecten, en behaalden zij betere uitkomsten in de categorie die als doel was 
gegeven.   
Dit proefschrift laat hiermee zien dat de positieve relatie tussen cognitieve 
controle en besluitvorming kan worden toegeschreven aan een hogere 
doelgerichtheid voor mensen met een hoge mate van cognitieve controle. Zoals 
boven werd aangegeven, was alleen updating (het kunnen monitoren en opslaan van 
informatie) gerelateerd aan strategieën, en in mindere mate aan uitkomsten, in lijn 
met het vooraf gestelde taakdoel in de beslistaak. Inhibitie en switching waren niet of 
nauwelijks gerelateerd aan strategieën of uitkomsten in lijn met het taakdoel. Ook 
werd er bewijs gevonden voor een causaal verband tussen updating en strategieën in 
lijn met een doel. Dit causale verband werd gevonden door updating te manipuleren 
met een mentale werkbelasting. Deze werkbelasting nam als het ware de processen 
in beslag die nodig waren voor updating, waardoor updating processen niet konden 
worden gebruikt voor het nemen van doelgerichte beslissingen. Tenslotte werd 
gevonden dat updating gerelateerd was aan beslisstrategieën, los van de rol van 
vloeibare intelligentie. 
Om de unieke bijdrage van updating voor doelgerichte besluitvorming verder te 
onderzoeken werd een eyetrack studie uitgevoerd (Studie 5.1). Hierin werd de 
grootte van de pupil van proefpersonen gemeten terwijl zij een updating, inhibitie, of 
switching taak uitvoerden. Op deze manier kon de mate van het toedelen van 
energie aan een bepaalde taak worden gemeten. De resultaten van deze eyetrack 
studie laten zien dat proefpersonen die een grotere pupil dilatie (verwijding) hadden 
telkens wanneer een stimulus werd getoond tijdens de updating taak (de 2-Back 
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taak), een betere prestatie op deze taak lieten zien. De consistente pupil dilatie bij 
elke stimulus wijst op een consistente focus op de taak. Voor een inhibitie taak (de 
Stroop taak) en een switching taak (Number Switch taak) bleek een consistente focus 
op de taak minder belangrijk. Bij deze taken werden andere voorspellers voor 
prestatie gevonden.  
De resultaten van de studies in dit proefschrift laten zien dat updating, maar niet 
inhibitie of switching, telkens gerelateerd was aan beslisstrategieën, en in mindere 
mate beslisuitkomsten, in lijn met een vooraf gegeven taakdoel. Deze bevinding is in 
lijn met het idee dat het monitoren van gedrag belangrijk is om doelen te kunnen 
bereiken. Dit laatste is een belangrijk aspect van bijvoorbeeld de “control theory”, 
waarin het monitoren van discrepanties tussen gedrag en doel centraal staat. Ook is 
de bevinding dat updating voorspellend is voor doelgericht gedrag in de 
besluitvorming in lijn met het idee van “doel activatie”. Dit laatste verwijst naar het 
succesvol kunnen toepassen van taakinstructies en het actief houden van een doel 
gedurende een taak. De bevindingen van de eyetrack studie bevestigen het idee dat 
consistente focus op de taak een belangrijk aspect is van updating.  
Wat betreft het maken van plannen, laat het onderzoek in dit proefschrift zien dat 
wanneer plannen concrete en bruikbare informatie bevatten, mensen met een hoge 
mate van updating daarvan profiteren. Er werd gevonden dat mensen met een hoge 
mate van updating beter in staat waren om zich aan concrete plannen (implementatie 
intenties) te houden, maar niet om deze zelf te maken. Dit duidt er wederom op dat 
updating helpt bij het actief houden van relevante informatie in het werkgeheugen. 
Maar hoge updating helpt niet bij het maken van plannen, daarvoor zijn 
waarschijnlijk andere vaardigheden nodig, zoals creativiteit of expertise.  
Om de ecologische validiteit van de bevindingen te vergroten werd één studie 
uitgevoerd met een groep ervaren beslissers: burgemeesters. In het dagelijkse leven is 
een burgemeester verantwoordelijk voor een grote variëteit aan beslissingen op 
verschillende vlakken. De bevindingen laten zien dat ook bij deze groep beslissers de 
mate van updating voorspellend is voor doelgerichtheid in de besluitvorming.  
Dit proefschrift laat zien dat het hebben van controle belangrijk is voor het nemen 
van goede beslissingen, omdat het mensen in staat stelt doelgericht te werk te gaan. 
De bevinding dat cognitieve controle, of eigenlijk updating, voorspellend is voor 
doelgerichte besluitvorming roept om praktische handreikingen om de controle en 
doelgerichtheid in de besluitvorming te bevorderen. Dat kan bijvoorbeeld door het 
vermijden van situaties waarin de werkbelasting hoog is, of door het gebruiken van 
concrete en bruikbare plannen. De bevindingen in dit proefschrift kunnen meer 
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bewustzijn creëren over de rol van cognitieve controle in de besluitvorming en 
daardoor bijdragen aan het optimaliseren van de besluitvorming. 
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Dit proefschrift gaat over beslissingen, doelen en controle. Thema’s die als een rode 
draad in mijn promotieonderzoek verweven zijn geweest. Graag wil ik een aantal 
mensen bedanken. Mensen die mij hebben geholpen doelgericht te blijven en de 
controle te houden, maar ook mensen die mij hebben geholpen om die 
doelgerichtheid en controle soms lekker los te laten.  
 
De eerste groep mensen zijn degenen die mijn intellectuele eigenschappen op 
scherp hebben gezet, mij hebben uitgedaagd en gemotiveerd. Rob, dankzij jouw 
enthousiasme en positieve instelling heb ik menig hobbel tijdens mijn 
promotieonderzoek overwonnen. Jij hebt mijn passie voor onderzoek steeds weer 
aangewakkerd en mij geholpen om positief te blijven. Ad, jij hield mijn geest 
continue scherp en zorgde ervoor dat ik op de juiste momenten de diepte in kon om 
later weer een goed overzicht te krijgen. Je was kritisch, maar hielp mij daardoor een 
betere onderzoeker te worden en dicht bij mijn bevindingen te blijven.  
Masja en Niek, jullie hebben telkens met een frisse blik tegen mijn onderzoek 
aangekeken en hebben mij altijd weer herinnerd aan het belang van de 
toepasbaarheid van mijn onderzoek. Er was ook altijd aandacht voor mijn 
persoonlijke ontwikkeling, die voor mij minstens zo belangrijk is geweest als het 
ontwikkelen van mijn onderzoekskwaliteiten.  
Kees, jou bedank ik graag voor het bieden van de mogelijkheid om een 
promotieonderzoek te doen als onderzoeker bij Thales research & Technology. Het is 
voor mij een bijzondere ervaring geweest om als onderzoeker te proeven van het 
bedrijfsleven en de universitaire wereld. Jimmy, jou wil ik graag bedanken dat je mij 
de gelegenheid hebt gegeven om mijn proefschrift in alle rust af te ronden.  
Ook bedank ik graag een aantal Thales collega’s voor het verlenen van hand-en-
spandiensten: Jeroen, dank voor je programmeerhulp. Thomas, thanks for your die-
hard grammar-check. En ook de vermakelijke ADG bijeenkomsten met Willem, 
Rianne, Masja en Niek mag ik niet overslaan. Ik ben blij dat we deze traditie voort 
gaan zetten! Annemiek, door jou voel ik me helemaal thuis op mijn nieuwe plek 
binnen Thales, bij het Human Factors and Cognition Team. Samen restaurants 
ontdekken in Delft en omgeving is altijd weer een plezier.  
 
Ook bedank ik graag de mensen met wie ik heb samengewerkt de afgelopen 
jaren. In het bijzonder wil ik Henk bedanken voor zijn technische hulp en scherpe 
geest bij de eyetrack studie, maar ook voor de leuke onderzoeksbesprekingen die we 
hebben gehad. Verder wil ik de onderzoeksassistenten en studenten bedanken die 
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mij hebben geholpen bij mijn onderzoek: Melanie Schellekens, Annemijn Loermans, 
Anouck Kluytmans, Willem Sleegers, Michelle Foolen en Lotte van der Zanden. Ook 
bedank ik Ronny voor zijn hulp bij het draaien van experimenten in het lab in 
Nijmegen. Ook wil ik graag alle burgemeesters bedanken voor hun medewerking 
aan mijn onderzoek. Ik vond het een bijzondere ervaring om een inkijkje te krijgen in 
het burgemeesterschap. Ook bedank ik graag Wouter Jong voor zijn hulp bij dit deel 
van mijn onderzoek.  
Ik ben als externe promovenda altijd met plezier naar Nijmegen afgereisd. De 
labgroepbijeenkomsten waren altijd nuttig voor het bespreken van resultaten en 
nieuwe ideeën. In het bijzonder wil ik collega-aio’s Gijs, Lieke, en Annemarie 
bedanken. Ook de Brown Bag Lunches heb ik altijd met veel plezier bijgewoond, 
zowel als toehoorder als spreker. Sanne, onze samenwerking bij In-Mind is voor mij 
een echte hobby geworden. Samen “werken” met jou onder het genot van thee en 
chocola is een feest! Hopelijk blijf je nog een tijdje in Den Bosch wonen. Anne, 
creatieve onderzoekster, mede-buitenpromovenda en oud-kamergenoot, hopelijk 
blijven we nog contact houden nu ik niet meer in Nijmegen werk. Wieteke, dank 
voor de gezellige thee-leut uurtjes wanneer we het allebei even niet (of juist weer 
wel) zagen zitten. Ron, dank voor je nuttige statistiek-opfrissers!  
 
Wie ik niet mag vergeten te bedanken voor het in de gaten houden van mijn 
controle en doelgerichtheid zijn mijn ouders. Mama, papa, jullie stonden altijd achter 
mij en het is fijn om te weten dat jullie trots op mij zijn! Sander, hoewel je het niet zo 
liet merken weet ik ook van jou dat je het stiekem wel stoer vond dat je zus(je) aan 
het promoveren was.  
 
In de ogen van een promovendus staat de relevantie van het eigen onderzoek 
gelijk aan die van de relativiteitstheorie of het oplossen van de derde 
wereldproblematiek. De realiteit is dat de relevantie van je eigen onderzoek vaak nog 
niet in de buurt lijkt te komen van een nieuwe sluiting op een pak Appelsientje. Op 
zo’n momenten heb je mensen nodig die je helpen de controle los te laten en te 
relativeren. Gelukkig heb ik er daarvan een hele hoop om mij heen verzameld in de 
loop der jaren. Kim, stoere advocaat en lieve vriendin. De weekendjes weg met Patty 
en Vanessa zorgen altijd weer voor hilarische momenten. Renske, creatieveling, 
zwem-maatje en mijn steun en toeverlaat in Den Bosch. Saskia, wij hebben elkaar 
echt gevonden als promoverende vriendinnen. Hopelijk blijft dat ook nog zo als we 
allebei dr. voor onze naam hebben staan! Maud en Mariëlla, het bewijs dat ik echt 
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Limburgs bloed heb. En iedereen die heeft bijgedragen aan de onvergetelijke 
weekendjes Ardennen en wintersport vakanties: You put a smile upon my face! Het 
was de perfecte afleiding om mijn controle los te laten.  
Reinout, jij zorgde voor de perfecte balans tijdens mijn promotieonderzoek. Jij 
wist altijd precies wat ik nodig had: loslaten of doorgaan, een avondje weg, een 
avondje samen doorwerken, motiveren, troosten, opbeuren, meedenken. Jij maakt 
me blij, trots en sterk! Ik kan niet wachten om samen met jou de wereld te verkennen. 
178 
 
mij hebben geholpen bij mijn onderzoek: Melanie Schellekens, Annemijn Loermans, 
Anouck Kluytmans, Willem Sleegers, Michelle Foolen en Lotte van der Zanden. Ook 
bedank ik Ronny voor zijn hulp bij het draaien van experimenten in het lab in 
Nijmegen. Ook wil ik graag alle burgemeesters bedanken voor hun medewerking 
aan mijn onderzoek. Ik vond het een bijzondere ervaring om een inkijkje te krijgen in 
het burgemeesterschap. Ook bedank ik graag Wouter Jong voor zijn hulp bij dit deel 
van mijn onderzoek.  
Ik ben als externe promovenda altijd met plezier naar Nijmegen afgereisd. De 
labgroepbijeenkomsten waren altijd nuttig voor het bespreken van resultaten en 
nieuwe ideeën. In het bijzonder wil ik collega-aio’s Gijs, Lieke, en Annemarie 
bedanken. Ook de Brown Bag Lunches heb ik altijd met veel plezier bijgewoond, 
zowel als toehoorder als spreker. Sanne, onze samenwerking bij In-Mind is voor mij 
een echte hobby geworden. Samen “werken” met jou onder het genot van thee en 
chocola is een feest! Hopelijk blijf je nog een tijdje in Den Bosch wonen. Anne, 
creatieve onderzoekster, mede-buitenpromovenda en oud-kamergenoot, hopelijk 
blijven we nog contact houden nu ik niet meer in Nijmegen werk. Wieteke, dank 
voor de gezellige thee-leut uurtjes wanneer we het allebei even niet (of juist weer 
wel) zagen zitten. Ron, dank voor je nuttige statistiek-opfrissers!  
 
Wie ik niet mag vergeten te bedanken voor het in de gaten houden van mijn 
controle en doelgerichtheid zijn mijn ouders. Mama, papa, jullie stonden altijd achter 
mij en het is fijn om te weten dat jullie trots op mij zijn! Sander, hoewel je het niet zo 
liet merken weet ik ook van jou dat je het stiekem wel stoer vond dat je zus(je) aan 
het promoveren was.  
 
In de ogen van een promovendus staat de relevantie van het eigen onderzoek 
gelijk aan die van de relativiteitstheorie of het oplossen van de derde 
wereldproblematiek. De realiteit is dat de relevantie van je eigen onderzoek vaak nog 
niet in de buurt lijkt te komen van een nieuwe sluiting op een pak Appelsientje. Op 
zo’n momenten heb je mensen nodig die je helpen de controle los te laten en te 
relativeren. Gelukkig heb ik er daarvan een hele hoop om mij heen verzameld in de 
loop der jaren. Kim, stoere advocaat en lieve vriendin. De weekendjes weg met Patty 
en Vanessa zorgen altijd weer voor hilarische momenten. Renske, creatieveling, 
zwem-maatje en mijn steun en toeverlaat in Den Bosch. Saskia, wij hebben elkaar 
echt gevonden als promoverende vriendinnen. Hopelijk blijft dat ook nog zo als we 
allebei dr. voor onze naam hebben staan! Maud en Mariëlla, het bewijs dat ik echt 
179 
 
Limburgs bloed heb. En iedereen die heeft bijgedragen aan de onvergetelijke 
weekendjes Ardennen en wintersport vakanties: You put a smile upon my face! Het 
was de perfecte afleiding om mijn controle los te laten.  
Reinout, jij zorgde voor de perfecte balans tijdens mijn promotieonderzoek. Jij 
wist altijd precies wat ik nodig had: loslaten of doorgaan, een avondje weg, een 
avondje samen doorwerken, motiveren, troosten, opbeuren, meedenken. Jij maakt 
me blij, trots en sterk! Ik kan niet wachten om samen met jou de wereld te verkennen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Curriculum Vitae 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Curriculum Vitae 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
183 
 
After completing secondary school (Gymnasium) in 2000, Eefje Wilhelmina Maria 
Rondeel, born in Heerlen in 1982, moved to Maastricht to study Psychology. She 
specialized in both Neuropsychology and Psychopathology. At first, her heart 
belonged to the world of Clinical Psychology, by which she was intrigued after 
reading Joanne Greenberg’s “I Never Promised You a Rose Garden”. But her interest 
in understanding human behavior and a research internship in Toronto in 2004 made 
her sell her soul to research. After obtaining her Master’s degree in Maastricht in 
2005, she started the Research Master Behavioural Science at Radboud University in 
Nijmegen. In the second year of this Research Master, she was hired as a Research 
Scientist at Thales Research & Technology in Delft. She completed her Research 
Master in 2007 with a thesis on the influence of mood on change blindness.  
In 2008 she started a PhD project on cognitive control and decision making, in 
collaboration with Prof. dr. Rob Holland and Prof. dr. Ad van Knippenberg from the 
Behavioural Science Institute in Nijmegen. For this PhD project she conducted a 
number of experimental studies, including an eye track study and a study among 
Dutch mayors. The results of this PhD project are described in this dissertation. Eefje 
is currently part of the Human Factors and Cognition Team at Thales Research & 
Technology as a researcher on human cognitive performance factors. She also 
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